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OUTLINE
This documentation examines the role of the allies of Sparta, in mainland Greece 
during the Peloponnesian war. The whole study is divided into six chapters, each 
one analyzes the contribution of a state or a group of states to the war.
The first chapter deals with the relationship of Corinth with Sparta and Athens 
during the Pentecontaetia, the importance of trade in the west in close connection 
with her colonies, the Athenian intervention in the region, the role of Corinth just 
before the eruption of the war, and finally her military, economic and political 
contribution during the years of the war.
The second chapter concerns the Confederacy of Boeotia, her political system, her 
relations with Athens and Sparta during the years that preceded the war, the role 
of Thebes in Boeotia during the war, as well as the military and political input of 
the Confederacy during the conflict.
The third chapter discusses the city of Megara, its relations with Athens and Sparta 
during the Pentecontaetia, the Megarian Decree, and the role and contribution of 
Megara during the Peloponnesian war.
The fourth chapter deals with the cities of Western Greece, which were allies of 
Sparta during the war, their relations with Sparta and other members o f the alliance 
(e.g Corinth), and their role and policies during the years of the war.
Chapter five is about the cities of Arcadia during the war, their attitude towards 
Sparta before and during the war, and finally their contribution.
Chapter six examines the involvement of Argos in the war and the role that it 
played especially during the years that followed the Peace of Nicias. Although 
Argos was not a member of the Peloponnesian League, I preferred to include it in 
the present work, for it gave me the opportunity to make a clearer analysis on the 
diplomacy that followed the Peace of Nicias, in which many states took part.
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PREFACE
The Peloponnesian war (431-404) was a conflict between the two major leagues in 
Greece, at that time. The Delian league in which Athens was holding the dominant 
position, and the Peloponnesian alliance in which Sparta was the hegemon.
The Delian league consisted © P  most of the Aegean islands and many of the 
coastal cities of Asia minor. Consequently Athens’ power was based on her navy 
which was necessary for her in order to keep her alliance under control.
On the other hand Sparta was the leader of a powerful coalition which was 
composed o? most of the Peloponnesian states, Boeotia, many of the islands of the 
Ionian, as well as of many states of the Western Greece.
Although Athens had the absolute control over the members of her alliance - who 
had to pay a tribute to - the Peloponnesian alliance did not work that way. The 
allies of Sparta were free and independent states and they did not pay any tribute 
to the dominant city of their coalition, Sparta. This means that the allies of Sparta 
had the freedom to follow an independent foreign policy. As we can see in many 
cases the allies of Sparta acted with their own free will without even consulting 
Sparta, (e.g. The Epidamnian affair or the Potidaean affair for Corinth, the 
Heracleia affair for Boeotia, etc.). In the Peloponnesian league every member of 
the alliance had the right to disagree with Sparta, and on the other hand every ally 
was free to bring an affair to Sparta for discussion, or to ask the alliance - as a 
whole - to take further measures if it was required. Naturally those states which
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were more powerful than the others, and consequently more useful allies to Sparta, 
could have more influence on the Spartan assembly and play an important role for 
the Peloponnesian alliance as a whole. Such states were Corinth, Boeotia, and in 
some extend Megara. Those cities were important for Sparta either for their wealth, 
their military strength, or their geographical position, so we have to assume that 
Sparta needed them in order to maintain her position in Peloponnesus. All of these 
cities were at odds with Athens during the years that preceded the war, each one 
for her own reasons, so consequently they were in favour of war, which could stop 
the ambitious Athenians from damaging them. On the other hand there were some 
other members of the Peloponnesian alliance which were in favour of a war^for 
they could have the opportunity to use their allies in order to fulfil their own plans.
The purpose of the present work is to give an analysis of the contribution of the 
allies of Sparta during the Peloponnesian war. I believe that the allies of Sparta 
played an important role !*v the Peloponnesian war and that we can have a better 
understanding of the whole struggle if we examine closer the relations of these 
states with Athens, during the years that preceded the war, as well as their military, 
economic, or political contribution during the years of the conflict. Such an 
examination could help us understand to what ex ten t Sparta was influenced by her 
allies to move to war against Athens, and on the other hand could give us a clearer 
comprehension of the reasons that urged some of the allies of Sparta to follow a 
certain policy towards Athens. I have tried to give a detailed analysis of the 
military contribution of each state during the years of the war as well as their 
internal affairs, their political situation, their economy, and in some cases their 
system of government, and the different problems they were facing in order to 
explain their role and their contribution during the Peloponnesian war as well as the 
reasons that forced them to follow their policies.
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CMIMTO
I. CORINTH 
The Naval Power of Peloponnesus
Corinth was one of the most important allies of Sparta during the Peloponnesian 
war. Her wealth, her fleet, and her diplomacy made the Peloponnesian state one 
of the protagonists of the war. Corinth’s source of power was her navy and 
commerce. Since the 6th century B.C., Corinth had developed a powerful fleet and 
acted as a naval power.
Sparta’s alliance with Corinth originates during the 6th century and according to 
Herodotus, (iii. 4 8 4  ), Sparta and Corinth cooperated for the first time during the 
year 525/4 when a Corinthian army joined a Spartan expedition against Polycrates 
o f Samos.
Sparta, at the end of the 6th century, was trying to impose her hegemony and her 
political views not only in Peloponnesus but also outside of the isthmus. These 
ambitions of Sparta gradually turned to become a threat for the Corinthians, who 
probably wanted to share with the Lacedaemonians the role of the hegemon over 
the other Greek city states. At this time Athens had not yet built her powerful fleet 
and Corinth was one of the few sea powers in Greece. "In the last decade, perhaps 
the last two decades, of the sixth century Corinth was much exercised over the 
danger of too great an extension of Spartan influence. When the two states made 
their original alliance it was an equal one; but Sparta’s numerous allies now gave 
her a pre-eminence which caused concern at Corinth. The procedure adopted by 
the Spartans when they proposed the restoration of Hippias demonstrates that 
Corinth achieved considerable success in limiting Spartan power." (Salmon. Wealthy 
Corinth, p. 249).
The relations between Sparta and Corinth did not change until the end of the 
Persian wars. After the defeat of the Persians, Greece realised that Athens and
4
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Sparta were going to struggle over the hegemony of all Greece. Corinth’s 
alternative was to join one o f them. The Athenian fleet gave no chance to 
Corinthian hopes for a naval superiority.
As I mentioned above, the whole power of Corinth was based in her fleet, and 
her trade was the major source of her wealth. Corinth had turned her attention to 
the Adriatic coasts and to the Ionian sea rather than the busy Aegean.
By the end of the eighth century Corinth had established two important colonies 
in the west. One was Corcyra and the other was Syracuse. Both of them were of 
great importance to Corinth because of their geographical position. Especially 
Corcyra, which was sited in a key location for the voyage to Italy, very soon 
became a necessity to Corinth. Other important colonies of the Corinthians were 
Anactorium, Leucas, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Potidaea, Sollium, Molycreium, and 
Ambracia.
Anactorium and Leukas were founded by the Corinthians during the seventh century 
B. C, but there was a large Corcyraean population in both cities. According to 
Thucydides Anactorium was a common colony between Corcyra and Corinth, (i. 55.
1), and during the fifth century both Corinth and Corcyra had equal rights on the 
city of Leukas after a decision of Themistocles who acted as arbitrator in a dispute 
between the two cities. (Plut. Them. 24. 1).
Around 627 both Epidamnus and Potidaea were founded. "The sites of some 
colonies have encouraged the belief that commercial considerations were involved. 
Ambracia stands near the end of the most important land route northwards to 
Epirus, and Leukas was in a useful position to exploit trade with Macedonia. 
Anactorium, on this view, will have been intended to secure for Ambracia the entry
5
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of her Gulf; while Epidamnus and Apollonia each stood at the Western endaf a not 
unimportant route ihland." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 216). According to 
Salmon, Ambracia was very attractive to the new settlers because of her fertile soil, 
in contrast with Leucas which did not have this advantage.
The close relations of Corinth with her colonies can be deduced by an examination 
of the coins of those cities. "The coins of Ambracia, Leukas, and Anactorium do 
not merely bear a Corinthian type; they are as near as possible identical with the 
coins of Corinth." (Graham. Colony and mother city in Ancient Greece, p. 125). We 
can say that the colonies of Leukas, Anactorium and Ambracia, were somehow 
dependent on Corinth, and the clearest evidence for that is their coinage, which had 
the Corinthian weight standards and pattern.
Most of the Corinthian colonies participated in the Persian wars and sent forces to 
help Greece and their mother city. According to Herodotus, Ambracia sent seven 
ships to Salamis and Leukas three. (Hdt. viii. 45). In the battle of Plataea 
Potidaea sent three hundred hoplites, Ambracia five hundred, Leukas and 
Anactorium eight hundred. (Hdt. ix. 28).
Between 480-435 Corinth secured a real control in the N. W. "... and that control 
depended, not on inherited relations from the time of the foundation of the colonies, 
but ©h continued political and military activity." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 
279). During these years Corinth maintained a close relationship with most of her 
colonies with the exception of Corcyra. Although Corinth’s colonies followed their 
own foreign policy from time to time, and y as Graham points out^they had a 
separate existence from the mother city, Corinth managed to have a political 
supremacy over them. Potidaea^for example^received each year ten magistrates 
(e  m f t  oop^o u s) who held important positions in the city and played an
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important role in Potidaea’s political life. It is very possible that Corinth sent these 
magistrates to Potidaea when the city joined the Athenian League and this alliance 
made Corinth anxious to keep her influence in this remote colony.
The Corinthian influence over the colonies and her efforts for a control of the 
Ionian made Corcyra build a large fleet in order to keep the Corinthians away from 
her. Although Corcyra herself was a colony of Corinth, her geographical position 
and her commerce made the island wealthy enough to seek independence and to 
become an opponent of Corinth in the area of Adriatic. "Corcyra had other 
colonies or shares in colonies, in the Greek north west. She shared with Corinth 
in the colonies of Anactorium, Apollonia, and Leukas, and we have reason to think 
that she made an effort to maintain her influence in them during the fifth century." 
(Kagan. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, p. 208). Corinth on the other hand, 
could not accept these Corcyraean tendencies and the rivalry of the two cities over 
the control of the Ionian; and N. W Greece became more fearful after 480. Of 
course the "terrain" of the clashes between Corcyra and Corinth were the colonies, 
which suffered a lot because of the two opponents.
Leucas which was considered as a jo in t . colony between Corcyra and Corinth, 
became a "Corinthian" city by 435 when the Corinthians managed to eliminate any 
Corcyraean influence in the island. At Anactorium the Corcyraean element was so 
powerful that it forced the Corinthians to capture the city by treachery in 433. 
(Thuc. i. 55). Eight years later the city was recaptured from the Athenians with the 
help of the Corcyraean population which had remained at the city. (Thuc. iv. 49).
During the second half of the fifth century the Corcyraean power and wealth 
became a threat to the Corinthians who saw their hegemony and thalassocracy over 
the Ionian to be in danger. The Epidamnian affair gave Corinth the unique
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opportunity to eliminate Corcyra’s power and to regain her supremacy over N. W 
Greece.
Before I go on with the dispute over Epidamnus I would like to give a summary 
of Corinth’s actions during the "First Peloponnesian War" in order to explain 
Corinth’s attitude and policy towards Athens. According to Thucydides it was the 
alliance between Megara and Athens in 461/0 that became the first cause of the 
Corinthian hatred against the Athenians. (Thuc. i. 103. 4). During these years the 
situation in Greece had started to change and Athens was beginning to build her 
Empire. Athens’ relations with Sparta were at odds and a war was ready to erupt 
at any time. "There was little that Athens could do to harm Sparta directly, as the 
rest of the century shows; Corinth may well have feared (perhaps justly) that Athens 
had determined to harm Sparta through her allies, even before the Megarians made 
their appeal. The Megarian alliance must have seemed all too clear a confirmation 
of Corinth’s fears." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 261-2).
The reason for the conclusion of this alliance, between Megara and Athens, was 
a territorial dispute between the Megarians and the Corinthians. Gomme was right 
to suggest that Corinth risked the stability of the Peloponnesian league and the 
peace of Greece, rather than give up her claim to the land at the borders with 
Megara. (Gomme. H.C.T., i. 104. 1). But on the other hand it was Athens who 
took the initiative to build the Long Walls at Megara and by this action she 
provoked the Corinthians. After all it was not the Corinthians who brought the 
Athenians into Peloponnesus, but the Megarians, who preferred to abandon the 
Peloponnesian league and to call Athens for help. According to Ste. Croix: "We 
cannot doubt that Sparta regarded herself as being at war with Athens from the time 
that Megara deserted the Peloponnesian league and entered into alliance with 
Athens." (De.Ste.Croix. Origins of the Peloponnesian war, p. 188).
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But on this point one question arises: Why did the Spartans and especially the
Corinthians let the Athenians complete the Long Walls from the city of Megara to
the harbour of Nisaea, and did not do anything to stop them? When a similar
incident happened in 419, when an Athenian force under Alcibiades tried to build
a fort at Rhium, the Corinthians responded immediately and finally managed to
destroy the fort. (Thuc. v. 52). Why did they not do the same thing in 461/0? We
know that Megara was of great importance to the Peloponnesians because of her
geographical position, and of course the construction of the Long Walls should have
troubled not only Corinth, but also Sparta, as well as many other States in
Peloponnesus. The only possible explanation for this question is that Corinth and
Sparta were not willing to risk a major war with Athens, and preferred to let
Megara abandon their alliance than to come in an open conflict with Athens. On
% ftll
{vjo-cepvet was^occupied with the helot revolt and naturally could not
prevent the Athenians from constructing the Long Walls. But although the 
Peloponnesians did not respond to this Athenian action, they did not manage to 
prevent the war, for the Athenians took the initiative and made the first assault of 
the First Peloponnesian war when they attacked the city of Halieis. Although the 
Athenian force was defeated by the forces of the Corinthians and the Epidaurians, 
Athens did not retire. The assault at Halieis was followed by a sea battle in 
Cecryphaleia, (Thuc. i. 105), and this time it was Athens who came victorious out 
of the clash. Although Thucydides does not give any details about the 
Peloponnesian ships that took part in the battle we cannot doubt that there w ex€ 
at least some Corinthian ships present in the Peloponnesian fleet, if not many. 
After their victory at Cecryphaleia, the Athenians turned to Aegina, and in the sea- 
battle that followed Athens defeated for a second time the Peloponnesian fleet, 
which suffered heavy losses. The Athenians managed to capture seventy ships, 
(Thuc. i. 105. 2), and we can assume that many of these ships belonged to Corinth.
9
Chapter I —  Corinth
The Peloponnesian counter-attack came immediately after the sea-battle o f Aegina, 
when the Corinthians and their allies invaded the Megarid, thinking that the 
Athenians were not in a position to prevent them, because a large Athenian force 
was in Egypt, and the fleet was in Aegina. (Thuc. i. 105. 3). The Corinthians who 
had underestimated the Athenians power were defeated by a force composed of the 
youngest and oldest Athenian hoplites. When the Corinthian hoplites returned home 
the elder citizens of Corinth insulted them for their retreat and finally persuaded 
them to return into the battle-field. The result of this action was the complete 
defeat of the Corinthian cpn+i^eiot which suffered heavy losses. (Thuc. i. 105. 2- 
106).
When all these operations came to an end the Peloponnesians realised that they 
had been quite unsuccessful, for Megara and Aegina remained under Athenian rule, 
and they had lost too many ships and hoplites. According to Salmon: ’’The 
Spartans are not mentioned by Thucydides in any of these actions, and that must 
mean that they took no part in them; the Corinthians probably undertook temporary 
and informal responsibility for the co-ordination of Peloponnesian action... The 
reason for the Spartan failure to participate in an invasion of the Megarid, which 
must have been planned in advance, can only have been that they believed4o have 
so small a chance of success that they refused to sanction it - or that they had for 
the time being abandoned the war effort altogether because Athenian tenure of the 
Megarid precluded the use of their only weapon, invasion of Attica. Thucydides* 
description of the invading force as "Corinthians with their allies", (i. 105. 3), 
implies that it was under Corinthian command; it seems that Corinth rejected 
Spartan faint-heartedness and organised an invasion with as many willing allies as 
she could find." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 264).
During the year 458 a Peloponnesian army composed of 11,500 hoplites moved
10
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Doris in order to confront the Phokians who had invaded the traditional mother- 
city of Lacedaemonians. On their way home, the Peloponnesians found that an 
Athenian-allied army of 14,000 men strong, tried to block their way. At the battle 
which followed in Tanagra of Boeotia, the Peloponnesians came out victorious 
although they had suffered heavy losses. (Thuc. i. 107-108). Sixty two days later 
an Athenian army attacked Boeotia, and defeated her army at Oenophyta, marking 
with their victory a short period of control over the Boeotian cities. (Thuc. i. 107). 
The Peloponnesian league lost Aegina in 457, and during the same year the 
Corinthians lost Chalcis, and the Athenians concluded their operations with a victory 
over the Sicyonians. (Thuc. i. 108. 5).
During the year 451/0 the Athenians and the Peloponnesians signed the Five Years 
Truce, (Thuc. i. 112. 1), and probably during the same year Argos signed a Peace 
Treaty with Sparta. During 447/6 the Athenians lost control of Boeotia as a result 
of their defeat at Coroneia. (Thuc. i. 113). This defeat was followed by the 
revolts of Euboea and Megara, (Thuc. i. 114), and, although Pericles managed to 
regain the control of Euboea, the revolution of the Megarians - who acted with 
the help of the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians, was successful. In the 
meantime the Peloponnesians moved their army against Attica but finally stopped 
at Eleusis after ravaging her territory. (Thuc. i. 114). The result of all these 
actions was the conclusion of the Thirty Years Peace which marked the end of the 
first Peloponnesian war.
In 440 Samos revolted from Athens and the Spartans found the opportunity to 
interfere in Athenian affairs. They called for a meeting of the members of the 
Peloponnesian alliance and proposed to help the Samians, but they failed to do so 
because of the opposition of the Corinthians. (Thuc. i. 40). According to Salmon: 
"This evidence illuminates Corinthian policy throughout the Pentecontaetia; it proves
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that Corinth was willing, other things being equalxto tolerate Athenian domination 
of the Aegean. Nothing else can explain her failure to take advantage of an 
opportunity that was most unlikely to recur." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 281).
In 436/5 the city of Epidamnus which was suffering from political stasis asked 
Corcyra for help but Corcyra refused the request, (Thuc. i. 24), and the 
Epidamnians turned to the Corinthians who found the case as a perfect opportunity 
to gain control over Epidamnus. Epidamnus was considered as a common colony 
between Corcyra and Corinth, and this share gave the Corinthians the right to offer 
their help to the colony. It is also probable that the Corinthians were aware that 
a major war in Greece was inevitable, so they wanted to take advantage of the 
situation by increasing their influence and power in the area of the Ionian and by 
this way creating a balance over the Athenian superiority in the Aegean sea.
According to Gomme: "It is to be noted that Thucydides, who in his introduction 
is careful to stress political and economic motives, should here mention only 
sentimental ones. One naturally suspects an economic motive, such as rivalry in 
the Adriatic trade, as well as a purely political one - Corinth making another 
attempt to establish her power in the Southern Adriatic and to secure her 
connections with the west. Not that a series of pinpricks, a constant provoking of 
touchy sensibilities, may not be a cause of greater quarrels; and in the course of 
previous conflicts, (cf. 13. 4), Kerkyra had been conquered by Periandros, who sent 
his son to rule it in his name - ... Corinthian economic interests in the west were 
important. Corinth had "imparted the use of her standard of weight to her colonies. 
.. and to the Achaean cities of Magna Graecia" and her money was the principal 
medium of exchange all along theco^steof the Corinthian Gulf and in Italy and 
Sicily, where the largest hoards of her coins have been brought to light." (Gomme. 
H.C.T., i. 25. 3, p. 159). In the meantime the Corinthians were at odds with the
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Corcyraeans because they had shown to their ^ nTf>07T0/hi. According
to Thucydides the Corcyraeans acted this way because they were powerful, rich, and 
they had a strong fleet. (In the beginning of the war the Corcyraeans had almost 
120 triremes). (Thuc. i. 25).
There is no doubt that the o ttfcle i*  of the Corcyraeans annoyed the Corinthians 
who could see that behind this lack o f respect was the growing power of the 
dangerous Corcyraeans as well as their desire to play a role in the Ionian. The first 
action of the Corinthians was to reorganize the old colony of Epidamnus. In order
* y)
to succeed^ that, Corinth sent a unit of Ambraciots, Leucadians and Corinthians to 
Epidamnus and invited everyone who wanted to go there as octtoiv^os  
(Thuc. i. 26. 1). Kagan in the "Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War" is speaking 
of land redistribution and is probably right, for Thucydides says that the Corinthians 
sent new colonists with an equal share, and they declared their city as the 
metropolis of the colony. (Thuc. i. 27).
The Corcyraeans who reacted immediately sent 25 ships to Epidamnus asking the 
Epidamnians to expel the soldiers and the new settlers, and to give permission to 
the oligarchs - who were exiled as a result of the political conflicts in the city 
- to return to Epidamnus. The Epidamnians refused the Corcyraean claims and the 
Corcyraeans started the siege of the city. When the Corinthians learnt about the 
siege of Epidamnus they responded immediately and started to organise their own 
army. The Corinthian allies which contributed to the common fleet were: The 
Megarians with eight ships, the Paleis of Cephallenia with four ships, the 
Epidaurians with five ships, the Hermionians with one ship, the Troizenians with 
two ships, the Leukadians with ten ships, and the Ambraciotes with eight ships. 
The Phleasians and the Thebans sent only money, and the Eleans money and empty 
vessels as well. Corinth herself sent thirty ships, and three thousand hoplites.
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(Thuc. i. 27).
As we can see from Thucydides’ narrative the Spartans were not present in the 
catalogue of the cities who contributed to the Corinthian allied forces. The Spartans 
did not assist Corinth, although the presence of even a small , contingent of hoplites 
and helots could have a positive moral effect on the Corinthian army, and show 
Sparta’s support for this expedition. It is very probable that the Spartans did not 
wish to participate in an operation which could bring Athens in the scene and cause 
a conflict between them and the Athenians. Another explanation is that the 
Lacedaemonians did not consider the Corinthian intervention in Epidamnus as a 
matter of the Peloponnesian league. After all the Corinthians had a powerful fleet, 
a strong economy, many allies who could support them, and friendly colonies in the 
region. Sparta’s policy was to avoid such troubles and the last thing that the 
Lacedaemonians wanted was to corned  a war against Corcyra because of Corinth’s 
ambitions.
When the Corcyraeans were informed about the Corinthian preparations they sent 
an embassy to Corinth demanding that the Corinthians should withdraw their 
garrison as well as their soldiers from the city and at the same time to stop the 
military preparations. On the other hand they offered to the Corinthians the 
solution of £tWcy. , but Corinth refused all the Corcyraean proposals and 
when the negotiations ended, both cities started immediate preparations for war. 
(Thuc. i. 28-29. 1). According to Thucydides the Corcyraean ambassadors to 
Corinth were escorted by Sicyonian and Spartan ambassadors who had come to 
Corinth in order to give a peaceful solution. (Thuc. i. 28. 1). This action of the 
Lacedaemonians shows not only their will to remain neutral, but also their desire 
to maintain peace in the region of the Adriatic, and the only way to succeedThat 
was to persuade Corinth to accept a peaceful solution.
14
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Finally the Corinthians who had seen the war as a perfect opportunity to finish 
with Corcyra once and for all finally rejected all the proposals for a peaceful 
solution and moved against Corcyra.
The result of the Corinthian expedition, during the summer of 435 was the defeat 
of the Corinthian-allied fleet at the sea-battle of Action or Leukimme. The 
Peloponnesians lost fifteen ships in the sea-battle, but even worse for them, 
Epidamnus surrendered to the enemy during the same day. After the battle, the 
Corcyraeans who had now the control of the Ionian sea, sailed against Leukas, a 
settlement of the Corinthians, and burnt the harbour of the Elians at Cyllene as a 
means of revenge, due to their cooperation with Corinth. (More details about the 
Corcyraean raids in the chapter about Western Greece).
The Corinthians of course were not willing to permit the Corcyraeans to have the 
control of the Adriatic and in 434 "they established posts for naval and land forces, 
f e n i ’A ktiY  Kot' ^ P *  To X e i ^ c p i o v  rv>s 0  e6TTpi*>T u>os t in order to
protect Leukas and other friendly states from raids by the Corcyraean squadrons..." 
(Hammond: "Naval operations in the South Channel of Corcyra 435-433 B.C.", J.H.S., 
1945, p. 28). (See also the chapter about Western Greece).
During the two years that followed the sea-battle of Leukimme, Corinth did not 
stop the preparations for a second and more successful attack against Corcyra. 
The Corcyraeans who were alarmed by these preparations sent delegates to Athens 
in order to become members of the Delian league (June 433). The Corcyraeans 
who were not members in any alliance had realised now that only Athens with her 
powerful fleet could offer them some help against the Corinthians. On the other 
hand, the Corinthians^ who were always afraid of an Athenian intervention in the 
Ionian Sea, sent their own ambassadors to Attica in order to prevent the
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Corcyraeans from getting help from Athens. (Thuc. i. 31). Thucydides in i. 32- 
36 gives us the main points of the speech of the Corcyraeans who asked to be 
accepted in the Athenian alliance:
1) Corcyra had a powerful fleet which could be added to the Athenian fleet.
2) The Corcyraeans did not have any doubt that a major war was going to erupt 
between Athens, Sparta and their allies. According to them the Corinthians, who 
had great influence on Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnesian states,, had started 
already preparations for an attack against Corcyra and possibly Athens.
3) It was Corinth who rejected the propositions for a peaceful solution on the 
Epidamnian affair.
4) It was a right of every neutral state to choose her own allies, and Corcyra 
preferred Athens to Sparta.
5) If the Athenians refused the Corcyraean claim then sooner or later Corcyra 
would become an ally of Sparta.
6) Corcyra held a key position in the Ionian^ very useful for anyone who wanted 
to have an access to Sicily or Southern Italy.
This last point was of great importance for the ambitious Athenians who were 
always thinking to kt©<*de*itheir Empire to the West.
When the Corinthian ambassadors came in front of the Athenians they tried to 
reject the Corcyraean points with the following arguments:
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1) The Corcyraeans refused to help Epidamnus and this refusal gave the Corinthians 
the right to intervene.
2) The Corcyraeans were showing disrespect towards their metropolis, Corinth.
3) If Athens was going to accept Corcyra as a member of her alliance then Corinth 
should consider Athens as an enemy.
4) According to the Corinthians the acceptance of the Corcyraeans as allies of the 
Delian league was against the Thirty Years Peace, because according to the treaty 
every neutral city was free to choose her allies during times of peace, and not 
during times of war; and Corcyra had come to Athens in a time of war.
5) The Corinthians reminded the Athenians^ the case of Samos when Corinth 
disagreed with some of her Peloponnesian allies and supported Athens.
6) Finally the Corinthians asked the Athenians to "pay an old debt" and reminded
-toe. ^  cy
them the time that Corinth had lent 20 ships tov  ^ - i - were at war with 
Aegina. (Thuc. i. 37-43).
The final decision of the Athenians was based o irc ity ’s interests and economy. 
'Qtcyt&s. had made a very proposition to the Athenians who were willing
to see the Corcyraean fleet to be added to their own, and finally a defensive, 
alliance was signed between Athens and Corcyra. According to Thucydides the 
reason^ for conclusion of this alliance between Athens and Corcyra were the 
following:
1) The Athenians considered a great war against Sparta as inevitable.
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2) Athens did not wish to abandon the powerful Corcyraean fleet to the hands of 
the Peloponnesians.
3) Athens’ plan was to eliminate the Peloponnesian sea-power. We have to 
remember that the Peloponnesians were somehow powerful only in the Ionian Sea, 
and by signing an alliance with Corcyra Athens could intervene any time in a 
Peloponnesian "territory".
4) The geographical position of Corcyra was of great importance for the Athenians 
who were always interested in Sicily and Italy. Gomme points out that: ..."imports 
from the west were valuable not only to Athens, but to the Peloponnese, which was 
not self supporting, and that in the event of war it would be to the Athenian 
interest to control this trade, and in peace it was a natural imperial interest." 
(Gomme. H.C.T., i. 44. 3, p. 177). When the Corinthian ambassadors left Athens, 
the Athenians sent ten ships in order to help Corcyra with the order "not to make 
the first attack against the Corinthians", because they did not want to break the 
Thirty Years Peace.
According to Gomme: "The date (of the commission of the small fleet) was on or 
shortly after the 13th day of the first prytany of 433-432 B. C. For we have the 
record o f the money paid for the expedition." (Gomme. H.C.T., i. 45. 1, p. 177).
After this, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed against Corcyra for a second time in a two 
years period, and was composed of 90 Corinthian ships, 10 ships from Elis, 12 
ships from Megara, 10 ships from Leukas, 27 ships from Ambracia, and 1 ship 
from Anactorium. (Thuc. i. 46). The Corcyraeans put against them 110 ships. 
The 10 Athenian ships probably sailed behind the Corcyraean fleet. The sea-batde 
took place near the island of Sybota. According to Thucydides the two fleets
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started the battle in the old way, (the Athenians who were using more modem 
techniques and manoeuvres did not take part during the first phase of the battle 
because of the order they had from Athens) and the two opponents had put into 
their ships archers and hoplites. Soon the right wing of the Peloponnesians was 
defeated by twenty Corcyraean ships and fled away, but the left wing of the 
Peloponnesians, which was composed o f  the Corinthians defeated the Corcyraean 
ships who were in front of them. After that, it was the time of the Athenians to 
take part in the battle, but it was too late and at the end the Corinthians came 
victorious out of the conflict. Many of the Corcyraean ships had been destroyed 
by the Corinthian allied fleet which, after the battle, returned to the harbour of 
Sybota and started the preparations for an immediate second attack. Suddenly an 
Athenian squadron of 20 ships appeared on the horizon and the Peloponnesian 
leaders preferred to avoid any conflicts against an unknown number of ships, for 
they could not distinguish the exact number of the enemys* ships, (Thuc. i. 47- 
51), and sailed back home. Finally the two opponents claimed that they were 
victorious. For me it is exactly the opposite. Both of them were losers. The 
Corinthians had failed to punish Corcyra, to take complete control of the Ionianvand 
lost 30 ships; the Corcyraeans, on the other hand, suffered heavy losses - they lost 
almost 70 ships - and 250 Corcyraeans were imprisoned by the Corinthians. 
Thucydides’ account on the events of Epidamnus gives the impression that it was 
Corinth who caused the whole war in the Ionian^ and of course by this action she 
bear a major responsibility for the greater Peloponnesian war that followed. But 
in 435 Corinth was not at odds with Athens but with Corcyra. Until 433 - when 
Athens signed the alliance with Corcyra -^had not any reason to force Sparta to 
take any measures against Athens. As long as she could defend her interests 
without the help of the Peloponnesian alliance, Corinth was not willing to cause a 
major war. Of course the Corinthians knew that an intervention of the Athenians 
in the Ionianv and an alliance between Corcyra and Athens could mean the end of
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their ambitions for the control of the Adriatic sea and coasts, and naturally the only 
alternative solution for the Corinthians was to bring the Spartan military machine 
into the scene. It is very easy to blame the Corinthians as the instigators of the 
Peloponnesian war, for according to Thucydides the dispute over Epidamnus, 
together with the Potidaean affair were the main causes of the war. O f course 
these two cases were some of the causes of the war, but we have to accept that 
Corinth acted the way she acted in order to protect her interests from the ambitious 
Corcyraeans and we have to keep in mind that it was not Corinth who brought the 
Athenians irfa the Ionian but Corcyra. We have also to remember that Corcyra was 
aware of the dangers of the Athenian intervention in the area, but it was the 
Corcyraeans who preferred to risk a major war in Greece in order to succeed her 
plans.
The affair of Epidamnus and the war in the Ionian damaged the relations between 
Athens and Corinth, who then had to face the thalassocracy of Athens.
Only a few months later, both cities (P&& to confront each other, for one more time, 
over the control of the city of Potidaea in Macedonia.
After the battle of Sybota, the Athenians who had suspected that the Corinthians 
were looking for a revenge, demanded from the people of Potidaea in Chalcidice 
the destruction of a part of the Walls, the giving of hostages to Athens, and the 
sending back home of the Corinthian magistrates. As I mentioned before, Potidaea 
was a Corinthian colony, but she was a member of the Delian league as well. 
Naturally the Athenians suspected that the Corinthians could instigate a revolution 
in the city with the help of Perdikkas, King of Macedonia.
During this time, Perdikkas was at war against his brothers, Derdas and Philippos^
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who had asked Athens for help. The Athenians made an alliance with Derdas and 
Philippos and Perdikkas turned to the Lacedaemonians and the Corinthians for 
support. Perdikkas’ plan was to damage the Athenians, and the best way he could 
do that was to help Potidaea to revolt from Athens, and the Corinthians were of 
course the best allies he could choose in order to succeed in that. In the meantime 
he tried to persuade some other cities of Chalcidice to revolt from Athens. (Thuc. 
i. 56).
"Perdikkas had set himself two modest aims: First, to maintain his own rule in
Macedonia, and second, to protect the territorial integrity of his country. When
threatened by Athens in 432, he sought protection from Sparta and Corinth; and
when some years later Spartan influence seemed more menacing, he attached
himself again to Athens, only to ally himself once more with Sparta a couple of
4V\&
years later. His dealings make clear his fear for the survival of Macedonian 
Kingdom, should a major southern Greek power establish itself firmly on his 
frontiers. It is characteristic of him that his policy was a tactical steering through 
the shoals of the conflicting interests of Athens and Sparta. In this way Perdikkas 
became notorious for his unreliability and his disloyalty to allies. (Errington. A 
history o f Macedonia, p. 18).
Perdikkas did not change this policy throughout his reign and he tried to succeed 
in his plans by changing sides several times and trying to choose always the allies 
which could serve best his country.
"Fundamentally, however, Macedonia needed neither Athens nor Sparta, and when 
their dispute posed a threat to Macedonia, which had become involved in the war 
through Athenian actions, not through its own, then no treaty partner could 
reasonably blame Perdikkas for acting in his own interest, as indeed did Athens and
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Sparta themselves." (Errington. A history of Macedonia, p. 18ff).
Soon, the Athenians understood what Perdikkas had in mind, and for this reason 
- as well because of the Corinthian threat - they had taken the above mentioned 
measures against Potidaea.
The Potidaeans sent ambassadors immediately to Athens asking the Athenians not 
to take any severe measures against them. In the meantime they sent another 
embassy to Sparta, which was joined by Corinthian ambassadors as well, asking the 
Lacedaemonians to send troops to their city. (Thuc. i. 58. 1).
Although the Potidaean embassy to Athens failed to change the minds of the 
Athenians, the Spartans promised to invade Attica in a case of a military 
conflict between Athens and Potidaea.
These Lacedaemonian promises had given to the Potidaeans the confidence and the 
high morale they needed in order to revolt from Athens. The first action of the 
Potidaeans was to conclude an alliance with Botti aea and Chalcidice, and when 
they succeeded in that they revolted from the Athenians. In the meantime 
Perdikkas persuaded the Chalcidiceans to destroy their coastal cities and to withdraw 
into the inland city of Olynthus.
When the Athenians arrived at Potidaea, they found out that the city had already 
revolted and that their troops were not sufficient for a siege, so they decided to turn 
against Perdikkas and united their army with the forces of Perdikkas* brothers. 
(Thuc. i. 59).
When the Corinthians realised that they were going to lose Potidaea they decided
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to retaliate. They gathered a force of mercenaries (because they knew that any use 
of Corinthian troops could be characterised as a violation of the Thirty Years Peace) 
which numbered 1,600 hoplites and 400 light-armed troops and sent it to Poddaea 
under the leadership of Aristeus who was a friend of the Potidaeans. These troops 
arrived at Chalcidice 40 days after the revolt of Potidaea. (Thuc. i. 60).
The response of the Athenians to this Corinthian action came almost immediately. 
A force of 2,000 hoplites sailed from Athens to Potidaea in a fleet of 40 ships. 
For the Athenians the loss of Potidaea was more important than the war against 
Perdikkas, and although they were successful in their first operations the Athenians 
found it necessary to sign a peace treaty and to conclude an alliance with Perdikkas 
in order to save Potidaea. Thucydides calls the alliance between Athens and 
Perdikkas " cxV o^ kougw (Thuc. i. 61. 3), for Potidaea was
already in a great danger because Aristeus and his troops were already into the city. 
But almost immediately Perdikkas changed his mind again, and joined once more 
the Potidaean and Peloponnesian forces. (Thuc. i. 62). The Athenians started the 
siege of the city after they came victorious out of the first battle between the two 
armies. (Thuc. i. 63).
The relations between Athens and Corinth had turned from bad to worse. The 
Corinthians were accusing the Athenians for the siege of a city in which there was 
a Peloponnesian army, and the Athenians were accusing the Corinthians for the 
support they provided to a city which had . revolted from Athens. (Thuc. i. 
66).
The next action of the Corinthians was to call a meeting of the Peloponnesian 
alliance in Sparta, in order to persuade their allies to take drastic action against 
the Athenians who had violated the Thirty Years Peace.
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At this conference the Corinthians accused not only the Athenians, for the violation 
of the Thirty Years Peace, but also the Spartans who were not willing to take any 
measures against the ambitious and powerful Athenians. (Thuc. i. 68-70). 
According to the Corinthians the Athenian power and wealth finally W  b^co^a threat 
not only to the Peloponnesian alliance but also to the rest of Hellenic World, and 
the only way to stop Athens was to confront them united under the leadership of 
the Spartans who had to act as the liberators of all Greece.
The following conclusions emerge from the speech of the Corinthians: 1. Their 
relations with Sparta must be very close, and these friendly relations gave the right 
to the Corinthian ambassadors to criticise and blame the Spartan policy. 2. Sparta 
should change her policy towards Athens if she wanted to remain hegemon of 
Peloponnesus. 3. Corinth "represented" at this conference her other allies of the 
Peloponnesian league, and showed the fear of these states towards the rising power 
of Athens. (Thuc. i. 68-71).
The Athenians, who had sent their own delegates to the conference, tried to 
persuade the Spartans to remain calm and not to take any action against them. 
(Thuc. i. 72-73). King Archidamus of Sparta, who was aware of the danger of any 
drastic Peloponnesian action, shared the same views with the Athenians and tried 
to make the rest of the Peloponnesians think of the results of any extreme actions, 
but the Lacedaemonian ephor Sthenelaidas expressed more radical views and 
managed to persuade the Spartans to vote against Athens. (Thuc. i. 80-87).
During the same year (432) a second congress was held in Sparta by the members 
of the Peloponnesian alliance. Here the Corinthians were the protagonists again, 
and the most important points of their speech are the following: 1. The cities on 
the inland area of Peloponnesus had to cooperate with the coastal cities, because 
they were going to depend on them for their supplies in a time of war. 2. They
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repeated for one more time Athens’ treatment towards Corinth, a member of the 
Peloponnesian league. 3. They referred to the building of a new fleet which could 
be compared with the Athenian navy, and could bring the end of the Athenian 
supremacy at sea. This was, of course, just » Corinthian propaganda which was 
aimed to persuade her allies not to be afraid of the Athenian naval forces. 5. 
They proposed the fortification of some in Attica, and their use by the
Peloponnesians, and they introduced their plan to uiiva Athens’ allies over to their 
side, something which could mean the end of the Athenian Empire. (Thuc. i. 119- 
125).
We can see that, according to Thucydides, Sparta was afraid of the growing 
Athenian Empire, and the increase of Athens’ power finally became a threat to the 
Lacedaemonians. (Thuc. i. 24).
Corinth, on the other hand, was one of the many Greek states which was treated 
badly by the Athenians, with the difference that she was an important member of 
a powerful alliance; and had ambitions and plans which were damaged by the 
Athenians. We have to remember that Corinth was not an ordinary ally of the 
Spartans. She was a rich city, with the most powerful navy in the Peloponnese, 
and held a very important geographical position, facing both the Aegean sea, and 
the Adriatic.
"In the first debate at Sparta the Corinthians allow one sentence (68. 4) to Corcyra 
and Potidaea, and devote almost all their speech to the danger caused by Athens’ 
expansion. The Athenian envoys (72-78) and Archidamus (79-85) refer very 
briefly to the o u t iV c and discuss them not at all. Sthenelaidas (86) refers to
TTptfyafc«S
them when he says that Sparta must stand by her allies, but he echoes thev at the 
close (86*-5) when he urges that Athens must not be allowed to increase her
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power." (Andrewes: "Thucydides on the causes of the war.", C.Q.Iiii, 1959, p. 225). 
For the Corinthians the of a conflict between Athens and herself were
of course the intervention of the Athenians in the Corcyraean affair, and the siege 
of Potidaea, an important Corinthian colony. But these oO T m** were not
enough to make Sparta take any drastic measures against Athens, and to bring the 
whole Peloponnesian alliance into a war against the powerful Athenian Empire. 
Corinth knew that the Spartans needed something more than these oUTiou in 
order to move their army against Athens. They were also aware of the fact that 
the Lacedaemonians were suspicious over the growing power of Athens who turned 
to become a threat for the rest of Greece. When they decided to present their case 
at the conference of Sparta they gave emphasis to the following point: That Athens 
threatened not only the other Greeks, but also the members of the Peloponnesian 
alliance, and the best example to prove that was the Athenian behaviour towards 
them. The cases of Potidaea and Corcyra were the best proof that the Athenians 
hold beoo'viedangerous.
On the other hand Sparta knew that Corinth had great importance for their alliance, 
and they did not want to lose her. Corinth used that as political blackmail in order 
to press the Spartans. During the first conference at Sparta the Corinthian 
ambassadors said clearly to the Lacedaemonians that they were ready to abandon 
the Peloponnesian alliance and to seek for other allies, if Sparta continued not to 
pay any attention to their complaints and refused to take any measures against 
Athens. (Thuc. i. 71). Thucydides does not tell us with whom the Corinthians 
could conclude an alliance, but it is probable that they meant Argos, a traditional 
enemy of Sparta, who was always looking for the opportunity to take over the 
hegemony of the Peloponnese. Such an alliance with Argos could mean the end 
of the Spartan power, and the Lacedaemonians were completely aware of that.
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No one denies that Corinth used Sparta, and the Peloponnesian alliance, in order to 
succeed in her plans, but we cannot blame the Corinthians for doing so. Athens, 
with her imperialistic policy, damaged seriously the Corinthian ambitions and forced 
Corinth to take measures against her. (For the chronology of the events of 
Epidamnus and Potidaea see Gomme, H.C.T., vol. 1, pp. 424-25).
The Archidamian war started in the spring of 431 when a Theban force attacked 
the small city of Plataea. (Thuc. ii. 2-6). After this event the Lacedaemonians 
who were afraid of the Athenian supremacy at sea, asked their allied states in Sicily 
to prepare 200 ships, so that the total number of the Peloponnesian fleet was to 
increase to 500 ships. (Thuc. ii. 7-8).
i
I
| Gomme says about the number of the ships: "We cannot imagine that the western
| states would think of sending even 200 ships and scarcely that the Peloponnesians
i
| would ask for as many (they sent 22 in 413); and there were nothing like 300 in
I
| commission among the latter. In 432 the Corinthians and their allies who include
i
I nearly every state that could provide ships for the Peloponnesian league, mustered
| 150, in a great effort. In ii. 66. 1 we hear of a fleet of 100 ships; in iii. 16. 3 of
40; and in viii. 3. 2, from all the cities of the alliances 100 were ordered."
| (Gomme. H.C.T., ii.T -^ .
According to Salmon: "Corinth’s main contribution (in the Archidamian war) was 
at sea: She led the Peloponnesian effort. Thucydides does not give figures which 
enable us to calculate the proportion of Corinthian to other ships in the 
Peloponnesian fleets; but Corinth is named first in the list of Spartan allies at ii. 
9. 3, and she probably provided something like half the total. Her colonies of 
Leukas and Ambracia doubtless took the contribution of Corinth and her colonies 
together to well over a half." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 306). Although the
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Corinthians provided the "back bone" of the Peloponnesian fleet they did not prove 
very efficient against the more skilful Athenians, even in cases where they 
outnumbered heavily the Athenian ships. The Corinthians*who were still fighting 
with the old sea-battle methods, proved to be inferior than their opponents during 
the whole Archidamian war.
"Whatever we make of the speech by Thucydides, the naval actions undertaken by 
the Corinthians during the war demonstrate that they were over-optimistic: they 
had to learn their almost total incapacity by bitter experience." (Salmon. Wealthy 
Corinth, p. 307).
Athens’ first action during the first year of the war was the periplous of the 
Peloponnesus, which aimed to damage the Peloponnesian States, but without taking 
too many risks. (Thuc. ii. 23). The first cities which were captured by the 
Athenians were the tiny Sollium, which belonged to the Corinthians, and Astacus. 
(Thuc. ii. 30). Astacus’ tyrant, Euarchos, who was expelled by the Athenians, 
managed to persuade the Corinthians to put him back in power. The Corinthian 
force which was sent was composed of 40 ships and 1,500 hoplites, and did not 
have any difficulties to regain Astacus. But the Corinthians were not successful 
when they tried to capture some other parts of the Acamanian coast, and they were 
defeated in Cephallenia as well. (Thuc. ii. 33).
From these operations, we can see that Corinth reacted vigorously in order to repair 
the damage that was done by the Athenian periplous, t u t  most of her operations 
were unsuccessful. During the summer of 430 a Peloponnesian fleet of 100 ships, 
under the commands of the Spartan Knemus attacked Zacynthus, and ravaged the 
land, but finally the Peloponnesians failed to bring the island into their alliance. 
(Thuc. ii. 66).
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The Athenians*who were aware of the importance of the Corinthian G ulf to the 
Peloponnesians, sent during the winter of the same year a squadron o f 20 ships 
under Phormio, to Naupactus in order to check the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. 
(Thuc. ii. 69).
During the same year, the besieged city of Potidaea finally surrendered to the 
Athenians, proving that the Corinthians were incapable of confronting the Athenians 
especially during these first two years of the war.
In 429, the Corinthians supported Knemus in his expedition in Acamania after an
Ambracian request for help. The Ambraciotes who wanted to capture the whole
of Acamania persuaded the Spartans to send land and sea forces for help. They
voF
believed that they could capture not only the whole Acamania, but also Zacynthus, 
Kephallenia, and even Naupactus. The Corinthians who wanted to help their settlers 
- the Ambrakiotes - supported the plan and decided to sent a squadron to take part 
in the operation, but their force was not ready yet, when the rest of the 
Peloponnesian fleet was waiting at Leukas. Finally the expedition started without 
the Corinthians and the Sicyonians - who were not ready - but proved to
be very unsuccessful for the Peloponnesians, and their army returned home. (Thuc.
ii. 80-82). (For the expedition of Knemus see also the chapter about Western 
Greece).
When the Corinthian fleet completed its preparations and came out to join the 
itallied fo rces faced the Athenian squadron of Phormio, which was stationed in 
Naupactus. At the sea-battle that followed, Corinth was defeated by the smaller 
fleet of Athens and suffered heavy casualties (12 out of the 47 Corinthian and allied 
ships were captured by the Athenians). (Thuc. ii. 83-84).
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After their defeat, the Corinthians who had now joined the rest of the Peloponnesian 
fleet, started immediate preparations for another sea-battle, thinking that it was a 
great opportunity for them to clear the Corinthian Gulf from the annoying Athenian 
squadron, for they knew that Phormio was badly outnumbered by the 
Peloponnesians. In the meantime, the Athenians decided to send some 
reinforcements to Phormio, but their forces did not manage to be in Naupactus on 
tim o - th e  sea-battle proved to be a disaster for the Peloponnesians, whose fleet 
of 77 ships was defeated by 20 Athenian triremes. (Thuc. ii. 85-92). The victory 
of the Athenians^which show ^for one more time their superiority in naval skills, 
disappointed the Corinthians who had miscalculated the real power of the Athenians 
at sea.
During the next year (428), the Lesbians asked the Lacedaemonians to accept them 
as a member of the Peloponnesian League, although Lesbos was a member of the 
Athenian alliance as well. This revolt of Lesbos was supported by the Boeotians, 
and finally the rest of the Peloponnesian allies accepted Lesbos into their League, 
(Thuc. iii. 2-15), and decided that they should send a force to Lesbos for support. 
This force was sent to the island during the next summer (427), but never managed 
to help the Lesbians, who could not resist the Athenians any more and surrendered. 
(Thuc. iii. 27-29). "Naval incompetence proved a serious impediment to the Spartan 
war effort... when the revolt of Lesbos offered the opportunity to attack Athens 
where she had most to lose, in the Aegean; Corinth was unable to help Sparta to 
exploit it. Geographical factors made it difficult for the Peloponnesians to operate 
in the Aegean. Of Sparta’s naval allies only Corinth and Megara had ports facing 
east. Even the Corinthian vessels which went to helf) Lesbos in 427 sailed from 
Lechaeum round the Peloponnese, not from Cenchreae (iii, 29, 1), and the forty 
ships from the Megarian docks at Nisaea which were used in the abortive attempt 
on the Peiraeus had been out of use for so long that they were no longer
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serviceable." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 311). During the same year the city of 
Plataea surrendered to the Peloponnesians after four years of resistance, (Thuc. iii. 
52), and a civil war broke out in Corcyra. (Thuc. iii. 69).
Corinth, which never forgot the Corcyraeans and was always looking to take control 
of the Adriatic by eliminating Corcyra’s power, found a perfect opportunity to 
succeed with her plans during 427.
"Ever since the battle of Sybota Corinth had held 250 Corcyraean captives... these 
prisoners were now sent back to Corcyra, ostensibly after payment of a large 
ransom, but in fact with the intention of handling the city over to Corinth." 
(Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 313). After a debate in their assembly, the 
Corcyraeans - under the influence of the Pro-Corinthians - decided to remain an 
ally of Athens and at the same time a friend of the Peloponnesians. (Thuc. iii. 70). 
According to Salmon: "This was hardly logical; but it proved that Corcyra felt that 
she still needed the Athenian protection against Corinth. Corcyra felt no special
friendship for Athens: her only recorded action during the war so far was to seni
fifty ships to help the First Athenian Periplous in 431." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, 
p. 313).
According to Salmon, the Corcyraeans wanted to turn neutral again - as they have 
done before 435 - but this time it was very difficult, if not impossible, to do that 
because of the Corinthian threat in the area.
The Corinthians sent to Corcyra their own Ambassadors in order to support their 
Corcyraean friends, but the Pro-Athenian party managed not only to defend its 
policy successfully, but also to impose a heavy fine on five of its opponents.
(Thuc. iii. 70. 3). As a result of this debate, the five Corcyraeans who were
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supported by Corinth used the force of arms against the council, and killed 50 
councillors with the help of their friends and supporters. But this "coup d ’etat" of 
the Pro-Corinthians did not solve any of the problems, but on the contrary, it was 
the beginning of a horrible civil war which ravaged Corcyra for a long time.
Very soon the Pro-Corinthians (or the Oligarchs), who were also supported by a 
Peloponnesian squadron, were defeated, (Thuc. iii. 76-80), and although many of 
them were slaughtered, the rest managed to escape to the mountains which became 
their basis for a guerilla war against their opponents. (Thuc. iii. 81-85). According 
to Salmon: "The nature of the Corinthian scheme is clear enough. Two main 
weapons were to be used by the Corinthian ex-prisoners: fear of enslavement to 
Athens, and oligarchic revolution, which was to be supported by a Peloponnesian 
fleet. It is naive to suppose that the oligarchic revolution was not part of the 
initial plan merely because the first actions were directed towards abrogation of the 
alliance with Athens; there would have been no hope of success if revolutionary 
intentions had been open from the start." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 314).
If the oligarchs, who were supported by Corinth, managed to take over the control 
of the city then the Corinthians could very easily take the control of the Ionian sea 
offering for exchange their support to the Oligarchic government of the city.
On the other hand, Sparta did not seem very cooperative with the Corinthians in the 
case of the Corcyraean civil war, and their presence in the area was more 
symbolical than essential. For Sparta, Corcyra’s civil war was not a matter which 
concerned the whole Peloponnesian alliance although it was of vital importance for 
Corinth. It is probable that Sparta could see that the success of the "coup d ’etat" 
could open Corinth’s way to the west, but after all this served only the Corinthians 
in an area of no strategic importance for Sparta.
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The whole operations in Corcyra lasted until 425 when the oligarchs were finally 
eliminated completely. (Thuc. iv. 46-48). During the year 426 Demosthenes with 
the help of the Acamanians, the Zacynthians, the Cephallenians, and the 
Corcyraeans was going to attack Leucas but changing his original plan the Athenian 
general turned against Aetolia after the strong insistence of the Messenians. (Thuc. 
iii. 94-98). By this action Demosthenes lost the support of the Corcyraeans and the 
Acamanians, who were in favour of an attack against Leukas, and finally was 
defeated by the Aetolians. Before the Athenian attack, the Aetolians had sent for 
help to Corinth and to Sparta and the Spartans decided to send an army, composed 
of different Peloponnesian contingents, under the leadership of Eurylochus. (Thuc.
iii. 100-102).
Eurylochus and his force were not successful on this expedition, and on their way 
back Eurylochus - under the influence of the Ambraciotes - decided to make an 
assault against the Amphilochian Argos, (Thuc. iii. 105-114), but his forces were 
badly defeated by Demosthenes and the Amphilochians, and the whole expedition 
turned to be a disaster for the city of Ambracia. The army of Ambracia was 
destroyed almost completely, and the city herself could be overtaken easily by the 
Athenians who were ready to make an assault. It was their enemies, the 
Acamanians, who saved the Ambraciotes because they were afraid that the 
Athenians could be proved worse neighbours than the defeated Ambraciotes. (More 
details about this expedition of Eurylochus on the chapter about Western Greece).
"This is good (if superfluous) evidence of Athenian relations with Acamania and 
Amphilochia: It was merely an alliance of convenience, encouraged by common 
resistance to Corinthian efforts to secure control of the north-west. In the case of 
minor sites, it was useful for Athens to give them to the Acamanians, for her 
interest was essentially to deny them to Corinth. But Ambracia was neither
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Acamanian nor Amphilochian territory, and Athens might wish to hold such an 
important site for herself; to help Athens to take it would be to encourage too 
positive an Athenian interest." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 317ff).
During 425 the greatest part of the Corinthian fleet was engaged at Pylos, and 
finally was destroyed, (Thuc. iv. 11-24), or captured by the Athenians. (Thuc. iv. 
23); proving for one more time the Corinthian inability to confront Athens at sea.
During the same year the Athenians under the leadership of Nicias, attacked Corinth 
with a fleet of 80 ships, 2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry, with the help of 
contingents from Miletus, Andros and Carystos. The Athenians chose the region 
of Solygeia to land, and by this way they surprised the Corinthians who had 
gathered their army in the area of Isthmus after they had received a warning from 
Argos. When the Corinthians realised what the Athenian plan was, they divided 
their army into three parts, in order to avoid any other surprises, and after an 
obstinate battle they managed to make the Athenians withdraw. The Athenians, 
after their retreat, sailed during the same day to Crommyon and after ravaging its 
territory they left for Epidaurus. (Thuc. iv. 42-45). During the year 423/22 Corinth 
signed, together with Sparta and the other Peloponnesian allies, the One Year Truce.
"Corinth’s part in the Archidamian war was thus merely to suffer; as between 
Corinth and Athens the war was an almost unbroken series of Athenian successes, 
especially in the north west. It was her special claim to influence in this region
fotceA
which hac^Corinth to fight, but the war had all but eradicated her strength here, 
and meanwhile her naval credentials had been exposed for the anachronism they 
were... The Athenian intention according to Thucydides was to "prevent the import 
of com (from Sicily) to the Peloponnese, and to make a preliminary survey to see 
whether it might be possible to bring affairs in Sicily under their control." (iii. 86.
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4). Corinth, one of the major Peloponnesian importers of Sicilian com, was one 
of the main targets, as she was of the blockade at Naupactus but Athenian hopes 
were not fulfilled, and the Peloponnesian com supply was probably little, if at all, 
affected." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 320).
It is very probable that the naval incompetence of the Corinthians - which caused 
many failures to the Peloponnesians - affected the relations between Sparta and 
Corinth, especially for two reasons. Corinth had almost promised an easy victory 
to her allies in order to persuade them to take arms against Athens^ but she failed 
to keep that promise, and even worse the Corinthians had the major responsibility 
for the Spartan failure and humiliation in Sphacteria. However, the Spartans did 
not show their anger straight away, but we can see the Lacedaemonian 
dissatisfaction towards the Corinthians when the Peace Treaty of Nicias was signed 
in 421. (Thuc. v. 18-19).
"Of all Sparta’s allies Corinth was least satisfied with the peace. None of the 
grievances that had led the Corinthians to push the Spartans toward war in 431 
had been removed. Potidaea was firmly in Athenian hands, its citizens, descendants 
of Corinthian colonists, driven from their homes and scattered. The island of 
Corcyra remained allied to Athens, and Megara was intimidated by the Athenian 
garrison at Nisaea. Corinth, moreover, had suffered territorial losses in the 
northwest. Sollium and Anactorium remained in hostile hands, and Corinthian 
influence throughout the entire region had been destroyed. Only the destruction of 
Athenian power would enable Corinth to achieve the restoration of her former 
position, so the Corinthians rejected the Peace and sought to disrupt the diplomatic 
situation that emerged from it." (Kagan. The Peace o f Nicias and the Sicilian 
expedition, p. 24).
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The renewal of the war against Athens was the only solution for the Corinthians 
who worked hard in the field of diplomacy during 421-420. In order to succeed 
that, Corinth who was not satisfied at all with the Peace of Nicias, turned to Argos 
and asked for an alliance. "What motivated the Corinthians to suggest such unusual 
arrangements? The exigencies of diplomacy do not provide an adequate explanation. 
Surely Corinth did not wish to keep her plans secret from the other Greek states 
to which she immediately repaired in the hope of persuading them to join in the 
projected coalition. Nor did she make any attempt to hide her negotiations from 
Sparta for the Spartans were immediately aware of what had occurred. If Corinth 
wanted to form a new alliance why did she not announce her plans openly before 
the Argive people." (Kagan: "Corinthian Diplomacy after the Peace of Nicias.", 
A.J.Ph., 81, 1960). According to Kagan there were two political powers in
Corinth since the 6th century. The Oligarchs (merchants, manufacturers) and the 
Aristocrats (great landowners). The Aristocrats always supported the Spartans u>ko. 
could provide security to their land. Although the .political situation in Corinth 
during 421 was stable and these two political powers co-existed in harmony, the 
Treaty of Nicias changed some things.
The Oligarchs who had suffered a lot from the Athenians decided that the only 
way to avoid economic destruction was to renew the war against Athens at the 
expense of Sparta. Of course the Aristocrats who supported Sparta for their own 
reasons could not accept that, and for this reason they simply chose to keep the 
negotiations secret at least in the beginning.
"When Corinth formally entered the Argive coalition the Chalcidians, bitter enemies 
of Athens, joined at the same moment (31,6) and whenever the Chalcidians are 
mentioned by Thucydides in this period, they appear in close association with the 
Corinthians (30,2; 35,3; 38,1,4) who evidently represented themselves as champions
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of a people betrayed by Sparta and likely soon to be subjected to Athenian attacks." 
(Westlake: "Corinth and the Argive Coalition", A.J.Ph., 1940, p. 417). (More 
details about the Corinthian Diplomacy that followed the Peace Treaty of Nicias in 
the chapter about Argos).
Corinthian foreign policy and diplomacy during 421/0 can be characterised 
as successful^for the Corinthians were the ones who brought Sparta back to the 
offensive, and their intrigues and negotiations with Sparta and other cities made the 
Lacedaemonians understand that their hegemony was in question, and that their own 
existence was threatened by an alliance which could unite the Peloponnesians to 
an enemy front. We can speak of another "political blackmail" of Corinth towards 
Sparta, which finally made the Spartans renew the war.
During the year 420/419 Corinth abandoned her alliance with Argos, Elis, and 
Mantineia, and turned again to Sparta. (Thuc. v. 48). Now the situation has 
changed for one more time. Sparta and Athens were again at odds and the renewal 
of the war was just a matter of time. The Corinthians who knew that, joined 
Sparta and her allies for one more time against Athens. "After her brief and foolish 
flirtation with Argos, Corinth settled down to play, in the land warfare generated 
by the quadruple alliance, the same insignificant role that she had played in the last 
years of the Archidamian war, Thucydides rarely thinks her part worth mention." 
(Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 329).
During the next year (419) Alcibiades with a small Athenian force tried to build a 
fort in Achaea in order to take control of the Corinthian Gulf, but the Corinthians 
with the help of the Sikyonians managed to stop him. (Thuc. v. 52). (For more 
details about this expedition of Alcibiades Seethe chapter about Western Greece).
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Although Alcibiades had failed in Achaea, his campaign in Peloponnesus was not 
over yet. The Argives - who were influenced by Alcibiades - started preparations 
to attack Epidaurus during the same year. The plan of Alcibiades was to keep 
Corinth quiet and to provide a shorter route between Argos and Athens, the capture 
of Epidaurus could offer him both. (Thuc. v. 53).
"The campaigns in Achaea and Epidaurus were two aspects of a plan meant to 
threaten and isolate Corinth. The alliance with Patrae made it easier to interfere 
with Corinth’s trade and communications with the Western colonies. If Epidaurus 
fell, the psychological impact on Corinth would be great. Even though Epidaurus 
was not well situated for launching an attack on Corinth, its fall would threaten the 
Corinthians with attack from two sides and demonstrate that Argos and Athens were 
willing and able to attack and defeat the Peloponnesians states allied to Sparta. 
The next time, with Epidaurus safely in hand, the Argives might march against 
Corinth by the Nemea road while the Athenians landed on the Corinthian coast, as 
Nicias had done in 425. The allies may have hoped that such a threat would force 
the Corinthians out of their alliance with Sparta." (Kagan. The Peace o f Nicias and 
the Sicilian expedition, p. 83).
After many delays the Spartans managed to send a garrison of three hundred 
hoplites to Epidaurus, during the winter of 419. This force came to Epidaurus by 
sea, and it is very probable that the Corinthians provided the vessels for the 
expedition. (Thuc. v. 52-56).
During the next years the Lacedaemonians decided to take more drastic measures 
in order to save Epidaurus. A huge army gathered under the leadership of King 
Agis in order to crush the Argive coalition. Thucydides describes this 
Peloponnesian force as the most splendid army that was ever gathered by Greeks.
38
Chavter I — Corinth
(Thuc. v. 60). The Corinthian contingent which followed the allied army numbered 
two thousand hoplites, a considerable force which shows Corinth’s desire for the 
destruction of the Argive power and the renewal of the war against Athens. 
Unfortunately for the Peloponnesians, this great aimy had to return home without 
having the opportunity to attack the enemy, for King Agis decided to conclude a 
truce with the Argives, without consulting his allies first. For this action Agis was 
condemned not only by the Spartans, who had lost the opportunity for a complete 
destruction of the Argive army, but also by his allies as well, who were ignored by 
the Spartan King. (Thuc. v. 57-60).
Corinth did not take part in the battle of Mantineia that followed during the same 
year and the reason for this absence was that the Corinthians did not have the time 
to prepare their forces, for the Spartans moved suddenly against Argos. (Thuc. v. 
6#7). The Spartans who came victorious out of this battle regained the control of 
Peloponnesus and imposed an oligarchy in Argos. (For more details about the 
victory of the Lacedaemonians, and the events that followed,. See the chapter 
about Argos).
During the years 417-415 Sparta invaded the Argolid twice with all her allies 
except Corinth. (Thuc. v. 83 and vi. 7). "The reason for Corinth’s refusal can 
only be the subject of conjecture. Probably Corinth believed that the Mantineia 
campaign and the subsequent treaty with democratic Argos had settled 
Peloponnesians affairs sufficiently to enable Sparta to resume vigorously the 
offensive war against Athens; she therefore resented diversions in support of Argive 
oligarchs." (Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 330). According to Kagan: "Under the 
Oligarchs, however, Argos had been and always would be merely a Spartan satellite, 
for given their inadequate political base the oligarchs must rely on Spartan support. 
With the Argive threat removed, Sparta’s fear and hence her need of Corinth, would
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diminish as a result Corinth would be less able to manipulate the Peloponnesian 
league for its own purposes." (Kagan. The Peace o f Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, 
p. 142).
When the Athenians invaded Sicily in 415 the Syracusans sent for help to Sparta 
and of course to Corinth who was their mother-city. (Thuc. vi* 73). The 
Corinthians responded immediately to the Syracusan request, for they were anxious 
to do anything which could harm the Athenians, and agreed not only to send help 
to Sicily but also to try to persuade the Spartans to join them. (Thuc. vi. 88. 7- 
8). In the people's assembly that followed in Sparta, the Syracusans, the 
Corinthians and Alcibiades - who had abandoned Athens after he was accused of 
impiety - managed to persuade the Spartans to send the necessary help to Sicily in 
order to help the Syracusans and their allies. (Thuc. vi. 89-93). The 
Lacedaemonians decided to send help to Sicily under the generalship of Gylippus, 
and in the meantime they were planning to fortify Deceleia - in Attica - in order 
to keep the Athenians busy in their own territory. In the meantime Gylippus asked 
the Corinthians to send at once warships to Asine and to prepare the rest of their 
fleet in order to sail to Sicily. (Thuc. v l  93).
During the next Summer (414) Gylippus sailed to Sicily having under his orders 
two Corinthian and two Spartan ships. (Thuc. vi. 104). In the meantime eight 
more Corinthian vessels were at Leucas, waiting for two Leucadian and three 
Ambracian ships to join them. (Thuc. vi. 104). Although Gylippus had been 
persuaded, by false reports, that it was impossible to save Sicily for the Athenians 
had surrounded the city, he decided to try save Italy, and for this reason he sailed 
immediately with four ships in order to see what he could do in order to succeed 
in that.
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When Gylippus arrived in Sicily he discovered that the reports he had received 
were false and that Syracuse was not lost yet. (Thuc. vii. 1). In the meantime the 
Syracusans^who were ready to finish the war with Athens, changed their plans after 
the arrival of the Corinthian Gongylus who brought them the news that the 
reinforcements were on their way to Sicily. (Thuc. vii. 2). The situation now had 
changed, and the Syracusan army came out of the city in order to meet Gylippus 
and the reinforcements. Gylippus* first action was to prevent the Athenians from 
surrounding completely the city of Syracuse, and he was successful in that although 
he lost the first battle. (Thuc. vii. 3-6). In the meantime the twelve remaining 
ships of the Peloponnesians arrived in Sicily, and their crews helped the Syracusans 
to build the rest of their protective Walls. (Thuc. vii. 7). Gylippus, who could see
t
now that the Athenians could be defeated in Sicily, decided to send a word to the 
| Peloponnesians asking for more reinforcements. (Thuc. vii. 7). In the meantime
the Syracusans started to prepare their own fleet. Now the Athenians were on the
f
| defensive and the change of the situation forced Nicias to ask for more
i
| reinforcements from Athens. (Thuc. vii; 8). When the Corinthians and the Spartans
received the news from Gylippus’ envoys they decided to send more forces to 
j Syracuse. (Thuc. vii. 17). The Corinthians used merchant ships to carry the hoplite
| forces to Sicily, and the Spartans did the same. In the meantime Corinth prepared
| twenty five warships in order to attack the Athenian squadron in Naupactus and by
this way to protect the merchant vessels which were going to sail to Sicily. (Thuc. 
vii. 17).
During the next spring (413-412) the Lacedaemonian army invaded Attika under the 
leadership of Agis, and ravaged the land for one more time. But this time the 
Peloponnesians did not withdraw as they had done during the previous invasions, 
instead they build a fort at Deceleia which was sited in an important strategic 
position between Boeotia and Attica. (Thuc. vii. 19). This fort could provide
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asylum to the slaves who could escape from Athens, and on the other hand it was 
a continuous threat to the Athenians whose land was now systematically ravaged 
by the Peloponnesians.
In the meantime the Spartan ships sailed to Sicily with 600 hoplites and after a 
while a Corinthian force of 500 hoplites followed them. Part of the Corinthian 
army was coming from Corinth herself, and the rest were mercenaries from Arcadia. 
The Corinthian plan had worked perfectly for the twenty five ships which sailed 
near Naupactus kept the Athenians quiet and gave time to the reinforcements to sail 
away. (Thuc. vii. 19). During the same time the Athenians sent an additional force 
of 65 ships and 1,200 hoplites to Sicily as reinforcements after an appeal of Nicias. 
(Thuc. vii. 20).
Meanwhile the Corinthian force of the twenty five ships in Naupactus gave a sea- 
battle against the Athenian squadron. Both the opponents claimed the victory, for 
the Athenians managed to sink three enemy ships, and the Corinthians because 
they disabled seven Athenian triremes with the use of a new technical device: 
They had strengthend their prow£. and by this way they rammed the enemy ships 
more easily. (Thuc. vii. 34).
Meanwhile the Athenians back home faced serious problems because of the fort 
of Deceleia; they had lost twenty thousand slaves, their land was completely 
ravaged and for the first time since the beginning of the war they faced serious 
economic problems. (Thuc. vii. 27-28). In the meantime Nicias had lost the 
fortifications of Plemmyrium, (Thuc. vii), and new reinforcements, composed of 
1,500 hoplites, from different cities of Sicily arrived in Syracuse. (Thuc. vii. 32). 
But worst of all, the Athenians had lost the sea-battle of the Great Harbour, in 
which the Corinthians had the opportunity to test, to a greater extent, their new
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technical device. The Syracusan and allied ships, having their prowx strengthened, 
defeated the Athenians after damaging many of the enemy ships. (Thuc. vii. 36- 
41). Although reinforcements arrived from Athens, under the commands of general 
Demosthenes, the Athenians failed to capture Epipolae, (Thuc. vii. 43-45), after 
suffering many casualties. Finally the Athenian fleet was defeated in two 
consecutive sea-battles, (Thuc. vii. 51-54 and vii. 70-71), and their admirable fleet 
was destroyed almost completely.
After these consecutive defeats the Athenians decided to withdraw immediately, 
but during the retreat their army was destroyed by the Sicilians and their allies, 
while their generals were put to death, on the advice of the Corinthians who either 
hated Nicias or were afraid of him. (Thuc. vii. 86).
Although Corinth had sent a force to Sicily in order to help the Syracusans, "the 
victory was almost exclusively Syracusan. The main Corinthian contribution was 
less tangible: encouragement and technical experience; the effects of these factors 
were of varying strength. It was after representations from Corinth had been joined 
by Syracuse and Alcibiades in begging Sparta to act. and in any case Sparta 
probably needed little persuasion beyond that provided by the events themselves." 
(Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 335).
We also have to remember that Corinth managed to prevent the Athenian fleet at 
Naupactus from attacking the Peloponnesian reinforcements who were sailing to 
Sicily. This action together with the technical advice they gave to the Syracusans, 
were the most important Corinthian contributions in the Sicilian war.
Unfortunately we do not have enough evidence for a detailed account o f  the 
Corinthian contribution during the last phase of the war.
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Athens did not attack Corinth during the last stage of the war (413-404), but despite 
their problems the Athenians managed to maintain a small squadron in Naupactus 
in order to "keep an eye" on any Peloponnesian movement in the area. The 
Peloponnesian strategy during this period was to support the revolts of the states 
which were allies to Athens, and by this way to challenge Athens in her Aegean 
territory.
Sparta and her allies were now more confident for their own fleet and - why not? - 
their sea-power. After all they had proved that they could face with success any 
Athenian fleet, as the war of Sicily proved, and with the support of their Sicilian 
allies they had the opportunity to destroy the Athenian "armada".
The Lacedaemonians asked their allies to build more ships, and Corinth built fifteen 
new triremes in order to contribute to the common fleet. (Thuc. viii. 3).
During the year 412/11 the Peloponnesians decided to move to their first serious 
action in the Aegean. The island of Chios was going to revolt from Athens and 
the Spartans with their allies decided to send a force there in order to support 
them. (Thuc. viii. 7-8). The Corinthian delay - because of the Isthmian Games - 
gave the time to the Athenians to prepare themselves and finally the 21 
Peloponnesian ships were defeated by the 37 Athenian, in Speiraeum of Corinthia. 
(Thuc. viii. 10-11). This defeat disappointed the Spartans and their allies, for it 
proved that Athens still had the "upper hand" in the Aegean, and although their 
fleet and their skills at sea had been improved since the beginning of the war, they 
could not confront the Athenians very easily. (Thuc. viii. 11).
Alcibiades - who was now in Sparta as an advisor of the Peloponnesians - 
supported for one more time the mission of a fleet in Ionia in order to help Chios.
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(Thuc. viii. 12). At the end five Lacedaemonian ships sailed to the Aegean under 
the leadership of Chalcideus. In the meantime the Peloponnesian ships, which were 
on their way back home from Sicily, found themselves under an Athenian attack. 
Fortunately for them they managed to escape after losing only one ship, while the 
rest sailed to the friendly harbour of Corinth. (Thuc. viii. 13).
When the Athenians were informed about the plan of the Peloponnesians to help 
Chios they decided to reduce the number of the ships which were blockading the 
Peloponnesian fleet at Speiraeum in order to send a force against the Spartans who 
were sailing to Chios. (Thuc. viii. 15), and by this action they gave the 
Peloponnesians the opportunity to break the blockade and to return with their ships 
back to Corinth. (Thuc. viii. 20).
According to Salmon, Corinth with the addition of the fifteen new ships she was 
ordered to build, could dispose a total number of fifty ships, ..."but it is unlikely 
that Corinth and her Adriatic colonies provided even a third o f  the Peloponnesian 
fleets, much less the half that they had contributed in the Archidamian war." 
(Salmon. Wealthy Corinth, p. 338).
Unfortunately we do not have any details of the Corinthian reductions in the 
number of the ships she contributed in the Ionian war, but it is possible that 
Corinth was not so enthusiastic any more to confront the Athenians. According to 
Salmon, Corinth’s hatred towards Athens had its origins at the Corcyraean affair, 
and of course at the expansionistic policy that Pericles and his followers adopted.
Since 413 Athens abandoned her plans for the control of the Adriatic Sea and after 
her defeat at Sicily, the only thing that Athens could do was to secure the Aegean 
and to keep her allies. Corinth could see that there was not any Athenian threat
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in the region any more, and it is very probable that this fact changed the minds of 
the Corinthians who decided now not to take many chances and risk ships and 
crews in the last phase of the war.
In 404 Athens collapsed completely. After suffering heavy losses the Athenians 
decided to surrender to the Lacedaemonians under very hard conditions. Xenophon, 
(Hell. ii. 2. 19), says that the Corinthians and the Thebans (together with other 
cities) asked the Spartans to destroy Athens completely; but Sparta denied this 
claim, by giving the excuse that Athens had served well Greece at the past, and she 
did not deserve this punishment. Sparta’s plans were to use Athens for her own 
benefits and the Lacedaemonians preferred to control the political scene of the city, 
instead of destroying her.
There are two possible explanations for the Corinthian attitude towards the defeated 
Athens in 404.
The first one is that Corinth had suffered too much in the past thirty years because 
of the Athenians, and now at the end of this costly war it was time to take her 
revenge. It is also probable that Corinth was still afraid of the Athenians, for she 
knew them too well, and the Corinthians might have remembered the years that 
followed the Persian Wars, when the Athenians built an Empire out of the ashes 
that the Persians had left when they retreated. For them, the Athenians were too 
dangerous even when they were defeated, and Corinth was not willing to give them 
another chance.
The second explanation is that the Corinthians preferred to destroy the city of 
Athens than to give the Spartans the chance to exploit her. Although there is no 
evidence of this explanation, it is very probable that the Corinthians could see a
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new Empire coming out of this war, but under the leadership of Sparta this time. 
Corinth was one of the most important (if not the most important) allies of Sparta 
during the Peloponnesian war. Corinth did not act out of friendship or loyalty, for 
she had to lose too much if the Athenians managed to impose their Empire in the 
rest of the Greek world.
Corinth hated the Athenians because Athens was a major threat in an area of vital 
importance for the Corinthians. The alliance of Athens with Corcyra, the policy of 
Pericles in the west, and the Athenian expansionistic plans made Athjens a h a ted  
enemy for Corinth.
The Corinthians used all their means in order to defeat the Athenians. Their 
wealth, their ships, their army, and above all their diplomacy, which proved to be 
the most powerful weapon of Corinth. This diplomacy of Corinth turned the whole 
situation that followed the Peace Treaty of Nicias, and brought Sparta and her 
allies back to the offensive.
During the years of the war Corinth supported Sparta enthusiastically - except tb  
the short period that followed the Peace of Nicias - and contributed too much for 
the benefit of the alliance, but everything she did, she did it for herself. This was 
not a characteristic of Corinth alone, but almost every city which belonged to the 
Peloponnesian alliance acted in the same way. The common enemy was Athens, 
and for them Sparta was the only state which was able to stand against the 
Athenian rising power which represented the threat.
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II. TH E BOEOTIAN FEDERATION
According to Thucydides, (i. 2), Boeotia was among the richest areas in Greece 
because of her very fertile soil. Later on, Boeotia’s wealth grew more as a result 
of her geographical position, and her access to the Aegean and the Adriatic sea.
According to Gomme: "... Boeotia was unique among the Greek lands in having 
a coast well provided with harbours and fronting three seas, open to the west, the 
North, and the East, to Italy, to Sicily, and Carthage, to Macedonia and the Euxine, 
and to Egypt, Cyprus, and the islands;" (Gomme. Essays in Greek History and 
Literature, p. 17).
•
The most powerful and wealthy city of Boeotia was Thebes which managed to be 
the dominant power in the region from archaic times to the times of the 
Macedonian rule over Greece.
"... All the legends of the Boeotian towns suggest that in early times the influence 
of Thebes spread over the whole of the interior of Eastern Boeotia but that it 
stopped short of the coast; and similarly, that Orchomenus ruled over the Western 
plain, but not over the coast towns at its extremities. Theban legend can be traced, 
that is, in Plataea and Tanagra in the south, at Mykalessos, Harma, Glisas, at 
Thespiai and the Sphinx mpqntain in the West." (Gomme. Essays in Greek History 
and Literature, p. 39).
"Thebes was among the palace sites of Mycenean Greece, a city whose past is 
related in the ivories, seals, linear B inscriptions and jewellery of the museum in 
Thebes, as well as the mythological traditions which were given new life in the 
plays of the Athenian tragedians... By the sixth century, however, Thebes appears 
to have become the predominant power in a loose federation of Boeotian cities, and 
to have also become involved in political manouverings beyond the borders of
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Boeotia." (Demand. Thebes in the fifth century, p. 17).
This confederacy of the Boeotians made its earliest appearance during the last 
quarter of the sixth century when Thebes forced the Plataeans to join the 
Federation. (Thuc. iii. 61. 2; Hdt. vi. 108).
After the Persian wars the Boeotians and especially the Thebans suffered from the 
invasions of the Greek allies, as a result of their friendly relations with the enemy. 
It is very probable that the first Boeotian Federation was dissolved during the years 
that followed the Persian Wars or, according to Demand, Thebes lost her hegemony 
over the resrBoeotian cities, and it was Tanagra which emerged for a short period 
as the most powerful city in the region. "In the post-war period, the coinage 
suggests was making a bid for control of the Boeotians. Theban coins from the 
period are few, suggesting a period of economic slow down as well as a slackening 
of Theban predominance in Boeotia. Tanagran coins are more plentiful, and some 
bear a "B", "B - O", or "B - 01", which has been interpreted to imply that Tanagra 
made a counter claim to Boeotian leadership during the relative eclipse of Thebes. 
If this was the case, in 470 we may get a glimpse of Thebes trying to whittle away 
the influence of Tanagra by this service to the people of Delion." (Demand. Thebes 
in the fifth century, p. 27). According to Buck: "The argument is that the Federal 
coins, that is, those with both shield and inscription, were issued at various times 
by Tanagra in the name of all the Boeotians. Therefore at certain times, though not 
all times during this twenty-year period (to explain the occasional presence of local 
Tanagran issues), Tanagra must have claimed the hegemony of Boeotia... However, 
since Thebes had clearly slipped from any pre-eminent position by 460, one could 
position on the basis of the coins an uneasy hegemony sporadically exercised by 
Tanagra, with Thebes attempting to get it back from time to time, but not being 
quite strong enough to do so. (Buck. A History of Boeotia, p. 141-142).
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According to Kraay: ’’Following the Medism of most of the Boeotian League in 
480 Boeotia appears to be in eclipse in the following decades both politically and 
economically. Little coinage can be attributed to these years, and what there is has 
an unusual character. A number of staters, all bearing the usual shield on the 
obverse, have as reverse either the mill-sail used early in the century as a four 
spoke wheel; the legends refer either to Tanagra alone (T or TA) or to Tanagra 
in conjunction with the Boeotians as a whole (BOI). These unusual issues have been 
plausibly regarded as evidence that during the years of Theban eclipse Tanagra 
aspired to the hegemony of "Boeotia", perhaps with Athenian encouragement." 
(Kraay. Archaic and classical Greek coins, p. 11 Off).
During the year 457 an hoplite battle between the Athenians and the 
Lacedaemonians took place in the region of Tanagra. According to Thucydides, (i. 
107-108), the Lacedaemonians had defeated the Phocians who had invaded Doris, 
the traditional mother land of the Spartans. The forces from Peloponnesus were 
composed of 1,500 Lacedaemonian hoplites and 10,000 allied troops. On their way 
back home the Peloponnesians found themselves against the Athenian forces who 
denied them access to their cities. An Athenian fleet was ready to prevent their 
return by sea, and Athenian garrisons guarded the passages on the Gerania 
mountain, so the Peloponnesians decided to stay for a while in Boeotia in order to 
find a safe way for their return. In the meantime, some Athenian oligarchs came 
to the Spartans and&^jlrit their help in order to take power in Athens.
When the Athenian allied forces, composed of 14,000 men, came to confront the 
Peloponnesian army in the region of Tanagra they were defeated and returned home 
after suffering heavy loses. We do not have enough evidence for the Boeotian 
contribution to the Spartan invasion at Doris and to the battle of Tanagra. 
Thucydides implies that the army was composed mainly of Peloponnesians (Thuc.
51
Chapter II  —  Boeotia
i. 107. 1) and Diodorus expressesthe same opinion though more clearly (Diod. xi. 
79. 5). One thing is certain about Boeotia during this period: that she was suffering 
from political stasis. (Thuc. iii. 62. 5 and iv. 92. 6). It is very possible that only 
a few states cooperated with the Spartans, for according to Diodorus Thebes became 
a member of the Peloponnesian league after the campaign of the Lacedaemonians 
at Phokis. (Diod. xi. 81). Sixty two days after the battle of Tanagra, the Athenian 
force invaded Boeotia and defeated her army in the battle of Oenophyta. As a result 
of this battle the territories of Boeotia and Phokis were occupied by Athens, and 
the Walls of Tanagra were destroyed. (Thuc. i. 108).
According to Diodorus, after the Peloponnesian victory at Tanagra, a Theban 
embassy visited Sparta asking the Lacedaemonians to support them in order to make 
Thebes the hegemon of Boeotia for one more time. (Diod. xi. 81). On the other 
hand, Thebes promised to Sparta her assistance in any future invasion against 
Athens. Such a promise was not ignored by the Spartans who started their 
cooperation with the Thebans by helping them to rebuild the Great Walls of their 
city. Unfortunately Diodorus does not give any further details about this 
Lacedaemonian contingent which was sent to Thebes; Su<M<*sif it took part at the 
battle of Oenophyta or not. According to Thucydides, (iii. 62), thetew ere 
political problems in Boeotia which caused the defeat of the Boeotians by the 
Athenians at Oenophyta. As the Boecrtarch Pagondas pointed out in his speech 
before the battle of Delium, (Thuc. iv. 92), the Boeotian state was not united and 
was sufferingft&h civil wars. "Usually the word Stasis means quarrels between rival 
candidates for the Hegemony. The disputes could equally well be between oligarchs 
and democrats, pro-Athenians and pro-Spartans or varying mixture of these." (Buck. 
Boeotia, p. 147).
According to Thucydides, (i. I l l ) ,  the Athenians sent some troops to help Orestes
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the son of the King of Thessaly. Together with the Athenians some Phokaeans and 
some Boeotians took part in the expedition. It is very probable that the Boeotians 
were forced by the Athenians to join them, for the Boeotian cavalry was considered 
among the best in Greece, together with the cavalry forces of Thessaly and Athens, 
and the Athenians could use it in order to minimise the losses of their own cavalry 
force. On the other hand these Boeotians and Phokians who joined the Athenians 
in this expedition could be the friends of democracy and of course of Athens in 
both states and took part in the expedition in order to get more support from 
Athens.
For ten years (457-447) the Athenians controlled Boeotia, but in 447 Athens was 
suffering from widespread unrest within its empire. This is reflected in the tribute 
list for that year, which is the shortest list of the series except for the first year, 
and which records that many States made only partial payments. (Demand. Thebes 
in the fifth century, p. 35). During the same year some Boeotian exiles - probably 
oligarchs who opposed the Athenian policies - managed to occupy the cities of 
Orchomenus and Chaeronia. The Athenians responded, and a force of 1,000 troops 
under the leadership of Tolmides moved to Boeotia in order to stop the unrest. The 
city of Chaeronia was easily captured by the Athenian army who set a garrison to 
protect the city. On their way home the Athenian forces were attacked and defeated 
by the Orchomenian exiles, who acted in cooperation with some exiles from Euboea 
and Locris. As a result of the Boeotian victory over the Athenian army, a peace 
treaty was signed and according to her terms, Athens evacuated the territory of 
Boeotia, giving an end to the Athenian occupation o f the region.
Thucydides does not say if the Athenians tried to occupy or even attack 
Orchomenus after they had captured Chaeronia. Tolmides, the Athenian army leader 
started this expedition in order to destroy the "revolutioners". Why did he stop at
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Chaeronia and did not move against Orchomenus? Of course the expedition was 
not complete when he decided to return to Athens. Even if he had not been 
attacked by the "Orchomenians", he could not be characterised as a winner as long 
as he had left Orchomenus unoccupied. According to Plutarch, (Per. 18. 2), 
Pericles opposed this ill-prepared expedition of Tolmides against Boeotia. It is 
possible that Tolmides decided not to attack Orchomenus, for his troops were not 
well prepared and sufficient for such a conflict and he preferred to secure Chaeronia 
at first, leaving a garrison there, and then to return home, in order to start 
preparations for the second and final assault over Boeotia.
After their victory over the Athenians the Boeotian exiles returned to their cities and 
the o ld  regime was re-established. Athens decided to sign a Peace treaty with 
Boeotia instead of launching another attack. "The Athenians*however, were still 
dangerous. Their army could march into Boeotia as soon as it was ready. The 
Athenians had won many victories over the Boeotians, and the prospect of facing 
them must have been daunting to the Boeotian leaders. The Athenians could rally 
their friends, especially the Plataeans and the Thespians. On the other hand, from 
the Athenian point of view it might be a bloody and expensive business; there were 
the isolated garrisons and the prisoners to consider as well. The Euboeans were 
restless, and with Boeotian help might very well succeed in breaking loose from 
Athens. The Spartans were threatening. Obviously there were ample reasons on both 
sides to negotiate..." (Buck. Boeotia, p. 153). After the defeat and retreat of the 
Athenians, Boeotia re-established her federal government and her political system 
was working as the following:
Citizenship and of course the right to vote depended on a property qualification. 
(Hell. Ox. vi. 2). All those who acquired a sufficient property most probably 
composed the hoplite and cavalry forces. On the other hand, we have to assume
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that all those who composed the light-armed troops did not have the right to vote. 
During the Athenian campaign in Delium, the Boeotian army was composed by
10,000 light-armed troops, 7,000 hoplites and a cavalry force of more than 1,000 
men was present in the operations as well. (Thuc. iv. 93). From the comparison 
of the forces given in this account we have to assume that the majority of the total 
population at Boeoua did not have the right to vote and to act as active citizens. 
From the number of the cavalry force we can also see that there was a significant 
part of the Boeotian population who lived in wealth and prosperity and this part 
composed the aristocratic fraction in Boeotia. "Under this system the. passive or 
disfranchised citizens differed from foreigners in that they possessed the civil rights 
of citizens, and to conclude legal marriages with citizens. For them to become 
active citizens no enfranchisement was needed. All that was needed was the 
acquisition of sufficient property." (Larsen. Greek Federal States, p. 33-34).
The active citizens of each city were divided into four councils. Each of the four
u k s
voted separately and a unanimous agreement of all fourvrequired for taking any 
measures. According to Larsen: Since the members of all four belonged to the same 
social class, this meant little and disagreement between them must have been very 
rare." (Larsen. Greek Federal States, p. 34). The federal government of Boeotia 
was divided into eleven units. In some cases some smaller towns incorporated into 
big cities and shared with them the same representatives. Each of these eleven units 
supplied one Boeotarch and sixty Councillors. The eleven Boeotarchs together with 
the body of the council composed the chief organs of the Boeotian Federal 
Government. (Hell. Ox. vi. 2-3). "Like the city councils, the federal council too 
was divided into four sections, which must have taken turns about conducting 
routine business and submitting its important findings to the other three. This 
federal council or councils had ’complete final authority’ and there was no longer 
^  federal assembly." (Larsen. Greek Federal States, p. 35). It is obvious that in such
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a political system the city which controlled more units controlled the political life 
of the whole Boeotia. For the organisation of the army, each division had to 
provide about one thousand hoplites and one hundred cavalry. (Hell. Ox. xvi. 4). 
The federal council’s meetings were held in Thebes.
During 435 the Thebans supported the Corinthian operations against Corcyra 
because of the Epidamnian affair. According to Thucydides, (i. 27), Thebes provided 
money to Corinth but the Thebans preferred not to send any hoplite forces.
In 431 a force of 300 or more Thebans attacked the small city of Plataea, under 
the commands of two Boeotarchs. The Thebans were invited by a Plataean party 
which wanted to take control of the city. According to Thucydides the Thebans 
were aware of the forthcoming war so they found the opportunity to acquire control 
over Plataea. The plot was well organised and when the Theban contingent arrived 
at Plataea found the gates of the city open and no guards at the Walls. When the 
people of the city gathered in the market place the Thebans invited everyone to join 
them instead of giving the power straightaway to the f action that had invited them. 
But very soon the people realised that the Theban force was not of great 
importance, for in the beginning they had miscalculated them, and finally decided 
to attack the invaders. (Thuc. ii. 2-3). The Plataean counter attack4ook by surprise 
the Thebans who suddenly found themselves in a very difficult situation. During this 
ferocious conflict many of the Thebans were slaughtered in their efforts to escape 
from the town. When the Thebans decided to surrender only 180 of them were still 
alive. According to Thucydides the Theban force which entered the city was just 
the advance guard of the entire Theban army which was following them. But the 
stormy night had prevented the main body of the Thebans ivj arrivlwjat Plataea on
i
time. The only thing that the Thebans could do , iv> * the 4 . situation was to
seize as hostages the Plataean farmers who were still out of the Walls of the city,
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(Thuc. ii. 4-5), but finally the Plataeans managed to save their fellow citizens and 
killed in cold blood the 180 Theban captives. (Thuc. ii. 5). Immediately after the 
incident Athens sent guards to Plataea and helped the city to get prepared for a 
siege. (Thuc. ii. 6). "The attack of Plataea had clearly broken the peace, and when 
word of it reached the Peloponnese the Spartans ordered their allies to send two- 
thirds of their fighting force to gather at the isthmus of Corinth for the invasion of 
Attica." (Kagan. The Archidamian War, p. 48).
This night of 431 marked the beginning of the inevitable war, and during the 
twenty seven years that followed, the Greek world was shocked by a devastating 
clash. But why Thebes which opened the hostilities? The Thebans probably
tried to take advantage of the situation. They were aware that their allies were 
going to invade the territory of Attica during the summer and they were thinking 
that Athens could not retaliate very easily against them, in the case that they had 
managed to capture Plataea, for very soon the Peloponnesian army was going to 
invade the Athenian land. On the other hand Plataea's geographical position, 
between Athens and Boeotia, was of great importance for the Thebans, who knew 
that they could not start any military operations against Athens leaving the 
enemy city of Plataea behind them. We also have to remember that Thebes always 
wanted to take control of Plataea, for her own political reasons (to increase her 
power into the federal council), since 519 when Plataea became an ally of Athens. 
For all these reasons the capture of Plataea before the beginning of the operations 
was considered as necessary from the Theban point of view.
The Boeotians entered the Peloponnesian war with a defeat but there was a long 
way in front of them for the next twenty seven years. During the first invasion of 
Attica Boeotia sent a contingent of hoplites, (Thuc. ii. 18), and a cavalry force, 
(Thuc. ii. 22), to join the army of the allies. Archidamos, the commander of the
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Peloponnesian army cho >se the Oinoe route, sited between Athens and Boeotia, in 
order to enter the Attican territory^ because he wanted to get in touch with the 
Boeotians first. The Boeotians sent a part of their army together with Archidamus 
and with the rest of their forces attacked Plataea devastating her country side and 
starting preparations for a siege. (Thuc. ii. 12). According to Gomme, (H.C.T., ii. 
102), the Boeotians did not necessarily send the two thirds of their hoplite forces 
to the campaign against Attica, «^5 the other allies did, for they could make an 
agreement to send less forces since they had to send an army4o Plataea as well.
Thucydides does not give any information about the Boeotian contribution during 
the second year of the war,but it is probable that the Boeotians sent a contingent 
to join the Peloponnesian allies when they invaded Attica in 430.
During 429 the Peloponnesian army turned against Plataea and invaded her territory 
instead of invading the Attican land because of the plague in Athens. (Thuc. ii. 
71). The Plataeans tried unsuccessfully/to persuade Archidamos to leave them in 
peace, for according to them Plataea was not an enemy of Sparta, and it was 
Thebes which had caused the whole affair. After long negotiations the 
Peloponnesian army started the siege of Plataea. (Thuc. ii. 71-74). Although the 
Peloponnesians tried many different methods in order to capture the city, their 
efforts proved unsuccessful and finally they returned home leaving behind them a 
force sufficient enough to keep the Plataeans busy. (Thuc. ii. 75-78). The attack 
ob  Plataea was merely a plan of the Thebans who wanted to take revenge for their 
hoplites who were slaughtered by the Plataeans. On the other hand, the 
Lacedaemonians were aware of the strategic importance of Plataea, and for them 
the small city could become their target after they had to avoid the Attican territory 
because of the plague. Kagan gives another reason: "... The Spartans accepted the 
Theban proposal... because of the need to placate the Thebans. In the Spartan
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alliance, the leader could not dictate to the other members. A state like Thebes was 
largely independent and could not be counted upon to obey Spartan orders or 
execute Spartan policy unless it wanted to. The attack on Plataea may have been 
the price Sparta paid for continued Theban support." (Kagan. The Archidamian war, 
p. 103).
In the year 428 the Boeotians were involved in the plans of the Mytileneans for 
an uprising against Athens. (Thuc. iii. 2). According to Thucydides the 
Mytileneans were of the same origin with the Boeotians (Aeolifuis). The 
Mytilenean embassy came to the Peloponnesian allies after a Boeotian invitation and 
asked them for their assistance. (Thuc. iii. 13). Finally Lesbos was accepted as 
a member of the Peloponnesian alliance and the Lacedaemonians decided to invade 
Attica immediately in order to keep the Athenians busy, and give the time to 
Lesbos to prepare her revolt. Unfortunately the Peloponnesian plan failed and 
Mytilene finally surrendered to Athens during 427/6. (Thuc. iii. 27). During the 
same year (428) half of the Plataeans who were surrounded in the city by the 
Peloponnesian forces, managed to escape to Athens in an effort to avoid the 
destruction which was coming. (Thuc. iii. 20-24).
The next year the Plataean and Athenian soldiers who were in Plataea were forced 
to surrender to the Lacedaemonians. Five judges arrived from Sparta to Plataea in 
order to give a trial to the prisoners. The Plataeans after a long apology, in which 
they blamed Thebes for their situation, appealed for mercy. (Thuc. iii. 53-60). The 
Thebans who were afraid that the speech of the Plataeans might soften the Spartans 
gave their own speech in which they analyzed the whole situation and gave the 
reasons for the hatred against Plataea. In the meantime they asked for a revenge for 
the massacre of their soldiers who had surrendered to the Plataeans after their 
unsuccessful attempt to capture the city that night of spring 431. After all Thebes
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was an ally of Sparta and Plataea was the enemy, so for them the Spartans should 
punish Plataea in the name of this alliance. It was this point that probably 
persuaded the Spartans to punish the Plataeans, for the Spartans knew that the 
Boeotians were a powerful and valuable ally. As a result, two hundred Plataeans 
and twenty five Athenians were executed by the Peloponnesians, the women were 
sold as slaves, and the city of Plataea was given, for one year, to some exiled 
Megarians, before its final destruction the year after. As for the Plataean land, it 
was given to some Theban citizens for a period of ten years. (Thuc. iii. 60-68).
Thus th e  small city of Plataea was finally destroyed for the sake of the Thebans who 
were always at odds with the Plataeans. Sparta’s decision to execute the prisoners 
and to surrender the territory of Plataea to Thebes can be characterised as necessary, 
for they preferred to have Boeotia in > their alliance despite the expenses. During 
the years of the war Sparta was claiming the role of liberator of all Greece. This 
action, of the slaughter of the Plataeans, certainly damaged her image, but it was 
necessary for the good of the whole Peloponnesian alliance.
During the same year an earthquake damaged Orchomenus and other Boeotian 
cities, (Thuc. iii. 87), and the Athenians ravaged the territory of Tanagra. Although 
the army of Tanagra came out of the city to stop the invader, it was not successful 
and the Athenians defeated the troops of Tanagra in the conflict that followed. 
(Thuc. iii. 91).
During the year 426 the Athenian general Nicias sailed to the territory of Oropus 
with a squadron of sixty ships and having under his orders two thousand hoplites. 
From there he marched at once to Tanagra which came under assault for a second 
time in two consecutive years. The next day the full Athenian army came to meet 
Nicias in Tanagra. The Spartans and their allies were not present in Attica this year, 
for many earthquakes in Peloponnesus had stopped their preparations for the annual
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invasion of Attica. After ravaging the Tanagraean territory for a day, the Athenian 
army won a victory against the forces from Tanagra which came out of their city 
together with some Theban reinforcements in order to confront them. (Thuc. iii. 
91). This sudden Athenian attack against Tanagra was probably a part of a greater 
plan: During the same time with the invasion at Tanagra Demosthenes, the Athenian 
general had come out with a bold effort which could turn Boeotia into Athenian 
hands. Demosthenes believed that he could easily approach Boeotia marching 
through the enemy territory of Aetolia, but his plan finally did not work, for his 
army was massacred by the Aetolians. (Thuc. iii. 94-98). It is very probable that 
the sudden Athenian invasion at Tanagra was just a counter attack which could 
draw the attention of the Boeotians awayftowjDemosthenes’ actions in Aetolia, but 
unfortunately for the Athenians, Demosthenes was not successful so they withdrew 
their forces, lo sing the chance to bring the war into the Boeotian territory.
In 424 the Athenian army made a surprise attack on Megarid. The Athenian 
expedition gave the Boeotians the chance to help their allies, for the loss of Megara 
could isolate Boeotia from Peloponnesus. The Boeotian army had already arrived 
in full force at Plataea when a message from Brasidas assured them that there was 
no need to come to Megara with the whole of their army, and finally 2,200 
Boeotian hoplites and 600 horsemen joined the Peloponnesian forces at Megara. 
At the end, the Athenians retreated avoiding a pitched battle, although some 
Boeotian horsemen lost their lives in Megara, after a few clashes with the Athenian 
cavalry which suffered some loses as well. (Thuc. iv. 72-73).
During the same summer the Athenians planned a triple thrust in Boeotia. "The 
fact that Megara had not fallen, however, did not d e te r  Demosthenes and 
Hippocrates from attempting to remove Boeotia from the war." (Kagan. The 
Archidamian war, p. 279). According to Thucydides there was a party in Boeotia
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which wanted to change the political situation in several states in Boeotia. (Thuc.
iv. 76). They were most probably Democrats who were seeking help from Athens 
in order to change the political scene. We have to remember that a few cities of 
the Confederation did not like the growing Theban power. Such cities like Thespiae, 
Orchomenus, Chaeronia could have a strong democratic element, although many of 
the democrats were living in exile. According to the plan some Boeotian democrats 
were going to surrender Siphae - a small town in the region of Thespiae - to the 
Athenians. In the meantime some exiles from Orchomenus were planning to 
surrender Chaeronia, a subordinate town to Orchomenus. On the other hand the 
Athenian forces were preparing to attack Delium which was sited in the region of 
Tanagra (opposite to Euboea). The purpose of the Athenians was to capture these 
three points (Siphae - Chaeronia - Delium) in order to use them for further military 
operations in Boeotia, and to create political unrest as well. The key for the success 
of these two expeditions was the perfect timing. Hippocrates was going to march 
against Delium while Demosthenes had to capture Siphae. Demosthenes sailed with 
fot-ty ships to Naupactus and from there he moved against Siphae after taking 
with him some Athenian allies who had come from these places to help them. 
(Thuc. iv. 76-77). Unfortunately for the Athenians the surprise attack in Siphae 
was not successful, for the plot had been revealed to the Boeotians. Either 
Hippocrates did not make the counter attack on time, or Demosthenes was too early, 
so the Boeotians found the opportunity to protect and secure their cities. (Thuc. iv. 
89). Later on Hippocrates marched against Delium with a big army. According to 
Kagan: "... An army that was large by Athenian standards:about 7,000 hoplites, and 
a great mass of others, well over 10,000 metics and foreign allies as well as 
Athenians-, who were largely unarmed and were meant only to help build a 
fortification at Delium quickly." (Kagan. The Archidamian war, p. 28 Iff). When 
Hippocrates completed the fortification at Delium he left a garrison at the fort and 
sent the rest of the army back to Athens. (Thuc. iv. 90). It is obvious that
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Hippocrates did not knowv the operation of Demosthenes in the west was not 
successful. In the meantime the Boeotian army was gathering at Tanagra. Although 
nine out of the eleven Boeotarchs did not want to give a pitched battle against the 
Athenians, the Boeotarchs of Thebes) Pagondas and Ariantides, finally persuaded 
them to fight. (Thuc. iv. 91). We do not know if it was the rhetorioJ speech of 
Pagondas persuaded the resr Boeotarchs or the fact that he was the Boeotarch 
of the most powerful city of the Boeotian league, Thebes. The fact is that the 
Boeotian army moved against the Athenians and prepared for a battle. When 
Hippocrates - who was still at Delium - heard about the Boeotian intentions, he 
immediately left Delium in order to lead his army to the battle. The whole army 
of the Boeotians consisted of 7,000 hoplites, 10,000 or more light armed troops,
1,000 cavalry and 500 peltasts. The right flank of the Boeotian formation was held 
by the Thebans, who had put their forces in an unusual deep formation, which can 
be characterised as the "forefather" of the phalanx which was used later on by the 
Thebans at Leuctra. The centre of the Boeotian army was occupied by forces from 
Haliar tus, Coronea, Copaea and other small cities, while the left flank was held 
by the Thespians, the Tanagraeans and the Orchomenians. The two flanks were 
covered by the light armed troops and the cavalry.
On the other hand, the Athenian army which was almost equal to the Boeotian 
force was formed in the usual eight men deep phalanx. Although the light armed 
troops of the Athenians were more than those of the enemy their presence in the 
conflict did not help the Athenians, for the majority of these masses was unarmed. 
(Thuc. iv. 93). When the battle started the left wing and the centre of the Boeotian 
formation suffered a lot as a result of the Athenian pressure, but on the right wing 
the Theban phalanx managed to stop the Athenians. At this crucial point of the 
battle the Boeotarch Pagondas came out with a bold movement. He sent two cavalry 
contingents to attack the winning right flank of the opponent, and he instructed
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them to ride around the foot of the hill which was behind them, in order to take 
the Athenian hoplites by syrprise. In the meantime the defeated left wing of his 
army had started to move towards the winning Theban flank seeking protection. The 
sudden attack of the Boeotian cavalry created confusion among the Athenians who 
took the Boeotian horsemen as the advance guard of an unknown army which was 
approaching to assist the Boeotian forces. As a result of this surprise attack, the 
Athenians broke their formation and fled in panic towards Oropus, Delium or Pames 
under the pressure of the Boeotian and Locrian cavalry forces which slaughtered 
many of them. (Thuc. iv. 96).
After the battle, the Boeotians put a guard to the dead of the enemy, and sent a 
herald to the Athenians asking them to surrender Delium to the Boeotian forces in 
order to take back to Athens their fallen fellow citizens. The Athenians refused the 
proposal and the Boeotian army had to start the siege of the fort which finally fell 
to their hands after 17 days of strong resistance. Two hundred Athenians were 
captured in the fort of Delium by the Boeotians, although the majority of the 
Athenian guard managed to escape. (Thuc. iv. 100). "Of all the land battles of the 
great war none, except possibly that of Mantinea six years later, can compete with 
the Battle of Delium in interest. Two of the leading military powers of Greece were 
marched together in straight forward pitched fighting. In recent years Athens had 
defeated Thebes and Thebes Athens. Now the matter was put beyond dispute. No 
Athenian army ever dared to cross the border to invade Boeotia again, and the 
Boeotians ravaged Attica whenever and wherever they pleased. ’The strategy of 
offence against Boeotia’ was indeed at the end." (Henderson. The Great War, p. 
239).
During the next year (423) the Thebans destroyed the wall of Thespiae. They had 
in mind to do this before the battle of Delium but after their victory this operation
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was easier for them. Thespiae, which was very weak after the loss of her best 
soldiers at the battle of Delium, was accused by Thebes as a friend of the 
Athenians and finally her Walls were destroyed by the Thebans. (Thuc. iv. 133). 
This action gave the Thebans the political control of two new districts in the 
confederacy. By this way Thebes increased her number of her Boeotarchs from four 
to six. (After the fall of Plataea two more districts were controlled by Thebes). Of 
course the destruction of the Thespian Walls gave Thebes the absolute majority into 
the federal council and of course absolute powers over all the matters of the 
Boeotian confederacy. It is true that the city of Thespiae had never been a close 
friend of Thebes and that her relations with Athens were always good.
During 422 the Boeotians captured Panactum, an Athenian fort at the borders of 
Attica, by treachery. (Thuc. v. 3). The Boeotian tactics were to harm the 
Athenians when they found the opportunity, and throughout the whole war these 
tactics had been proved more than successful.
During 421, after ten consecutive years of war, Athens and Sparta decided to give 
an end to the fights, and concluded the Peace Treaty of Nicias. Boeotia together 
with Corinth, Elis and Megara refused to sign the Peace Treaty, for each one of 
these cities had her own reasons for the renewal of the war against Athens. (Thuc. 
v. 17. 2). Thucydides’ narrative implies that the Boeotians rejected the Peace 
because they did^want to restore Panactum to Athens as^heyhad to do according 
to the terms of the treaty. (Thuc. v. 17. 8). According to Kagan {Peace of
Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, p. 23), Thebes had gained too much power since 
431 and the end of the war could threaten her supremacy over the rest of Boeotia. 
We have to remember that Thebes* political power had been increased since the 
beginning of the war. The population of the city was almost doubled soon after 
431, for the citizens of many unwalled cities had settled Aft Thebes seeking
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protection, (Hell. ox. xvii. 3), and after the fall of Plataea Thebes’ votes in the 
Boeotian council had been increased from two to four. (Hell. ox. vii. 3). When 
the Walls of Thespiae were destroyed by the Thebans in 423, this number increased 
from four to six, giving the majority, of the Boeotian council, to the Thebans. We 
also have to remember that Thebes’ prestige and power had been increased after the 
batde of Delium which proved to be the "golden opportunity" for the Thebans to 
increase their power inside Boeotia. For the Thebans, the conclusion of the Peace 
Treaty could threaten their political control over the other Boeotian cities, since 
Athens, free now from the war, could very easily intervene with the Boeotian 
politics, and create political unrest in the region. We know that there was a 
democratic element in many cities of Boeotia and with the support of Athens, 
Thebes could be in serious trouble. According to Kagan: "The democratic and 
separatist forces in the Boeotian cities could surely seek help from the Athenians, 
who might be glad to assist them in hopes of restoring the control over Boeotia 
which they had exercised between the battles of Oenophyta and Coronea. So 
frightened were the Thebans that^even while rejecting the Peace of Nicias, they 
negotiated an unusual^if not unique, truce with the Athenians whereby the original 
cessation of hostilities was for ten days; after that, termination by either side would 
require ten days notice. Such fears, along with great ambitions^made the Thebans 
hope for the renewal of a war that would lead to the defeat of Athens and the 
destruction of its power." (Kagan. The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, p. 
24). When Sparta realised that it was not possible for her to change the decision 
of those states which had refused to conclude the Peace Treaty, turned to Athens 
and concluded an alliance with her, for the Spartans could see that their hegemony 
over the rest of Peloponnesus was in question, especially after the refusal of the 
Argives to renew their treaty. The Lacedaemonians knew that a Peace Treaty with 
Athens could isolate the ambitious Argives, and on the other hand, to press those 
o f the allies which refused to cooperate. (Thuc. v. 22). Meanwhile Boeotia had
66
Chapter II  —  Boeotia
signed a Peace Treaty with Athens under a ten days basis.
During the next year (421/0) Corinth and Argos concluded an alliance together 
with Mantineia and Elis. Although Boeotia and Megara were asked to join them 
they preferred to stay aloof, for - according to Thucydides - it was x ‘ . cfor 
them to make an alliance with a democratic state like Argos. (Thuc. v. 31). The 
Thebans, and the other oligarchicstates in Boeotia preferred to conclude a separate 
alliance with Sparta - like the one the Lacedaemonians had signed with Athens 
earlier on - than to risk their own political stability seeking for new friends in a 
crucial period.
Although the Corinthians tried one more time to persuade the Boeotians to change 
their minds and join them in the new league, Boeotia refused to do so and ignored 
Corinth’s appeal for breaking her ten days truce with Athens. (Thuc. v. 32). 
Meanwhile the Spartans failed to restore Amphipolis to Athens, but they promised 
the Athenians to persuade the Boeotians to give back Panactum and to return the 
Athenian prisoners they held after the battle of Delium. (Thuc. v. 35). In return 
they asked the Athenians to leave Pylos, or to remove the Messenians and the 
Helots who were there. Finally Athens agreed with the terms and removed the 
Messenians and Helots to the island of Cephallenia. During the winter of the same 
year new ephors were put in office and some of them were against the Peace 
Treaty. (Thuc. v. 36. 1). Thucydides names two of them, Cleobulus and Xenares, 
who were looking to find a way in order to break the treaty. The two ephors, who 
were acting privately, proposed to the Boeotian and Corinthian ambassadors, who 
were in Sparta at the time, to conclude an alliance with Argos, at first, and then 
to try bring Argos to the Peloponnesian league. The Boeotians were also asked by 
the Spartan ephors, to restore Panactum to Athens in order to help Sparta regain 
Pylos. (Thuc. v. 36). The two ephors who were aware of Boeotia’s and Corinth’s
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desires for the renewal of the war made this appeal in order to bring Sparta in a 
better position in order to reopen hostilities against Athens. On their way home the 
ambassadors of Boeotia and Corinth were stopped by two magistrates from Argos 
who had come to meet Boeotians in order to persuade them to join their alliance.
The Boeotians who liked the proposal, for it was the same with the one that was 
made by the two Spartan ephors, agreed with the Argives to bring the matter to the 
Boeotian Federation. (Thuc. v. 37). According to Kagan the Argives^proposal was 
not related with the appeal of the Spartan ephors, and it was probable that Argos 
had no intentions to join Sparta in a common alliance. "They appear still to have keen 
aiming at a new Peloponnesian alignment by which they and their allies could more 
effectively challenge Spartan leadership. The ambiguous language about the Spartans 
and other unnamed enemies or allies may have been meant merely to sugarcoat a 
rather bitter pill; such language committed Argos to nothing." (Kagan. The Peace 
o f Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, p. 53).
Although the Boeotian ambassadors were interested in the Argive proposal, the 
Federal Council rejected the alliance, for they considered this alliance as an action 
against Sparta (Thuc. v. 38) and they did not move to any further negotiations with 
the Argives. In the meantime the Spartans who were anxious to get Pylos back 
repeated to the Boeotians their appeal for the restoration of Panactum to Athens.
The Boeotians agreed to the Spartan appeal under the condition that Sparta and 
Boeotia should sign a separate treaty, similar to the one that the Spartans and 
Athenians had concluded earlier on. This offer was probably made by the pro-war 
f \action of Boeotia which was aiming to the renewal of the war. Although the 
Spartans knew that a separate treaty with Boeotia could harm their relations with 
Athens, they preferred to accept the Boeotian proposal - which had the support of 
the Lacedaemonian pro-war party - and to conclude the separate treaty. (Thuc. v.
39). According to Kagan: "The Boeotians welcomed the treaty as a step in
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breaking up the alliance between Sparta and Athens, but there is yet another reason 
why the Boeotians were willing to reverse their policy: they meant to deceive the 
Spartan allies." (Kagan. The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, p. 57).
When the Boeotians concluded the alliance with Sparta they decided that they no 
longer needed Panactum and during the next year (419) they demolished the fort 
without the knowledge of the Spartans. (Thuc. v. 42). "This act not only deprived 
Athens of a valuable border fort, but also had distinct political advantages: it was 
certain to put further strain on the Athenian alliance with Sparta and the Peace of 
Nicias." (Kagan. The Peace o f Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, p. 57).
When the Spartan ambassadors arrived to Boeotia they found the fort completely
destroyed. However they escorted the Athenian prisoners back to their city, and 
■+©
announced the Athenians the destruction of the fort. (Thuc. v. 42). The whole 
incident damaged the fragile relations between Sparta and Athens, for the Athenians 
had the impression that Sparta betrayed them by ^P usiw jto  follow the terms of the 
treaty for one more time. It is very possible that the pro-war party of Xenares and 
Cleobulus was aware of the destruction of the fort, and that the friends of war at 
Sparta supported the Boeotian action, but I doubt that the majority of the Spartans 
shared the same opinion. I think that the friends of peace at Sparta were aware of 
the Athenian mistrust towards the Lacedaemonian actions, and for them the 
destruction of Panactum was just another threat to the peace. The destruction of the 
fort panicked the Argives who assumed that the Athenians were aware of the 
alliance between Boeotia and Sparta and they were in agreement with Boeotia in 
the case of Panactum. This assumption made the Argives believe that had been 
betrayed and found themselves alienated, and from the military point of view, badly 
outnumbered by a powerful coalition composed by Sparta and the rest of the 
Peloponnesian cities, and of course f-‘_* ’ Boeotia. (Thuc. v. 40). The
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Argives decided to react immediately and suddenly they became too eager to sign 
an alliance with Sparta, although they knew that this action could bring an end to 
their ambition to gain the control of Peloponnesus. Fortunately for them the truth 
was revealed soon, and finally Argos concluded an alliance with Athens. (Thuc. 
v. 47).
During the winter of the same year the Spartan colony of Heraclea found herself
in a difficult position after an attack by her neighbours. (Thuc. v. 51). According
to Diodor us, (xii. 77. 4), the people of the city asked the Thebans for help, and
finally one thousand Theban hoplites arrived at Heraclea and joined her forces.
During the following spring the Thebans dismissed the Spartan governor of the city
on the ground of bad administration. (Thuc. v. 52). According to Thucydides^the
Boeotians claimed that they took this measure in order to prevent Athens from
occupying the territory, which was already under threat. Although this explanation
seems possible, I believe that it does not reflect the whole truth, for the Boeotians
acted in this way in order to fulfil their own plans. Since the battle of Delium the
confidence, and strength of the Thebans had been increased. We have to remember
that Thebes and Boeotia in genera) were among the less affected regions in Greece
during the whole Archidamian war, and naturally the power of the Boeotians and
especially the Thebans had grown. The growing power of Thebes is reflected in the
\0« t
actions of the spring 419. Thebes turned'to be a power strong enough to follow an 
expansionistic policy outside of the Boeotian borders, choosing as a first target a 
city belonged to Sparta. It is probable that the Thebans wanted to show their 
dissatisfaction, the conclusion of the Peace of Nicias, and the situation at 
Heraclea helped Thebes to intervene, in a Lacedaemonian territory and to 
demonstrate her displeasure for one more time. Whatever the reason was, the 
Theban intervention must have damaged the relations of Thebes with Sparta, for the 
Spartans lost one more territory and it was Boeotia, a member of the Peloponnesian
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league ywhich won it.
During the summer of the year 418 the Lacedaemonians decided to help Epidaurus 
which was under an attack from Argos. The alliance of Argos with other 
Peloponnesian states had finally become a real threat to the Lacedaemonian 
supremacy over Peloponnesus, and the fall of Epidaurus could damage seriously the 
Spartan prestige in; Peloponnesus, and put her hegemony under question. (Thuc.
v. 57). More than a half of the Greek army which wasv gathered to attack Argos 
had come from Boeotia. The Boeotians contributed five thousand hoplites, five 
thousand light armed troops as well as one thousand cavalry and mounted infantry 
to an army which was numbered twenty thousand troops. Thucydides describes the 
Peloponnesian force as the "most splendid army ever gathered in Greece", (v. 60), 
and it was composed by the elite troops of each state which contributed to it.
But the huge Boeotian contribution Jtai$e*one question: Why did the Boeotians 
send such a splendid army to an allied expedition against the much weaker Argive 
alliance? According to Thucydides the Peloponnesian fbrce was so large that it 
could defeat easily the army of the Argive coalition. (Thuc. v. 60). It is possible 
thafalthough the Boeotians did not have to send such a force, they decided to do 
so in order to calm the Spartans after the Heraclea affair. As we have seei^the 
Theban intervention in a territory of the Lacedaemonians must have caused some 
tension to the relations of the two states, and the Spartan expedition against Argos 
gave the Thebans the chance to strengthen the ties with Sparta for one more time 
On the other hand the Boeotians had the opportunity to make a demonstration of 
their power, not only to their enemies but also to their allies, and to remind them 
that it was the same force which defeated and humiliated the Athenians just a few 
years ago at Delium.
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Although Agis, the Spartan king, had under his orders the finest army of Greece, 
he did not take advantage of this unique opportunity and preferred to withdraw his 
forces after he concluded a four months truce with two magistrates from Argos. 
(More details about Agis expedition against Argos in chapter 4: Argos). For this 
action Agis was condemned back in Sparta, and for the first time in Spartan history 
ten counsellors were appointed as "advisors" to the king in any future expedition. 
(Thuc. v. 63).
During the same summer the Spartan army, under king Agis, finally crashed the 
alliance of Argos in the battle of Mantineia. (Thuc. v. 65-75). Although the 
Lacedaemonians had asked their northern allies to send help, Corinth, Boeotia, 
Phocis and Locris did not manage to be present at Mantineia, for according to 
Thucydides they did not have enough time to mobilise their army because the 
Spartans had moved unexpectedly against the Argive alliance. (Thuc. v. 64). In 
the battle of Mantineia the Spartan army won a great victory giving an end to any 
Argive ambitions for the hegemony of Peloponnesus.
During the year 415/4 a huge Athenian-allied army attacked Sicily under the 
leadership of Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus, all generals of Athens. (Thuc. vi. 
30). The war had now entered a new phase.
During the same year the Lacedaemonians and their allies decided to build a fort 
in Deceleia - in the borders between Attica and Boeotia - Oft "Ihe advice of 
Alcibiades. The accusations of Alcibiade^ opponents, after the destructions of the 
Hermae turned the prominent Athenian general into an ally and advisor of the 
Spartans and her allies. The Athenian general ^ who was aware of the importance of 
a fort inside the Athenian territory, gave the initiative to the Lacedaemonians to 
resume the war following a strictly offensive tactic. (Thuc. vi. 89-92).
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During the next year the Thebans managed to suppress a democratic revolt in 
Thespiae proving for one more time +heit desires to remain the unchallenged 
hegemon in Boeotia. (Thuc. vi. 95).
During the year 413/2 the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica for one 
more time, under the commands of king Agis. This time the Peloponnesian army 
did not withdraw after they had finished ravaging the Attican countryside, but 
instead the Spartans remained there fortifying Deceleia. (Thuc. vii. 19). The 
fortification of Deceleia put the Peloponnesians into offensive and troubled the 
Athenians who had now to face the enemy inside their own territory. According to 
Thucydides the fort of Deceleia played a major role to Athens’ final defeat, for the 
countryside of Attica suffered a lot from the continuous raids of the Peloponnesians, 
and more than twenty thousand slaves found asylum at Deceleia during the last 
years of the war. On the other hand the fort cut Athens completely from her allies, 
and soon the Athenians found themselves in the position to use their ships in order 
to import all the necessary things to survive. According to Thucydides, (vii. 27- 
28), the city of Athens had turned to a big fort and the great walls of the city were 
guarded day and night by soldiers.
The Boeotians who had assisted Sparta in the fortification of Deceleia made a great 
profit from the continuous raids over Attica, and we have to assume that most of 
the slaves and spoils would have been carried to the nearby cities of Boeotia. 
(Hell. ox. xvii. 4), (See also: Henderson. The Great War between Athens and Sparta, 
p. 242).
During the same year a Boeotian contingent of three hundred hoplites was sent to 
Sicily to help Syracuse, under the commands of two Thebans and a Thespian. 
(Thuc. vii. 19), (Diod. xiii. 7. 7). It was the same contingent that took part in the
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battle of Epipolae and brought defeat on the Athenian army, winning a decisive 
victory. (Thuc. vii. 43).
During the same year the Thebans went to the rescue of Mycalessos after a sudden 
attack of Thracian mercenaries who were on their way home. The Thracians had 
come to Athens in order to serve with the reinforcements which had been sent to 
Sicily, but they arrived too late, and the Athenians who could not afford to pay 
these troops, decided to send them back to Thrace. The Athenian commander 
Dieitrephes who escorted them used the Thracians in order to damage the enemy 
territory, and after a short raid in the area of Tanagra the barbarian force retreated 
Chalcis. During the next day they crossed Euripus for one more time and 
attacked the town of Mycalessos. The Thracian force had enough time to destroy 
the small town and to slaughter most of its population before a rescue force from 
Thebes arrived on the scene. The Theban contingent succeeded Vh pursuit^ the 
Thracians andity kill,'c8most 250 of them^but for Mycalessos it was too late, for the 
town suffered almost a complete destruction. (Thuc. vii. 27-30).
During the same year (413/2) Euboea decided to revolt from Athens and become 
ally of the Peloponnesians. After the Athenian destruction in Sicily the situation 
turned in favour of the Peloponnesians and their allies. Athens was exhausted by 
the continuous war, her economy was almost ruined, and worst of all the operations 
of the war were not taking place in Sicily any more>but out of the city of Athens 
herself. Under these circumstances, most of the Athenian allies were more willing 
than ever to revolt, (Thuc. viii. 1-2), and Euboea and Lesbos were the first cities 
which took the initiative and came to Sparta asking for help. The Boeotians helped 
Lesbos to w i n o f  /^jiswho promised to send twenty ships to the island, ten 
from Lacedaemon and ten from Boeotia. (Thuc. viii. 5). In the meantime Sparta 
decided to increase the Peloponnesian fleet and for this reason asked her allies to
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build a new fleet, and Boeotia contributed twenty five ships. (Thuc. viii. 3).
During the next year (412/1) the Boeotians captured by treachery the Athenian fort 
of Oropus. The Boeotians were assisted by some Eretrians as well by some people 
from Oropus itself, who were aiming to bring Euboea into revolt. (Thuc. viii. 60). 
"Oropus’ strategic position in the hands of the enemy seriously threatened Euboea’s 
continuous possession of the Athenians. The conquest of Oropus immediately 
encouraged some Eretrians to pursue plans for a rebellion of the kind that had 
already been alive on Euboea the previous year and to seek the support of the 
Spartan fleet at Rhodes." (Kagan. The fall o f the Athenian Empire, p. 95). Later 
on, the same year, the fort of Deceleia provided refuge to the oligarchs who had 
been overthrown from Athens after the failure of their coup. One of the oligarchs, 
Aristarchus, managed to deceive the Athenian soldiers of the Oenoe fort and 
persuaded them to surrender the fort to the Boeotians, making them believe that a 
treaty had been concluded and according to its terms the fort should be controlled 
by the Boeotians. (Thuc. viii. 9 S ) .
During the year 411/0 the Boeotians assisted the Euboeans to revolt from Athens 
and a Boeotian contingent helped the Euboeans to build a ^ ^ f ^ ^ c r o s s  the Euripus 
channel. By this way Euboea passed completely out of the Athenian control, for her 
isolation from mainland Greece was now over and help from the nearby Boeotians 
could very easily reach Euboea whenever it was needed. (Diod. xiii. 47). Although 
Athens had sent a force under Theramenes in order to prevent the construction of 
the bridge, the Boeotian forces did not give him the chance to stop the work and 
Theramenes withdrew his forces and preferred to ravage the coasts of Euboea and 
Boeotia.
During the year 409/8 Boeotian troops, under the command of the Theban
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Coeratadas took part in the defence of Byzantium together with troops from Megara 
and Sparta. The Athenians managed to capture the city by treachery and the 
Peloponnesian forces which defended the city suffered many casualties. (Xen. Hell. 
1. 3. 14-22), (Diod. xiii. 66-67). Coeratadas himself was captured by the Athenians 
but he escaped later on. During the same year the Boeotians contributed a cavalry 
force of nine hundred men strong to Agis’ attack against Athens. (Diod. xiii. 72. 
3-9).
At the sea battle of Arginusae in 406 the Boeotian squadron, under the leadership
'Cp/oJ- *M8*4)
of the Theban Thrasondas held the left wing of the Spartan allied fleets Two years 
later the Athenians finally surrendered to Sparta and her allies, after suffering heavy 
casualties.
According to Xenophon, Thebes and Corinth wanted to destroy the city of Athens 
and to execute or to sell as slaves its population. (Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 19). "In
particular the Thebans had demonstrated ambitions of their own, some times in 
conflict with Spartan interests. They might be glad to see Athens destroyed and 
Attica depopulated, for they as powerful neighbours, could exploit the opportunity, 
expand into the deserted territory, and increase their own power. Perhaps, as time 
passed, the Spartans might see that they would not be well served by such an 
outcome and offer terms more to the liking of the Athenians. (Kagan. The fall of 
the Athenian Empire, p. 399).
During the years of the war the power and wealth of Thebes had grown, especially 
after the capture of Plataea and other Boeotian towns. As we have seen before, 
Thebes managed to gain the control of the political life of all Boeotia and no other 
Boeotian city could confront her. The destruction of Plataea, the victory at the battle 
of Delium, and the Theban intervention at Heraclea, gave Thebes the ability to
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follow an ambitious policy which expanded beyond the borders of Boeotia. It was
the Theban power which made the Spartans deny her appeal for the destruction of
Athens. Boeotia and especially Thebes were among the few cities which gained
much from the war. The Athenian threat was finally eliminated, the wealth of
Thebes had grown, as well her political influence and of course ambitions. Thebes
o f
came out of this war as a major power in the whole Greece and the Thebans made 
an independent claim to victory in the war by the claim of the tithe belonging to 
Apollo at Deceleia. (Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 5), (Plut. "Lys.", 27). "Such a claim was 
clearly not without justification in the light of the Theban contribution to the defeat 
of Athens, but the claim nevertheless angered the Spartans. It was a sign of things 
to come. Thebes had already shown a potential for independent and even anti- 
Lacedaemonian action during the Peace of Nicias, and this potential was to become 
actualised in the years immediately following the conclusion of the war." (Demand. 
Thebes in the Fifth Century, p.44).
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III. MEGARA
The ancient city of Megara was situated between Athens and Corinth and used to
be the gate to mainland Greece and the Peloponnese. Megara was surrounded from
the North West by the mountains of Pateras and Kithaeron, the Saronic gulf which
4o
was in the Eastern side opened''them the sea route to the Aegean and Asia Minor. 
The harbours of Megara were Nisaea and Pagae. (Thuc. i. 103).
It was the geographic location of Megara which played the most important role in 
the history of the city, as I believe, and not her power as a city state nor her 
alliances with powerful protector states. Megara’s geographic position was at the 
same time enviable and dangerous, for the city held such an important key position.
Megara was not a rich city concerning its agricultural products, and its inhabitants 
did not expect wealth to come from the cultivation of the land. Isocrates (8. 117) 
and Strabo (ix. 19) said that the soil of the Megarid was very poor and that it was 
not easily cultivated. "The Megarian territory may have approached 700 square 
kilometres, making Megara one of the smallest of mainland states. Probably no 
more than one fifth of this area, under 100 square kilometres, was of much use to 
the Megarians. The rest was too rugged for systematic economic development or 
permanent settlement..." (Legon. Megara, p. 22). Aristophanes in the Acharnians 
(521 and 761) and in Peace (500 ff) is suggesting some clues for the cultivating 
power of the Megarians. Garlic and onion were the main export crops of the city. 
Although olives and olive oil were also part of their produce, I do not think that 
these products were of export - at least to Athens - since the olive oil is a common 
product in the whole of Greece. Furthermore, Aristophanes in the Acharnians (520, 
760-1) informs us that they also exported salt.
Under these circumstances Megara should have turned their attention some where 
else if they wanted to prosper. During the second half of the eighth century Corinth
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challenged Megara over territorial disputes and even threatened Megara*s existence 
as an independent state. "The Megarians succeeded in averting complete absorption 
by Corinth, but lost a large and irretrievable proportion of their domain. Relations 
between the two states were poisoned for centuries to come." (Legon. Megara, p. 
60). It is probable that it was this conflict with Corinth that forced the Megarians 
to unite in one city and to abandon the Dorian comae system, or even forced them 
to colonize, due to the constant threat Around 730 Megara Hyblaea were settled 
by Megarians and one hundred years later Selinous was founded* (Thuc. vi. 4. 1- 
2; Diod. iv. 78; Stabo. vi. 267). "From Sicily came grain and cheese, and from 
the forests of South Italy wood." (Highbarger. The History and Civilization of Ancient 
Megara, p. 104). Megara lost control of the West as a result of the Lelantine war. 
(see also: Highbarger. The History and Civilization o f Ancient Megara, p. 108-109) 
(Hdt. v. 77; vi. 100). "The immediate effect of the war upon Megara very probably 
was to stop the expansion in Sicily and turn her attention to the east where her ally 
Miletus was already active." (Highbarger. The History and Civilization of Ancient 
Megara, p. 109). Around the mid c7th the Megarians had managed to settle in a 
great line of colonies in the areas of Propontis and the Black sea. Chalcedon was 
founded around 690-675, (Thuc. iv. 75; Hdt. iv. 144), and then Selymbria followed, 
Byzantium (Hdt. iv. 144; Strabo, vii. 319), and Chersonesus. "From this region the 
Greek world received its food supply and raw materials of manufacture as well as 
slaves. Hence came grain, fish, flax, hemp and timber. At all times that the city 
which controlled the gates to the Euxine held the greatest commercial importance 
in Greece. And the most important of these gates was guarded by Byzantium." 
(Highbarger. The History and Civilization of Ancient Megara, p. 111). All these 
colonies of Megara were of great importance for they changed the economy of the 
city from an agrarian one to one based on commerce. Since economic prosperity 
could not come from agriculture, because Megarid is a mountainous territory, the 
Megarians had to find another way to improve their economy. The colonies had
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been settled in areas with very fertile soil and they possessed key positions for 
trade. So the Megarians were preoccupied with commerce and at the same time they 
improved their ship building. Gradually, after Corinth, Megara improved her fleet, 
and became one of the naval powers of the Peloponnese.
Sparta’s fears of a helot revolt forced her to seek alliances in fhePeloponnese and 
around the 6th century she began to conclude a series of alliances, starting with 
Tegea. (see also: Kagan. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, pp. 9-30; 
De.Ste.Croix. O.P.W., pp. 96-124). On the other hand this series of alliances gave 
Sparta the chance to isolate her enemy city, Argos, and most importantly to obtain 
the power to interfere in the interior affairs of her allies. Sparta’s alliance with 
Megara should have taken place around the end of the 6th century but "cannot be 
explicitly confirmed until the period of Xerxes’ invasion of Greece in 481." 
(Legon. Megara, p. 143).
The Persian expansionistic plans, at the end of the 6th century, must have damaged 
Megara, at least indirectly, for her most important eastern colonies were in danger. 
Around 520 Chalcedon passed into Persian hands (Hdt. iv. 85) and Byzantium as 
well had friendly relations with Persia. (Hdt. iv. 138). During the spring of 493 
the Persians conquered the whole of Propontis. Selymbria, Byzantium and 
Chalcedon were burnt, while their inhabitants deserted them seeking safety. (Hdt.
vi. JjS )  • \  : During the times of the Persian invasion in mainland Greece,
Megara cooperated with the other Greek cities, and a Megarian squadron of twenty 
triremes took part in the sea-battle of Artemisium (Hdt. viii. 1), as well as in the 
sea-battle of Salamis. (Hdt. viii. 45). During the Plataea campaign in 479 Megara 
sent three thousand hoplites^a number which seems exaggerated, (Munro: "The 
Campaign o f Plataea", J.H.S., 24 (1904), p. 152), and according to Herodot us the 
Megarian losses were almost six hundred men. (Hdt. ix. 70. 3). During the years
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that followed the Persian wars, Megara allied with both cities, Athens and Sparta. 
Unfortunately for the Megarians, their geographic position and key location, between 
the two major powers in the Greek world, as well as their naval powe^gave them 
little hope to follow a policy of neutrality towards Athens or Sparta, for the two 
States were aware of the importance of Megara. Immediately after the end of the 
Persian invasion, Athens emerged as a superpower, with the most powerful navy 
among the other Greek Sf&tes. The efforts of the Greeks in 479 for the freeing of 
the Ionian cities from the Persians did not leave the Megarians indifferent, since 
their interests were lay. in these colonies. When the Spartan king Pausanias 
returned home, as a result of his friendly relations with Persia, the Athenians took 
over the leadership of the Greek forces and set the foundations for the Delian 
league. Athens finally managed to free the Ionian cities among which were the 
Megarian colonies which joined later on the Delian League. In the meantime 
Megara was again under the Corinthian pressure due to territorial disputes. At that 
time Sparta was preoccupied with the revolt of the helots (around 464), and 
Megara’s only alternative solution was to turn to Athens and conclude an alliance 
with her (462/1). (Thuc. i. 103). As a result of this alliance Athens got control 
of Pagae and Nisaea, and Athenian hoplites were put there to guard them. 
"Megara’s commercial ties to Athens may also have increased during this period, 
since it is likely that all traffic with the Peloponnese was cut off by the state of 
belligerency between Megara and Corinth." (Legon. Megara, p. 185). Since Athens 
controlled the Aegean, Megara’s prosperity shouldv increased, and the Megarians 
had the opportunity to take advantage of their commercial fleet. The markets of the 
Aegean and the coastal cities of Asia Minor were under e Athenian protection and 
control, a fact which gave the Megarians the chance to increase their trade.
-fhe
During the summer of 459 the Corinthians attacked Megarid thinking that the 
Athenians were not in a position to assist the Megarians, for they were already
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occupied in Egypt and in Aegina as well. Unfortunately for the Corinthians, their 
calculations were not correct because the Athenians, using their reserve forces, 
defeated them after a forceful battle, and forced them to retreat. (Thuc. i. 105. 3- 
106. 2).
According to Legon {Megara, p.189), Megara wees of great importance to Athens 
for the Athenians wanted Megara to survive as a base behind enemy lines in a case 
of a war. For this reason the Athenians tried to safeguard the city of Megara with 
Long Walls which connected the port, Nisaea, with the Metropolis. "A strongly 
walled town with a secure water supply could hold out against superior forces for 
as long as its food reserves lasted, usually one to two years, unless betrayed from 
within. But if the besieged town could maintain access to the sea, it could, in 
theory resist a land attack as long as it had money or friends enough to keep fresh 
supplies arriving by ship." (Legon. Megara, p. 188). Under this Athenian policy, 
we can assume that Megara depended a lot on Athens, since Athens controlled the 
city’ s harbour, and offered protection to the Megarians.
When in 457 the Spartans launched an expedition in order to support Doris which 
was under pressure from Locris, the Athenians tried to block their way back home. 
A battle at Tanagra in Boeotia followed and finally the Lacedaemonians and 
their allies^came out victorious. (Thuc. i. 107-108). On their way back home, the 
Spartan-allied force marched into the Megarian territory and ravaged the Megarid. 
(Thuc. i. 108). The Megarians did not come out of their Walls to defend their 
land, for the Peloponnesian army could not be confronted by the Megarian hoplite 
force, and the only thing the Megarians could do at that moment was to seek 
protection behind their defensive Walls. Assistance from Athens could not come 
since the Athenians had already been defeated in the battle of Tanagra, and the 
Megarians were left alone to watch the destruction of their land by the
83
Chavter III — Mezara
Peloponnesian army. "Perhaps the beginnings of disillusionment with the Athenian 
alliance should be dated from this point." (Legon. Megara, p. 191).
During 446 the island of Euboea revolted from the Delian league. Pericles, who was 
in command of the Athenian force which was sent to Euboea, had just arrived in 
the island when he received the news that Megara had revolted and the 
Peloponnesians were going to invade Attica. In the meantime the Athenian ganison 
at Megara had been slaughtered by the Megarians with the help of some 
Corinthians, Sikyonians and Epidaurians. (Thuc. i. 114). Pericles withdrew his 
army from Euboea immediately and^furned to Athens. The Peloponnesians invaded 
Attica, but they did not advance further than Thria in Eleusis, and finally returned 
home after ravaging the Eleusinian territory. Although the Athenians still had under 
control the two Megarian ports, Nisaea and Pagae, the revolt of the Megarians was 
successful, and during the same year, Athens concluded the Thirty Years Peace 
with Sparta. (Thuc. i. 115). "The Athenians seem to have realised that their 
mainland policy had been a failure, and they were prepared to surrender their 
remaining footholds in the Peloponnese to secure peace." (Legon. Megara, p. 199). 
According to the terms of the peace, Athens restored Nisaea and Pagae to Megara, 
giving the Megarians the opportunity to restore their harbours which had been under 
Athenian control for many years.
During the years that followed the Persian wars, Megara based her economic 
prosperity on commerce, and especially after 462/1, when the Megarians concluded 
an alliance with Athens, trade should be the most important source of wealth for 
Megara. The continuous conflicts with Corinth must have affected the Megarian 
agriculture and the sea became the only alternative solution for the Megarians. 
Together with Corinth, Megara should be a naval power of great importance for the 
Peloponnesians. "Megara had more extensive commercial and political contacts in
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the east than any other Peloponnesian ally, and the Megarian fleet had become the 
largest squadron available to the Spartans in the Aegean.” (Legon. Megara, p. 200). 
The Megarian Decree which imposed oid Megara by Athens was a severe blow to 
the Megarian economy. The Megarian Decree followed the battle at Sybota in 433. 
According to Thucydides (i. 46-48) the Megarians sent twelve ships to assist the 
Corinthian expedition against Corcyra. The Corinthian and their allies were not 
successful^for they did not manage to defeat completely the Corcyraean/Athenian 
fleet which opposed them, and the Megarian squadron suffered heavy casualties. 
Sometime after the battle of Sybota and before the congress of the Peloponnesian 
alliance in Sparta during 432 (Thuc. i. 67. 4), the Athenians passed^ciecree against 
Megara. According to Thucydides (i. 67. 4) the Megarians complained that they 
were excluded from all harbours within the Athenian empire, as well from the 
Athenian market, something which was against the Thirty Years Peace. This 
Megarian complaint came together with the Corinthian appeal to take measures 
against Athens, and was made during the congress of the Peloponnesian alliance in 
Sparta. Of course the decision of the Athenians, to impose this kind of "blockade” 
oh  the Megarians, can be seen only as an action of punishment or revenge. The 
question which arises here is what caused the Athenian anger which brought such 
a problem to Megara. As we have seen already, Athens’ relations with Megara 
should be at odds since 446, when the Megarians revolted from Athens. During the 
years that followed Megara’s revolt, the Megarians had assisted Corinth during her 
war with Corcyra (Thuc. i. 27; i. 46), and they had probably played a role in the 
revolt of Byzantium in 440. (see also: Legon. Megara, p. 201). It is very probable 
that the Athenians did not like the actions of Megara, but according to Thucydides 
these were not the reasons which caused the Megarian decree. According to 
Thucydides the Megarians were charged by the Athenians with the cultivation of 
a part of the sacred land in Eleusis, an action which could be characterised as 
sacrilege. Moreover, the Megarians were receiving the run away slaves of the
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Athenians, giving them asylum. (Thuc. i. 139). Both of these reasons were serious
mu$+ tuutebeen
enough to make the Athenians react the way they reacted. The decree . '  _ of 
great importance for the Megarians, and the Peloponnesians in general, because 
according to Thucydides (i. 139) the Spartan Embassy which was sent to Athens 
in 432 asked . the Athenians to raise the siege of Potidaea, to leave Aegina 
independent; , and declared m ost especially and distinctly of all that there would 
be no war if they rescinded the decree respecting the Megarians, in which it had 
been declared that they should not use the ports in the Athenian Empire, or the 
Attic Market. But the Athenians were neither disposed to obey them upon the other 
points nor to rescind the decree as they charged the Megarians with the cultivation 
of sacred land of Eleusis and with receiving the run away slaves. According to 
Thucydides (i. 139. 4) there were some Athenians who were willing to withdraw 
the decree in order to avoid the war, but it was Pericles who finally persuaded them 
not to do so. For Pericles the Megarian decree was not a cause for war (i. 140) and 
Athens would allow the Megarians to use the ports and the Market if the 
Lacedaemonians abstained from expelling foreigners. (Thuc. i. 144). According to 
De.Ste.Croix (O.P.W., p.252-254) the Decree applied to the Megarians (and not to 
Megara) and it excluded them, not from the whole of the Athenian Empire or even 
the whole of Attica, but specifically from the Athenian Agora and from the 
harbours of the Empire. So, according to De.Ste.Croix: 1. The decree was imposed 
only upon the Megarian citizens, and not 6m all the inhabitants o f Megara. 
Consequently, there should be merchants at Megara who continued having 
commercial relations with Athens. 2. The decree was referring to the Athenian 
Agora only and not any other markets in Attica, including Piraeus market, and 3. 
The decree was not referring to the markets of any other cities, which were 
members of the Athenian alliance, but just to their ports. Consequently the 
Megarians could have retained their trade with these cities, if they could find a way 
to reach their markets. So, the reasons for imposing this decree were by no means
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economic , but even more, not political, and the only aim of the decree was the
humiliation of the Megarians. According to these points, the Megarians were not
blamed seriously from the economic aspect of the decree, but they were simply
ridiculed, and had a good lesson about the Athenian power. Yet the conclusion
D e S + e C r o i x  d r e w  a b o u t  t h e  M e g a r i a n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  " s a c r e d  l a n d "  i s  n o t  a t  a l l
persuasive. According to De.Ste.Croix, the Megarian decree was the "punishment"
which Athens imposed on  Megara for the impiety in cultivating a part of the sacred
land. It is a fact that the Athenians paid much attention to religious matters, but I
do not think that they could have taken such a measure against another city just
for religious reasons. On the other hand, the impiety of the Megarians could be a
very good excuse for the "punishment" of Megara. This excuse could hide very well
the real motives of the decree, either economic, political or military. Now,
De S+e
concerning the rules imposed by the decree, I cannot understand whyACroix puts 
Piraeus out of the Athenian control, insisting that the Megarians could use the 
market of Piraeus, and of course the harbour as well setting that way Piraeus out 
of the Athenian domination an interpretation which opposes Thucydides account (i. 
67), who clearly says that the decree excluded the Megarians from all the harbours 
of the Athenian domination. (De.Ste.Croix. O f.W ., p. 285ff). It is difficult to 
understand why Athens closed to the Megarians all the other ports, which belonged 
to her domination, except Piraeus. It sounds rather unbelievable, but the wayACroix 
puts it, it seems that Athens was punishing all her other allies, by not being able 
to trade with Megara, whereas Athens had allowed the Megarians to use both the 
harbour and the market of Piraeus. De.Ste.Croix makes a distinction between the 
Agora and the commercial market of Athens insisting that the Megarians could use 
the commercial market, for the decree which was imposed on them did not aim to 
harm the Megarian economy, but its purpose was just to humiliate Megara. Again 
here I find myself with disagreement with De.Ste.Croixsinterpretation, for as Legon 
points out: "Yet even if we concede these points, exclusion from the civic agora
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would have placed Megarian traders outside the protection of Athenian law, making 
it hazardous, if not impossible, for them to do business in Athens.” (Legon. 
Megara, p. 214). According to De.Ste.Croix, exclusion from the harbours of the 
Athenian Empire did not mean exclusion from the markets of these places, 
something which means that the Megarians were allowed to use these markets, 
providing that they could reach them. But the question which arises here, is how 
they were going to reach the markets of these states, which most of them were 
islands, without being able to use their ports? Athens had built a maritime empire, 
and of course the use of the harbours was essential for anyone who wanted to have 
a contact with the cities which were under Athenian dominion. It is rather difficult 
to believe that the Megarians could still reach these cities by using their shores, and 
carrying all their products to their markets. We also have to remember that most 
of the Aegean islands have rocky shores and only very few natural harbours exist 
there. So we have to assume that exclusion from the harbours of these cities meant 
exclusion from the cities themselves.
Except Thucydides, we have two more sources referring to the Megarian decree. 
One is Aristophanes, and the other is Plutarch. Although Aristophanes can be 
considered as a source for the Megarian decree, he cannot be trusted as much as 
Thucydides, concerning the political implications he makes in his Achamians and 
his Peace. According to Aristophanes jthe reason of the Megarian decree was the 
abduction of two harlots from the house of Aspasia by some Megarians. (Achar. 
514-529). For Aristophanes this was the reason of the Megarian decree and the 
cause for the whole Peloponnesian war. Of course this is comic fantasy of 
Aristophanes who makes a comic parallelism with the cause of the Trojan war (see 
also: MacDowell. "The Nature of Aristophanes' Akharnians", Greece and Rome, xxx 
(1983), p. 151), or he is just sarcastic against Pericles who led them to war. 
According to Aristophanes (Achar. 530-539), Pericles acting on Aspasias behalf
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proposed the decree, excluding the Megarians from the harbours of the Athenian 
Empire, and from the Agora. Then the Megarians and the Spartans came several 
times to Athens asking the Athenians to rescind the decree, and when the Athenians 
refused, the war broke out. This interpretation of Aristophanes comes in 
contradiction with Thucydide s' interpretation concerning the causes o f the war. 
According to Thucydides the true cause of the war was the fear of the Spartans of 
the growth of the Athenian power. "But Dikaiopolis too says something which is 
not very different from that. In 540 he points out that the incidents which he has 
been describing may be thought an adequate reason for fighting; but he goes on to 
say th a tjf  the Athenians had had similar provocation, if some Spartan had taken 
not some slaves, nor all the produce imported from some ally, but merely one little 
dog from Seriphos (one of the least important places in the Athenian Empire), the 
Athenians would have reacted with even more military and naval fuss. That is as 
much as to say that the reason for the Spartans’ declaration of war was really that 
they were sensitive to Athenian encroachment on their own sphere of influence." 
(MacDowell. "The Nature of Aristophanes’ Akharnians", Greece and Rome, xxx (1983), 
p. 154). Finally Plutarch's account o f  the Megarian decree is almost the same «S. 
Thucydides’ account, with the difference that the Athenians banned the Megarians 
not only from the Athenian Agora but also from all the other markets of the 
Athenian Empire. (Plut. Per. 29). According to Plutarch it was the violation of the 
sacred land which caused the decree. (Per. 30). In my opinion the Athenians and 
especially Pericles knew that the war was inevitable. Pericles’ strategy just before 
the eruption of the war was the weakening of the Peloponnesians, by damaging 
their trade and of course their economy. Sparta like many other of the 
Peloponnesian allies did not have a strong fleet and consequently Corinth together 
with Megara were the two most important naval states in Peloponnesus. Corinth’s 
naval power had been crippled after her defeat at Sybota, and the Corinthian trade, 
which was practised in the West, should have been damaged, when Athens had
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started to intervene in the Ionian after she concluded an alliance with Corcyra. On
the other hand the Megarians had their losses in the sea-batde of Sybota, but their
commerce to the East had remained intact. Naturally the next target of the
Athenians were the Megarians. By weakening the Megarian trade, the Athenians
could damage the whole Peloponnesian alliance. The decree which was imposed
upon Megara could serve the Athenian aims very well, and the violation of the
sacred land, together with the accusation of providing asylum to run away slaves
were the best excuses for the imposition of the decree. Athens had many reasons
to impose this decree upon the Megarians: 1. Economic: By imposing this decree
the Athenians damaged the Megarian trade and Economy, and consequently the
economy of many other Peloponnesian states. 2. Political: Pericles probably believed
that by imposing the decree upon the Megarians he could press them to leave the
Peloponnesian league and turn for one more time to the Athenian alliance. If this
£ » F  + V \ £
happened it could be a good propaganda for the restAcities who were allies of 
Sparta. On the other hand an alliance with Megara just before the eruption of the 
war not only weakened the Peloponnesians, but also secured the territory of Attica 
from any invasion of the Peloponnesians, and isolated the Boeotians from 
Peloponnesus cutting off one of their two ways which they could use in order to 
come in contact with the rest of their allies. 3. Religious: The violation of the 
sacred land was a reason that made Athens impose the decree but not the only 
one. Finally we have to remember that Athens was willing to punish Megara who 
abandoned the Delian league and turned the Peloponnesian alliance, and helped 
Corinth in the affair of Corcyra. (for more information about the Megarian decree, 
see also: Kagan. O.P.W:, Legon. Megara; Highbarger. Megara; De.Ste.Croix.
O.P.W.\ Connor. Phoenix, 28 (1973); Hammond. E.H.R., 88 (1973); Forrest. Times 
Literary Supplement, 72 (1973); Fornara. 91 (1971); Wick. UAntique
Classique, 46 (1977) e t c ) .
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During the summer of 431 the Spartan king Archidamos invaded Attica with a 
Lacedaemonian and allied army. The Athenians did not try to resist this huge 
Peloponnesian army which was numbered, according to Plutarch (Per. 33. 4), almost 
60,000 men, and they waited until the enemy returned to its base. When the 
summer ended and the forces of the Peloponnesian alliance left Attica, the 
Athenians invaded the Megarid under the command of the general Pericles, using 
their whole army, which numbered almost 13,000 hoplites, and a great number of 
light armed troops. The Megarian territory was devastated, and the Athenian 
invasions continued twice a year until the Athenian army captured Nisaea in 424. 
(Thuc. ii. 31/iy.^lJrhe Megarians were not able to resist the invasion, for the 
Athenians greatly outnumbered them, and their allies could not help them because 
they had already returned home. Until 424 Megara became, for the Athenians, the 
most easily reached target among the other members of the Peloponnesian alliance. 
The Megarians were very close to Athens, and of course they could not expect any 
assistance from their allies, for the Athenians could very easily attack Megarid and 
then return home before the Megarian allies even had the time even to prepare their 
army.
The Megarians who suffered a lot from these annual invasions of the Athenians, 
soon found themselves in a very difficult position from economic point of view. 
Aristophanes gives a general idea of the situation that existed in Megara during the 
war in his Achamiav\s - and Peace. Especially in the Acharn.icuv* (753-763) he 
seems to be trying to encourage the Athenians making jokes about the sufferings 
of the Megarians. "Megara had become for him the most dramatic illustration of the 
suffering the war brought to Greece. He personifies her abasement in the figure of 
a desperate Megarian farmer (denied even the dignity of a name), who tries to sell 
his daughters to Dicaeopolis, disguised as pigs, so that both he and they can avert 
starvation." (Legon. Megara, p. 231). According to Aristophanes the Megarians
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were starving, because of the annual invasions of the Athenians, and there was 
nothing which could save them from this difficult position. Of course we can see 
some comic exaggeration on this scene, but on the other hand we can have an idea 
of Megara’s economic situation during the first years of the war. The conditions in 
Megara had gone from bad to worse. If the Megarian decree had crippled their 
economy) the annual invasions of the Athenians should have devastated them. The 
Megarians could not cultivate their land any more, and of course food supplies 
Hcul "ho imported from Corinth or Boeotia. In Aristophanes’ Peace (481-83) which 
was presented around 421, the situation is exactly the same. The Megarians were 
starving to death and their condition was worse than ever. "It was, after all, proof 
that the Athenians had been able to inflict worse hardship on at least one of their 
enemies than they themselves had suffered. At the same time, Aristophanes hoped 
that the pathetic condition of the Megarians would provide an example of the 
extremes to which the war had been carried, perhaps helping to soften his 
countrymen’s attitude toward peace. The plays were more successful as comedy, 
however, than, as political propaganda, and they did not alter Athens’ policy toward 
Megara in any measurable way." (Legon. Megara, p. 232). But Megara was not 
suffering only from the invasions of the Athenians but also from the naval blockade 
which was imposed by Athens. In (ii. 93) Thucydides says that the Athenians used 
Budorum in the island of Salamis in order to control Nisaea and to prevent the 
Megarians from reaching the sea. We do not know exactly when the Athenians 
started to use Budorum as a base in order to control the Megarians, but this 
measure must have taken place around 431-430. According to Legon: "...it can only 
have resulted in the further drastic reduction of Megara’s capacity to import food 
and other supplies by sea. It is true that Pagae on the opposite coast was still in 
Megarian hands, but ships embarking from it were restricted to the eastern end of 
the Corinthian Gulf by the Athenian blockading force at Naupactus. Thus Megara 
was isolated from the grain rich cities of Magna Graecia as effectively/ as from the
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Black Sea communities." (Legon. Megara, p. 229-230). So we have to assume that 
the Megarians were dependent on the Corinthian and Boeotian assistance concerning 
their food supplies.
The invasions in Megarid as well as the naval blockade must have put the 
Megarians in a very bad position, which forced them to propose to their allies a 
bold and ambitious plan which could give an end to the war. The Megarian plan 
was to launch a sudden attack against Piraeus, and by this way to have the 
opportunity to capture the harbour of the Athenians in one night (Thuc. ii. 93-94). 
The Athenians did not pay much attention to Piraeus for they could not imagine 
that somebody could dare to attack their harbour especially the Peloponnesians who 
had been defeated in two consecutive sea-battles during the same summer of 429. 
(Thuc. ii. 83-92). MOTt&ove't; ... , it was almost winter and the usually windy 
Saronic Gulf offered them protection. But the Lacedaemonians had already decided 
to take the chance and to sail against Piraeus. The Peloponnesians used 40 vessels 
which were at the harbour of Nisaea. According to Legon: "At no other time are 
more than twenty Megarian warships attested. In fact, the 8,000 men it would have 
taken to man forty triremes was probably greater than the entire free adult male 
population of the state, and Thucydides’ account makes it clear that rowexsfrom 
other Peloponnesian states had to be brought in as crews for these vessels. One 
possible explanation of this puzzle is that the Megarians attempted to float ships 
that had long since been taken out of service - not only their active fleet, but 
retired hulls as well. A more plausible explanation is that ships of other 
Peloponnesian states were stationed or quartered at Nisaea. Such warships might 
have been used at some stage to convoy supplies to Megara, past the Athenian 
blockade." (Legon. Megara, p. 234-235).
According to Thucydides this bold Megarian plan failed for three reasons: 1. The
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Peloponnesians were afraid because their ships had not been afloat for a very long 
time, probably because of the Athenian blockade. 2. They considered finally the 
whole operation as too risky. 3. They were hindered by the winds.
I believe that those difficulties made unsuccessful the whole plan, but in my opinion 
there are some points which need more explanation. First of all, the plan of the 
Peloponnesians was to sail during the night because they were afraid of the
Athenian guard in Budorum. If we suppose that the original plan of the
Peloponnesian was to launch a surprise attack on Piraeus, then their vessels had to
get around Budorum and to sail South, and then to turn North. This operation was 
very difficult for the following reasons. 1. They had to sail very fast as long as it 
was still night. 2. Their vessels were not too safe, and 3. the opposite wind made 
the sails useless. The winds in the Southern and Eastern sides of Salamis are 
usually very strong - even today the modem small vessels have difficulties passing 
these points - and there are also many dangerous streams in the Southern point of 
the island as well as in the North coast. I believe that the ships of the
Peloponnesians which had not been used for a long period of time, could not sail 
very fast and finally the whole operation became dangerous. The only alternative 
solution for the Peloponnesians was to turn back and then to sail north passing 
between Nisaea and Budorum, and trying to attack Piraeus, making the round of the 
island on the west side. But this was not possible, for the night could not cover 
them any more and of course it was not possible to pass the narrow straits of the 
northern coast of the island, where the Porthmeion was during the day light. The 
only target they could reach without facing serious problems was Budorum. So, 
finally, the Peloponnesian squadron made a surprise attack on the Athenian fort, and 
after they captured the guards and the three Athenian triremes which^stationed there, 
they devastated Salamis. With the first light of the day the Athenians came out with 
their fleet, but it was too late, for the Peloponnesians had already left the island.
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Two years later - summer of 427 - the Athenians managed to capture the island of 
Minoa under the commands of general Nicias. Minoa was facing the harbour of 
Nisaea and was separated from the mainland by marshy ground. (For the topography 
of Minoa see: Gomme. H.C.T., iii. 51. 4). The Athenians wanted to control Nisaea 
from a point which was closet to Megara than Budorum, and aimed to cut off 
completely the Megarians from the Aegean. (Thuc. iii. 51). Although there was 
a Megarian garrison on Minoa, Nicias did not have any difficulty tin capturigthe 
isle. The loss of the Minoa created a lot of troubles for the Megarians. A
democratic revolution must have occurred by this summer, and although there is no
•+ i+
evidence of any participation of the A thenians/is very possible that^was related
with the capture of Minoa by Nicias. According to Legon: "Megara’s deepen crisis
had brought her to the point of revolution by 427, and the loss of Minoa may have
been the iast straw for those who regarded the oligarchs’ policy as bankrupt."
(Legon. Megara, p. 235). Thucydides . (iii. 68) says that the Spartans, after they
had captured the city of Plataea during the same summer (427^ gave . permission
to some Megarians who were loyal to them to inhabit the city for one year, for
they had been exiled from Megara after a stasis which had erupted there. These
Megarian exiles probably moved to Pagae later on, before the second stasis of the
oligarchs in 424. So we see that these "loyal to Lacedaemonians" Megarians were
oligarchs who were exiled for political reasons. I agree with Legon when he is
saying that the Spartans offered them temporary refuge. This would place the
revolution in close proximity to the fall of Minoa, but we will probably never know
which event helped to trigger the other." (Legon. Megara, p. 236). In the
AcharmtfviS-S (755) we read: "When I was leaving there, the men who are
Probouloi for the city were trying to find the quickest way of getting us to ruin."
(Translation by MacDowell). The word Probouloi means that the Megarians were
using a kind of Boule of the Athenian type. According to Legon: "We ought to
assume at least that Thucydides’ description of the regime as a democracy meant
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that the Megarian assembly was more active than it had been during the centuries 
of oligarchy." (Legon. Megara, p. 237). This coup had not changed the policy of 
Megara towards Athens and of course the Megarians did not abandon the 
Peloponnesian alliance.
During the summer of 425 the Spartans suffered a terrible disaster in Pylos, and 
they proposed to the Athenians to end the war and conclude a peace treaty. The 
Athenians, and especially Cleon the leader of demos at the time, wanted among 
other things, to receive Nisaea and Pagae, territories which, according to the 
previous treaty, (Thirty Years Peace Treaty), belonged to Athens. (Thuc. iv. 21). 
The Lacedaemonians, who did not reject the Athenian claims, asked the Athenians 
to discuss the matter in private, and not in the assembly, for they did not want to 
be exposed ito their allies. (Thuc. iv. 22). Finally Cleon persuaded the people 
to reject this proposal, and the negotiations for the treaty failed. The point here is 
that the Spartans were ready to accept the Athenian terms and to give them Pagae 
and Nisaea (and of course the opportunity to close Megara from all sides), in order 
to get back their soldiers who had been captured in Sphacteria. The Spartans could 
very easily sacrifice the interests of the Megarians, who were completely ignorant 
of the negotiations, in order to succeed Ito their own plans.
The situation in Megara remained the same until the summer of 424. During this 
summer the Megarians faced serious problems, not only because of the twice- 
yearly Athenian invasions, but also because of the attacks of the political exiles 
(oligarchs) who were using Pagae as their base and ravaging the countryside. 
(Thuc. iv. 66). According to Gomme: "...There were exiles at Pagai; these la tte t 
were very likely the same men as had been given the right to live at Plataia for one 
year, in 427." (Gomme. H.C.T., iv. 66. 1). The democrats of the city who could 
not defend their city to this "counter attack" of the oligarchs started to think that
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they could permit the exiles to return to the city, so they could have to face only
one enemy. "The democratic leaders found themselves in an extremely awkward and
WcsS
dangerous position. Their state was a democracy whose survival ^ dependent on the 
firm support of oligarchic allies, and especially of Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes. 
These allies were needed to defend Megara against Athens, the champion of popular 
government in Greece, and also against her own oligarchic exiles, with whom they 
were in open sympathy. Megara was caught up in a contradiction. She would either 
fall prey to Athens, because she was too weak to continue resistance, or, if the 
Peloponnesians kept her defences propped up, she would soon be compelled to take 
back the oligarchs, and might well lose her democratic regime and sacrifice its 
leaders before long." (Legon: "Megara and Mytilene”, Phoenix, 22 (1986), p. 216). 
The democrats who knew that the return of the exiles could start a civil stripe, 
preferred to ask the assistance of the Athenians, instead of giving the exiles the 
chance to create political unrest to the city. (Thuc. iv. 66). As a result a secret 
agreement was made between the Megarian democrats and the Athenian generals 
Demosthenes and Hippocrates, in order to surrender the city to the Athenians. 
According to Legon, the leaders of the Megarian democracy had to resort to 
treachery in order to achieve their ends,for they did not believe that the demos 
would approve an alliance with Athens under any circumstances. That is why they 
did not openly propose a change of alliance to the Megarian demos. (For a 
detailed analysis of this argument see Legon: "Megara and Mytilene", Phoenix, 22 
(1986), p. 221). "These observations cast a new light on what might otherwise 
appear as treasonable or subversive activity on the part of eminent politicians, 
democrats and oligarchs, in the smaller poleis. In reality, in the cases treated above, 
and in numerous other instances, such apparent deviousness was the only course of 
action open to political factions with even legitimate aspirations. (Legon: "Megara 
and Mytilene", Phoenix, 22 (1986), p. 223). Losada rejects this hypothesis of Legon 
on the basis of two reasons: First, there is no . y evidence in Thucydides which
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supports it, and second, "regardless of why the demos would not support the 
prostatai, the fact remains that they did not, and, on Legon’s argument, this in turn 
forced the prostatai to commit treason. We would agree that the loss of the support 
of the demos was the main incident in the political situation which caused the 
prostatai to turn to treason; but we also note that Legon’s hypothetical explanation 
of the demos’ failure to support the prostatai has an important bearing on any 
assessment of the motives of the prostatai. On his argument, the prostatai, in 
betraying the city, were defending the best interests of the demos which did not 
understand that the survival of the democracy was at stake." (Losada. The fifth 
column in the Peloponnesian war, p. 53). Of course as Losada points out their action 
does not appear as treasonous but it treason. On the other hand I agree with 
Legon’s point that "neither more or less reason to condemn the behaviour of the 
democrats in this period than that of the oligarchs. Both factions were powerfully 
influenced by considerations of self interest - that is, their desires to prosper and 
rule, or at least survive - but both would also have claimed with some sincerity to 
have had the best interests of Megara at heart. Seldom do men see any clear 
distinction between their own welfare and the general good. Each faction would 
have believed that Megara’s security was best served by the political ties that 
favoured their personal interests as well." (Legon. Megara, p. 242). Gomme 
supports that: "The majority (of the Megarians) were not fanatical and were more 
patriotic than loyal to party, anxious to preserve their independence of both Athens 
and their Peloponnesian neighbours... the extremists of both sides were 
unscrupulous, particularly the oligarchs, and it was they who came to the front." 
(Gomme. H.C.T., iv. 66. 1). For me the democrats did not propose to the demos 
their plans for two more reasons: 1. They were afraid of the presence of the 
Peloponnesian garrison in Nisaea and in Long Walls. According to Thucydides, (iv. 
66. 3), the Peloponnesians alone guarded Nisaea because they were afraid, or they 
did not trust the Megarians. It is probable that they had put these troops in Nisaea
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after the stasis of the democrats in 427. 2. The democrats were probably afraid of 
the strong oligarchic element which had remained in the city. As we will see the 
oligarchs opposed the democrats when the latter tried to persuade the people to 
open the gates and to permit the Athenian force to enter the city
The plan of the democrats was the following: At first the Athenians were going to 
capture the Long Walls as well as the harbour of Nisaea. Then the conspirators 
were going to surrender the city to an Athenian command of Demosthenes. (Thuc. 
iv. 66. 3). The first part of the plan was successful and the Athenians did not face 
serious problems when they attacked Nisaea and the Walls. The Peloponnesian 
garrison was eliminated and its Spartan leader surrendered. (Thuc. iv. 67-69). But 
the second part of their plan failed as the oligarchs of Megara opposed the 
democrats who were ready to surrender the city to the Athenians. (Thuc. iv. 68. 
5-6). Of course the oligarchs could not expect, at this moment, that they were able 
to save finally their city for they were not expecting any help from their allies. I 
suppose that the Spartan leader of the Peloponnesian garrison in Nisaea must have 
thought the same thing and decided to surrender and not to fight. But help from the 
Peloponnesians was not far away. The Spartan commander Brasidas was in Sicyon 
or Corinth trying to gather an army for his expedition in Chalcidice when he 
received the news of the Athenian effort to capture Megara. Brasidas reacted 
immediately and moved to Megarid with an army of almost 4,000 men strong. In 
the meantime he sent a word to Boeotians asking them to bring an army and meet 
him at Tripodiscus, in Megarid. (Thuc. iv. 70). The Boeotians had intended to 
assist Megara even before they were summoned by Brasidas, for they had 
considered that the loss of Megara could trouble them as well, (see also the chapter 
about Boeotia), and they had moved their whole army already to Plataea; but when 
the messenger of Brasidas met them they decided to send forward a force of 2,200 
hoplites and 600 cavalry, and allowed the rest of their forces to return home. (Thuc.
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iv. 72). The Athenians, who were not aware of Brasidas’ expedition in Chalcidice, 
were very surprised when they learnt that a Peloponnesian army, which 
outnumbered them, was marching against them. But before Brasidas moved his 
whole army to Megarid he went first to the city of Megara with a force of 300 
men in an effort to persuade the Megarians to accept him and his army into the 
city. (Thuc. iv. 70). The Megarians refused admission* for the two parties in the 
city were both afraid that the oligarchs were going to bring back their exiled friends 
from Pagae, and of course this was an immediate threat to them, and the oligarchs 
were afraid that a civil war was going to erupt because of this fear of the 
democrats. (Thuc. iv. 70-71). Finally the next morning the two armies faced each 
other but no battle was fought for both the opponents did not want to risk a 
conflict. Brasidas took advantage of it, and he considered himself as a winner, as 
the Athenian army withdrew into the port of Nisaea. (Thuc. iv. 72-73). According 
to Kagan; "Thucydides tells us that he (Brasidas) thought he had a superior position 
from which to fight; if they refused he would have achieved his purpose, the 
defence of Megara without a battle. These calculations were reasonable, yet 
Brasidas’ behaviour is surprising. Here seemed to be the moment the Spartans had 
hoped for since the start of the war: a Peloponnesian army facing the Athenians 
with prospect of a pitched battle between hoplite phalanxes. Why, then, did the 
boldest of Spartan generals hold back? Some scholars have suggested that his 
restraint is evidence of Sparta’s continued lack of self-confidence after its recent 
defeats, and they blame him for not making an attack... The explanation of 
Thucydides is perfectly sound. Additionally, the Athenian army was arrayed just 
outside a fortified place. If Brasidas had attacked it and gained the advantage the 
Athenians could have taken refuge in Nisaea and suffered few losses. On the other 
hand, the Athenians might win which would be disastrous for Sparta." (Kagan. The 
Archidamian War, p. 277). We also have to remember that Brasidas was making 
preparations for an ambitious expedition in Chalcidice. I believe that the Spartan
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commander would like to keep his forces intact and to avoid taking any risks that 
could damage his plans.
After the Athenian retreat the Megarian oligarchs considered Brasidas as a winner 
and they received him and his army into the city. (Thuc. iv. 73). Consequently, 
the oligarchs who had been exiled returned to Megara, and the democrats who took 
part in the conspiracy fled secretly. Although the exiled oligarchs had sworn'oaths 
to respect their opponents and not to take any revenge, when they came into office 
again, they selected about a hundred of their enemies, and executed them. (Thuc.
iv. 74. 1). As for the democrats who left the city, som6 of them took part in the 
Sicilian expedition, fighting as light armed troops along with the Athenians. (Thuc. 
vi. 43; vii. 57).
During the same summer of 424 the Megarians sent a contingent to Boeotia in 
order to assist the Boeotians in the battle of Delium but unfortunately Thucydides 
does not give any additional information about this Megarian force. (Thuc. iv. 100. 
1).
During the winter of the same year the Megarians captured and destroyed the Long 
Walls which connected the Metropolis with Nisaea. (Thuc. iv. 109. 1). According 
to Legon: "Thucydides gives no hint that the Athenians put up any serious 
resistance to this move, and it seems reasonable that they were content to see it 
take place. Since they had lost hope of capturing Megara by force in the immediate 
future, the Long Walls were as much menace to their troops at Nisaea as they were 
to the Megarians, for they could provide cover for a surprise attack at either end. 
With the Long Walls demolished a no man’s land was created between Nisaea and 
Megara, and this situation remained essentially unchanged for about fifteen years'' 
(Legon. Megara, p. 247). After the successful campaign of Brasidas in Chalcidice
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and the surrender of Amphipolis to the Peloponnesian army in 423 the Athenians 
and the Lacedaemonians concluded an armistice for one year. (Thuc. iv. 117. 1). 
The Lacedaemonians who were anxious to take back their soldiers who were 
imprisoned in Athens after their defeat in Sphacteria, agreed among other things that 
the situation on Megara should remain the same, which means that the Athenians 
kept Nisaea and Minoa, and neither side should communicate with the other. 
(Thuc. iv. 118. 4). The Megarians did not oppose this article for they had the 
opportunity to recover from the continuous war and to start rebuilding their ruined 
economy. Of course they could not use their harbour®'1' Saronic gulf but on the 
other hand their countryside had been saved, at least for one year.
The armistice of 423 was followed by the Peace Treaty of Nicias which was signed 
between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians. Although, according to the terms
+hey
of the treaty, each one should return whatever^had captured by the force of arms, 
the Athenians refused to give back Nisaea (Thucydides does not mention Minoa) 
formas they  ^ c1_et»me& the harbour was surrendered to them, and was not captured 
by arms. (Thuc. v. 17. 2). The point here is that the Lacedaemonians did not 
oppose this Athenian claim and did not pay any attention to Megara’s interests; and 
finally allowed Athens to keep Nisaea - although, as Gomme points out, (H.C.T.,
v. 17. 2), "the surrender of Nisaea was the action of Peloponnesian troops rather 
than of the Megarians". Finally Athens and Sparta concluded the Peace Treaty of 
Nicias with Athens, although Megara together with Corinth, Boeotia and Elis 
rejected it.
The end of the Archidamian war found the Megarians suffering greatly, as a result 
of the continuous Athenian raids in Megarid, the naval blockade, and the political 
stasis which shaken the city for several years. On the other hand Sparta had agreed 
with Athens to leave the harbour of Nisaea in Athenian hands for at least thirty
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years, according to the terms of the treaty. Although Sparta tried to persuade 
Boeotia, Corinth, Elis and Megara to accept the peace treaty, these states finally 
rejected it and as a result the Lacedaemonians concluded an alliance with Athens 
which aimed to put pressure on those cities who had rejected the treaty. (Thuc. v. 
22. 2-24). Although Megara was unhappy with the terms of the treaty, she 
preferred not to take part in the new coalition which was formed by the states of 
Corinth, Argos, Mantineia and Elis. (A detailed analysis of this coalition and of 
the diplomacy of this period follows in the chapter about Argos). Megara together 
with Boeotia remained quiet for they preferred not to cooperate with a democratic 
state like Argos. (Thuc. v. 31. 6). "Hereof any further evidence is needed, we see 
clearly the connection between the Megarian oligarchs’ self interest and their foreign 
ties. Despite Sparta’s adoption of a policy that spelled severe economic hardship for 
Megara, the oligarchs contented themselves with a half-hearted protest and shrank 
from any foreign connection that might have improved Megara’s position while 
jeopardising their own. Sparta could hardly have expected her oligarchic friends in 
Megara to do more if they were to retain any vestige of respect among their fellow 
Megarians.” (Legon. Megara, p. 251). During 421/0 a defensive alliance was 
concluded between Megara, Boeotia, Corinth and the cities of Thrace and it 
probably aimed to work as a counterbalance to the alliance between Athens and 
Sparta. (Thuc. v. 38. 1). Furthermore these states were planning to conclude an 
alliance with Argos as well, but finally the whole plan was abandoned, for in reality 
none of them was willing to leave Sparta and turn to the democracy of Argos for 
support. When the war recommenced Megara joined Sparta for one more time, as 
well as her other Peloponnesian allies. (Thuc. v. 58. 4; 59. 2; 60. 3). During the 
years that followed, until the end of the war, Athens stopped her invasions in 
Megarid for the war now had been transferred into the Aegean sea, and Athens was 
not on the offensive any more. Around 409 the Megarians attacked and recaptured 
Nisaea, with the help of some forces from Sparta or Sicily. (Diod. xiii. 65. 1).
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Unfortunately Diodorus does not give many details about the whole operation, and 
we cannot be sure about the date nor the number of the forces who assisted the 
Megarians. The Athenians responded to this Megarian attack, and a cavalry force 
of 400 men invaded Megarid and defeated the Megarian-allied force who came out 
to confront them. Although the Athenians were winners in this battle they did not 
manage to recapture Nisaea, but they inflicted many casualties to the Megarians and 
they probably devastated .Megaris. (Diod. xiii. 65. 1-2). "Since the Megarid had 
probably been spared for the greater part of the decade, there was quite a lot of 
damage to be inflicted. This may account for the Megarian!* uncharacteristic and 
futile effort to resist the invasion. This failure was both an indication of Megarian 
weakness and a sharp setback to her hopes of recovery, since it led to the further 
depletion of her manpower and resources." (Legon. Megara, p. 254).
Although the Megarians managed to recapture Nisaea, their sea power had been 
destroyed. Megara contributed only one ship to the Peloponnesian fleet during 412 
(Thuc. viii. 33. 1), and her contribution did not increase after 409 when Nisaea was 
recaptured.
During 412 the Megarian Helixus commanded a Peloponnesian squadron of ten 
ships, according to and succeeded to raise a revolt in
Byzantium. When the war ended with the complete defeat of the Athenians, the 
Megarians did not follow the line of the Boeotians and the Corinthians who wanted 
Athens to be destroyed completely, although the Megarid had been devastated for 
many years, the Megarian economy had been destroyed, and the people of Megara 
had suffered heavy losses during the 27 years of the war.
I believe that Megara did not have any desire to take part in the war but they were 
just victims of the circumstances. The Megarians did not have any concrete ideology
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towards this war. The conflicts between Sparta and Athens did not touch them. 
They did not care who was going to be the winner, but on the other hand they 
could not remain neutral. Their geographical position and their conflicts with 
Corinth did not allow that. It was a necessity for Megara to join one of the two 
superpowers in Greece. That is why they left the Peloponnesian league and took 
part in the Delian league when the Athenians had the power to protect them. When 
the Athenians proved unable to assist them and the Peloponnesian forces devastated 
Megarid after the expedition at Locris, the Megarians turned again to the Spartans, 
hoping that there was not going to be a war. Unfortunately for them their hopes 
had not come true, and the war devastated their land, their economy and many 
Megarians lost their lives trying to protect their city.
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IV. W ESTERN G REECE
The Cities of W estern Greece During 
The Peloponnesian W ar
Anactorium, Ambracia, Astacus, Leucas, Elis, Locris, Phokis, Cephallenia and 
Achaea, were the cities of Western and Central Greece who were allies of the 
Spartans during the Peloponnesian war.
Although all of them cooperated with the Peloponnesian alliance, only a few of 
them played an important role during the years of the war.
The cities of Anactorium, Leucas, Astacus, and Ambracia were colonies of Corinth 
and they were very important for the Corinthian trade and access into the Ionian 
sea. They cooperated with the Spartans in the war only because they were of vital 
importance for Corinth. Especially Ambracia, which was the greatest Greek city of 
North Western Greece^ fought against the Athenians in order to fulfil her own plans.
Elis and Achaea0 although they were Peloponnesian states^ did not show great 
enthusiasm to fight against the Athenian league and Elis tried to abandon Sparta 
after the treaty of Nicias. Achaea remained neutral during the first years of the war 
and even when she decided to fight did not offer too much to the Peloponnesians. 
The Locrians and the Phokians proved to be more cooperative allies especially to 
the Boeotians, and were among the cities who accepted the troubled treaty of 
Nicias.
Among the most powerful cities of North Western Greece was Ambracia. The
people of Ambracia were Dorians and the city itself was a colony of Corinth. At
the peak of its strength Ambracia could use no less than five thousand hoplites and
a fleet of 27 ships. According to Thucydides the Ambraciotes were the "
% »
[^T*Toi Twir Tfepi tw", (Thuc. iii. 108), and of course their military strength
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made them the most useful allies of Corinth in the region. T o  the strength of 
Ambracia we have to add their allies, the barbarian Chaones who were an Epirote 
tribe. But at the eastern end of the gulf of Ambracia ..."there were at least two 
fortified cities hostile to Corinth and Ambracia: Olpae, the Acamanian ’thing* and 
Amphilochian Argos, which, though largely hellenized by the Corinthian colonies 
which had been its neighbours for centuries, was on bad terms with them." 
(Beaumont: "Corinth, Ambracia, Apollonia", J.H.S., 72, 1952, p. 62).
The first attempt of the Ambraciotes to take control of Amphilochia was made 
sometime after the Trojan war, and Thucydides gives no date for it. The founder 
of Amphilochian Argos was Amphilochus an Argive who had fought at the Trojan 
war. The Amphilochian Argos soon became the biggest and the most powerful city 
of the Amphilochian region, but after a few generations the Amphilochians faced 
troubles, probably because of their barbarian neighbours, and invited the 
Ambraciotes to settle at the city with them. The Ambraciotes "hellenized" the 
Argives but later on they drove away the original inhabitants of the city and kept 
it for themselves. The Athenians came with a squadron of thirty ships under the 
general Phormio in order to help the Argives, captured the city by storm and then 
enslaved the Ambraciotes of Argos. After this an alliance was concluded between 
the Athenians and the Amphilochian Argives. "It has been generally said that this 
incident must be dated after 440, to explain the decision of the Corinthians in the 
Samian crisis and before 435 after which year Thucydides’ account of the events 
in the north-west which led to the war is alleged to be exhaustive." (Beaumont: 
"Corinth, Ambracia, Apollonia", J.H.S., 72, 1952, p. 62).
According to Beaumont: "The help which the Athenians sent to the Amphilochians 
and the alliance which they concluded with them at the same time, show the 
awakening interest of Athens in the north-west. This alliance may have been
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concluded in the hope of blocking the overland route, though there were no doubt 
other motives; a desire to break Ambracia , which must be ranked as only just not 
a great power, accounts for a great deal. But that the land route was the most 
important single interest which Athens had in Acamania is indicated by the 
Attention which was paid to Oeniadae, a city which so far as is known, did not 
furnish contingents to Corinthian fleets or armies. The taking of Oeniadae cannot 
have been an end to itself; and it is unthinkable that in the critical year 454, when 
he abandoned the attempt to cut Corinth off from Sparta and sailed to Acamania 
Pericles was engaged in an operation of minor importance." (Beaumont: "Corinth, 
Ambracia, Apollonia", J.H.S., 72, p. 63).
For Corinth the city of Ambracia - as well as her other colonies in the Ionian - was 
of vital importance. These cities were necessary to the Corinthian trade to the west 
because they could be used as naval bases, for triremes or merchant ships, to make 
the difficult trip to Sicily and southern Italy or could prevent raids of Corcyra in 
the Ionian, especially after 435. During the first half of the fifth century an 
argument over Leucas took place between Corinth and Corcyra and it was 
Themistocles who gave a solution to the dispute. He decided that Leucas was to be 
considered as a colony common to Corcyra and Corinth, and that Corinth should 
payMalents to the Corcyraeans. Of course this decision was in favour of Corcyra 
which after this declared Themistocles as her benefactor. (Plut. Them. 24. 1; Thuc.
i. 136. 1). Anactorium as well was a common colony of Corinth and Corcyra, 
(Thuc. i. 55. 1) and "...like Leukas, Anactorium used Corinthian coins engraved with 
its own initial. This appears to suggest that the city had initially been a Corinthian 
colony... There can, in any case be no doubt that there was a Corcyraean population 
of strength in Anactorium at the outbreak o f the Peloponnesian war. We have seen 
that Thucydides considered it common to Corinth and Corcyra, and its actions in 
the succeeding years make it clear why he thought so. At the battle of Sybota in
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433, the nearby states of Ambracia and Leucas supplied a total of thirty-seven ships, 
while Anactorium was a lesser naval state than the others, the degree of disparity 
remains surprising. When Thucydides lists the states who supplied ships to each side 
at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Leucas and Ambracia are named, but 
Anactorium is missing." (Kagan. The outbreak o f the Peloponnesian war, pp. 217- 
218).
This fact probably shows that at those times (433) there was political unrest in the 
city of Anactorium and that there was a pro-Corcyraean "party" who did not want 
a further intervention ir» the war between Corcyra and Corinth. The fact that 
Anactorium was captured through trickery by the Corinthians in 433 shows that 
during this year it was the pro-Corinthian party who had the control of the city. 
However, later on the friends of Corcyra managed to surrender the city to the 
Athenians and their Acamanian friends by treachery in 425, and the city was 
inhabited by Ac lamanians (Thuc. iv. 49). The enmity between Corinth and 
Corcyra over the control of the Ionian became more serious during the second half 
of the sixth century and led to the conflict for Epidamnus. We can see that Corinth 
used all its power in order to side with all these cities and prevent Corcyra from 
using them, and even an open war against Corcyra could not prevent her from 
doing so.
Sometime before 435/4 a civil strife broke out in the city of Epidamnus which was 
a common colony of Corcyra and Corinth. As a result of this struggle the oligarchs 
of the city were exiled, and cooperated with the barbarian neighbouring tribes of 
Epidamnus. During the year 435 the Epidamnians sent an embassy to Corcyra for 
help in order to take the city under their own sphere of influence and at the same 
time to damage Corcyra which was a threat for them in the region. (Thuc. i. 24- 
26), (see also the chapter about Corinth).
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Very soon a garrison was sent to Epidamnus by Corinth, Ambracia and Leucas. 
Furthermore the Corinthians decided to send new settlers to the city who could have 
an equal share with the colonists. This was a provocative action towards Corcyra 
which realised that she could lose her rights over Epidamnus. Corcyra responded 
immediately and sent out of the city the garrison and the new settlers. The 
Epidamnians refused and the Corcyraeans sent forty ships and with their Illyrian 
allies besieged the city. (Thuc. i. 26).
After that the Corinthians started preparations for a war. Their aims were to prevent 
Corcyra from taking over Epidamnus and on the other hand to create a new colony 
. PY1 a new basis. In order to succeed in  this they proclaimed that anyone who 
wished could take part in the new colonization of Epidamnus having an equal share 
with the old settlers. Meanwhile Corinth started the military preparations for the 
expedition and asked for the help of her allies. The Megarians provided eight ships, 
Cephallenia four, Epidamnus five, Hermione one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, 
Ambracia eight ships, Thebes and Phlius sent money and Elis also sent money as 
well as empty vessels which could be used as cargo ships. The Corinthians 
themselves sent thirty ships and three thousand hoplites. (Thuc. i. 27). The 
diplomatic solution that Corcyra offered to Corinth did not improve the situation, 
for Corinth hoped that she could destroy the ambitious Corcyraeans with the support 
of her allies. (Thuc. i. 28). When the preparations were completed^ Corinth 
declared war on Corcyra. At the naval battle which followed in Actium, the 
Corcyraeans defeated the Corinthian allied force and destroyed fifteen ships of the 
enemy fleet. During the same day of the sea battle Epidamnus surrendered and the 
new settlers of the city were sold as slaves. (Thuc. i. 29). After that victory the 
Corcyraeans found the opportunity to attack those cities who were allies of Corinth 
and fought against them. They destroyed part of the countryside of Leucas, burnt 
Cyllene the harbour of the Eleans and during the summer they damaged many of
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the Corinthian allies in the Ionian. At the end of the summer the Corinthians 
responded to the Corcyraean raids and sent a force which established forts in 
Actium and Cheimerion of Thesprotis in order to protect their allies. (Thuc. i. 30).
"The post of Actium could check raids on Ambracia, Anactorion and Leucas or
further south; that at Cheimerion opposite cape Leukimme must have been intended
to report Corcyraean movements though the channel and to harass Corcyraean
raiders either sailing thence or returning." (Hammond: "Naval operations in the South
Channel o f Corcyra 435-436 B.C.", J.H.S., 1945, p. 28). The Corinthians, after
their defeat at Leukimme, did not quit their claims over the control of Ionian but
during the next two years that followed they started preparations for a larger new
fleet which would be able to punish Corcyra. New vessels were built and
mercenaries from Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece gathered in Corinth in order
to serve in the ships. These Corinthian preparations made Corcyra quite anxious and
afraid. The Corcyraeans turned to Athens for help and in the summer of 433
ambassadors from Corinth and Corcyra presented their case to the Athenian people.
(Thuc. i. 31). The speech of the Corinthian ambassadors shows that Corinth simply
could not let Corcyra play the role of the superpower in the Ionian. Corinth
needed her colonies and allies there in order to have an easy access to the trade
route with the west. On the other hand Athens^desire was to cut off this access and
in
the only way to succeedAthis was to make an alliance with Corcyra. Pericles could 
see that a major war in Greece was inevitable. He had realised that Corinth was a 
powerful city and an ally of Sparta and the cities of the Ionian were necessary for 
her in order to keep her power and wealth. As a result a defensive alliance was 
concluded between Athens and Corcyra during the year 433. (Thuc. i. 44). The 
Corinthians now had to fight against the two naval superpowers of Greece. 
Immediately after the meeting of Athens the Athenians sent a squadron of ten ships 
to Corcyra for help and very soon a Corinthian allied fleet of one hundred ships
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followed them. Ninety of these ships were Corinthian, ten had come from Elis, 
twelve from Megara, ten from Leucas, twenty seven from Ambracia, and one from 
Anactorium. (Thuc. i. 46). The fact that Ambracia sent twenty seven ships 
(probably her whole fleet), shows her friendly relations with Corinth and her will 
to support her mother city, even when the Ambraciotes knew that they were going 
to risk their fleet and their city because from that moment they had added Athens 
to their enemies. At the naval battle which followed at Sybota both sides claimed 
the victory. Although the Corinthian fleet managed to destroy seventy ships of the 
enemy her original wish to destroy the Corcyraean power was not fulfilled. The fact 
that the Corinthians did not defeat Corcyra completely showed that the Ionian was 
not a Corinthian "lake" and Athens with Corcyra could still cooperate in the future 
in order to damage the Corinthian power. From the narrative of Thucydides on the 
battle we can see that although the ships from Corinth were victorious their allies 
and especially Megara and Ambracia suffered heavy losses from the Corcyraeans 
and they were defeated. (Thuc. i. 49).
In two years time, after the battle of Sybota, a great war was going to erupt over 
Greece. The Athenian empire was a threat for Corinth, Thebes, Megara and Sparta. 
It was time for the Peloponnesian league to counterattack. Thucydides gives a 
catalogue of the cities who took up arms against Athens. Among them was Achaea, 
Elis, Phokis, Locris, Ambracia, Leucas and Anactorium. Elis, Ambracia, Leukas and 
PellinCin Achaea could provide ships in addition to their land forces and Phokis 
along with Locris provided cavalry, another important factor in Greek warfare. 
(Thuc. ii. 9). During the first year of the war Athens sent a fleet of one hundred 
ships along with fifty Corcyraeans in order to ravage the Peloponnesian territories. 
This was the answer of Pericles to the invasion by the Spartans aP the territory of 
Athens. The Athenians attacked Methone in Laconia and after their unsuccessful 
invasion there, they chose Pheia in Elis as their next target. For two days they
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ravaged the countryside and when the native army came out along with an elite 
force of three hundred men from Elis to stop them, it was defeated by the 
Athenians and their allies. At the same time a Messenian force had managed to 
capture the harbour of Pheia. But the main army of the Eleans was on its way to 
Pheia, so the Athenians realised that it was not c&tiSbcileto an hoplite battle 
against an unknown number of enemies and to take the chance in enemy territory; 
so after taking the Messenians to their ships they sailed away from Elis. (Thuc.
ii. 25). The combined attack of the Athenians and the Messenians was not 
successful but of course made the Eleans feel anxious and insecure for their land. 
During the same time as the attack of the Athenian fleet at Peloponnesus another 
Athenian squadron of thirty ships sailed from Piraeus to Euboea in order to protect 
the island from a possible attack Locris. The Athenians did not hesitate to ravage 
some coastal territories of Locris, they captured the city of Thronium and took its 
inhabitants for hostages. When the Locrian army came out to defend its country it 
was defeated in an hoplite battle and left Thronium in Athenian hands. It was the 
second time that the Locrians had lost control of a part of their territory because 
of the Athenians. The first time was at 457 when the Athenians took over the 
whole of Locris, Phokis, as well as Boeotia when they defeated the Boeotian army 
at Oenophyta, (Thuc. i. 108), and controlled almost all the central Greece. The 
Locrians became independent again in 446 when an Athenian army under Tolmides 
was defeated and suffered heavy loses as a result of an attack by exiled Boeotians, 
Locrians and Eubfleans at Coroneia. After this battle the Athenians abandoned every 
plan of creating a strong hegemony in mainland Greece. (Thuc. i. 113). During 
the summer of the second year of the war the Ambraciotes and their allies, 
Chaones, made another attempt to capture Amphilochian Argos but they were not 
successful. (Thuc. ii. 68). This attack made the Athenians more cautious, so they 
sent during next winter a squadron of twenty ships under Phormio to watch over 
the Corinthian gulf, and of course to take care of any further attempts of the
114
Chapter JV — Western Greece
9
Peloponnesians m  the Ionian. Phormio made Naupactus his naval base in order to 
block the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. From then on it was too difficult for 
Corinth to have an easy access to her allies like Ambracia, and the only way for 
the Peloponnesians was to use the land route every time they wanted to send an 
army to Ambracia or their other allies at the region.
But the Ambraciotes did not quit from the idea of capturing Acamania and in order 
In
to succeed a this they decided to ask Sparta for help. During the year 429 the 
Ambraciotes managed to persuade the Lacedaemonians to support them for an 
expedition against Acamania. (Thuc. ii. 80. 1). "Their motives were selfish, they 
wanted to expel Athenian influence from the region and conquer it for themselves. 
But they presented the idea to the Spartans as part of a grand strategy to prevent 
from troubling the Peloponnesus. Acamania would fall easily, then Zacynthus and 
Cephallenia, perhaps even Naupactus." (Kagan. The Archidamian War, p. 107). The 
Lacedaemonians accepted the plan and immediately started the preparations for the 
expedition. The Peloponnesians saw in this plan the perfect opportunity to regain 
control of the Ionian. A land force under a Spartan general in friendly territory 
could succeed in defeating the barbarians of the region, and the small Athenian 
squadron of twenty ships which was stationed at Naupactus could not prevent a 
large Peloponnesian fleet from sailing into Ambracia. Although the Corinthians were 
anxious to take part in the expedition they failed to meet the allied forces of 
Leucas, Ambracia and Anactorium. In the meantime Knemus the Spartan admiral 
arrived at Leucas and did not spend any time waiting for the delayed Corinthians 
and Sikyonians. The army of Knemus was composed of troops from Ambracia, 
Leucas, Anactorium and a Peloponnesian force of one thousand hoplites. In addition 
a large barbarian army had come in order to support Corinth and Ambracia. This 
barbarian army numbered one thousand troops, and another force was expected to 
arrive from Macedonia, but came too late. The Ac amanlans could not oppose this
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army alone and appealed to Phormio for help. Phormio^ who knew that the
Corinthian fleet and the Sikyonians had not joined their allies yet^expected them to 
come out of the Corinthian gulf any time. The plan of Phormio was to cut the 
Peloponnesian forces in half and it was the only thing that he could do under the 
circumstances. In the meantime Knemus was marching at the Acamanian territory 
and chose Stratus as his first target. The Peloponnesian and allied army was divided 
into three phalanxes. Two of these phalanxes were composed of Greek hoplites and 
the third one only by barbarians. This third phalanx caused trouble among the 
whole army because the barbarians thought that they could capture Stratus alone and 
by storm and attacked the city without waiting for the support of the Greeks. The 
result of this unreasonable action was the complete defeat of the barbarian phalanx 
which suffered heavy losse^especially the Chaonians who had inspired the "plan". 
The situation now had become dangerous for the Ambraciotes and the
Peloponnesians and Knemus who did not dare to attack the Ac arnanl ans returned 
to Peloponnesus. (Thuc. ii. 80-82).
Almost the same day as the battle of Stratus, the delayed Corinthians who were 
supposed to come to Acamania to help Knemus were defeated by the Athenian 
squadron of Phormio at the entrance of the gulf of Patrae. (Thuc. ii. 83-84). The 
first effort of the Peloponnesians to confront the Athenians at sea was more than 
unsuccessful. Corinth had now realised that a larger fleet was needed in order to 
destroy even a small squadron of twenty Athenian ships, and her next step was to 
prepare this fleet. The Peloponnesians were ready to take their revenge and in order 
to succeed this they gathered a powerful fleet of seventy seven ships at Cyllene the 
harbour of Elis. The naval battle which followed at Rhium proved to be a disaster
and a humiliation of the Peloponnesians. The Athenian squadron defeated the
Peloponnesian fleet which fled to Panormus. (Thuc. ii. 85-92). "The significance 
of Phormio’s victory was great. The Athenians had successfully defended their vital
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base at Naupactus, thereby making it possible to take swift action in Acamania and 
the other western regions and helping to foil the ambitious Peloponnesian plan in 
that quarter. Even more important perhaps, was the effect on morale. The Athenians 
were convinced more than ever of their superiority at sea. So were their enemies 
and subjects. Spartan’s undertaking naval campaigns would be more timid; ...The 
best way to appreciate the importance of Phormio’s victory is to imagine the 
consequences of defeat. Athens would have lost Naupactus, her position in the west, 
her chance to damage the commerce of Corinth and other Peloponnesian states 
trading with the west." (Kagan. The Archidamian War, p. 115).
During the next year the Athenians sent another squadron of thirty ships in order 
to ravage the coasts of Laconia. Asopius the son of Phormio who was in charge of 
the expedition decided to attack Leucas with twelve ships, but his army was 
defeated and he was killed by the Leucadians and the Peloponnesian garrison 
(probably Corinthian), which was stationed at Nericus. (Thuc. iii. 7).
Although the Athenians were defeated in this expedition, they did not forget the 
importance of Leucas and decided to take another chance two years later (426). 
This time it was general Demosthenes who commanded a force of thirty Athenian 
ships, fifteen ships from Corcyra and units from Acamania, Zacynthus and 
Cephallenia. The Athenians ravaged for a while the country side of the city of 
Leucas, but although they had the opportunity to capture the city itself Demosthenes 
agreed with the Messenians of Naupactus to use the allied force against the 
Aetolians. (Thuc. iii. 94). The plan was very ambitious and for Demosthenes it 
was more important to secure Naupactus and to bring the Aetolians to the Athenian 
alliance than to capture Leucas, so he abandoned the siege of the city and 
disappointed the A c amanlans who wanted to see Leucas in Athenian hands in 
order to get rid of a dangerous enemy.
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The expedition of Demosthenes against the Aetolians was unsuccessful and his army 
suffered heavy losseS.Demosthenes did not have the courage to return to Athens and 
he returned to Naupactus. On the other hand the Aetolians sent envoys to Sparta 
and Corinth in order to help them to take revenge upon Naupactus which had 
proposed the expedition. (Thuc. iii. 100). The Lacedaemonians sent a force of 
three thousand allied troops under the commands of Eurylochus. The Peloponnesian 
army failed to capture Naupactus by storm, and Eurylochus instead of trying to 
besiege the city changed the original plan and decided to attack Amphilochian 
Argos. (Thuc. iii. 102). "Eurylochus’ behaviour was curiously like that of 
Demosthenes at Leucas earlier in the summer. Instead of engaging in a difficult 
tedious, expensive and possibly unsuccessful siege, he was lured by the promises 
of other allies to undertake a different mission. The Ambraciots, excited by the 
presence of a large friendly army in unfamiliar regions, wanted it used against their 
local enemies. They urged an assault upon Amphilochian Argos, their main enemy, 
and upon all of Amphilochia and Acamania as well." (Kagan. The Archidamian War, 
p. 210). The Ambraciotes who wanted to take advantage of the presence of the 
Peloponnesian army in the region presented the plan as a unique opportunity to the 
Lacedaemonians who wanted to bring the cities of mainland Greece into the 
Peloponnesian alliance. (Thuc. iii. 102). For one more time Ambracia used her 
Peloponnesian friends in order to fulfil her own selfish interests. According to the 
plan the Ambraciotes were going to send an army into Amphilochia in order to 
make the first assault and then Eurylochus was going to join them with the 
Peloponnesian forces. During the winter of the same year, the Ambraciotes invaded 
the Amphilochian territory with a force of three thousand hoplites and captured 
Olpae a fort near the sea. The distance between Olpae and Amphilochian Argos was 
twenty five STo&nx When the Ac amanlans heard the news, they sent a force to 
protect Argos and in addition they put some troops near Amphilochia to watch over 
the region in case the Peloponnesian army under Eurylochus decided to unite with
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the Ambraciotes. In the meantime, they appealed for help from the Athenian 
squadron, of twenty ships, which was sailing around Peloponnesus, and asked * . 
Demosthenes, who was in Naupactus, to take the command of their troops.
At the same time the Ambraciotes who were at Olpae sent a messenger to 
Ambracia and asked the rest of their army to come as reinforcements, because they 
were afraid that Eurylochus and his forces could be cut off by the Ac amani'ans 
at Crenae (Thuc. iii. 105), but their fears did not come true, for Eurylochus 
managed to join them after a difficult journey in Acamania, and when the two 
armies united they encamped at Metropolis. Demosthenes arrived after a while at 
Argos bringing with him a small force of two hundred Messenians and sixty 
Athenian archers. The Athenian ships had blockaded the city of Olpae and the 
Aci amanians and Amphilochiansof Argos started the preparations for a battle with 
Demosthenes as a general commander of their army. The first action of 
Demosthenes was to move his army close to Olpae where he made his camp. For 
five days the two armies did not attack and during the sixth day they arrayed in 
battle order. When Demosthenes realised that the Peloponnesian army outnumbered 
his troops, he put an ambush of four hundred hoplites in a road covered with 
bushes, in order to avoid a possible outflank of his army and gave them the orders 
to attack the enemy at the most crucial moment of the battle. When the battle 
started, the left wing of the Peloponnesian allied army, which was composed by the 
Peloponnesians, outflanked the right wing of its enemy, as Demosthenes expected. 
It was the moment for the four hundred Ac .amanians to rise up from their ambush 
and to win an unexpected victory. The phalanx of the Peloponnesians broke in two 
parts. The left wing which was attacked by the four hundred of the ambush started 
to retreat when panic spread into its lines. In the meantime the victorious right 
wing, which was composed by the most able warriors of the region, the 
Ambraciotes, returned from the pursuit of its enemies and surprisingly the soldiers
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saw their left wing to retreat in a great hurry towards Olpae. The Ambraciotes 
followed them under the pressure of the victorious Ac, jamanlans, and with great 
difficulty they managed to find protection at the fort of Olpae. The army of 
Eurylochus suffered heavy loses because its hoplites retreated in a hurry and without 
keeping their battle order and of course under the spread of panic. The exteiption 
were the Mantineians who managed to retreat in close ranks. (Thuc. iii. 106-108). 
Henderson describes the situation in which the Ambraciotes and allies found 
themselves after their defeat: "When evening came, the defeated Peloponnesian and 
Ambraciot army found itself cooped up with Olpae’s Walls, a victorious army 
outside and the enemy fleet riding the waters of the gulf just beneath, while among 
their dead on the battlefield lay Eurylochus himself and Macarius, one of the other 
two Spartan generals. Demosthenes had won a most notable victory over superior 
numbers by the tactical device of the ambush, at the cost of but 300 slain. And he 
held the enemy’s southern army in the hollow of his hand." (Henderson. The Great 
war between Athens and Sparta, p. 158). The next day Menedaeus, the Spartan 
commander, could not find a solution to his problems. Although he knew that 
reinforcements from Ambracia were on their way, he decided to abandon the 
Ambraciotes and to save only the Peloponnesian forces. In order to succeed in that 
he secretly made a truce with Demosthenes, which covered only the Mantineians 
and the most important of the Peloponnesians. (Thuc. iii. 109). Demosthenes 
agreed with the proposals of Menedaeus because he wanted to cut off the 
Ambraciotes from the allied army, and most of all he wanted to discredit the 
Lacedaemonians to the peoples of mainland Greece, for their treacherous action. 
(Thuc. iii. 109). On the other hand Demosthenes knew that reinforcements from 
Ambracia were going to arrive any moment and it was a good opportunity for him 
to get rid of the Peloponnesian forces before the final clash. Demosthenes’ plan to 
stop the reinforcements from Ambracia was to set up ambushes in different parts 
o f the road following the same stratagem which gave him the victory at the battle
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of Olpae. (Thuc. iii. 110). In the meantime the Mantineians and the most notable 
Peloponnesians pretending to gather herbs started to move away from the fort and 
the rest of the army. When the Ambraciotes and the rest of the Peloponnesians 
realised that they were leaving, they run away from the fort and followed them. But 
the Acamanian soldiers, who did not know about the secret treaty, attacked not only 
the Ambraciotes, but also the Peloponnesians who were covered by the truce. When 
the situation became more clear they let the Peloponnesians leave and started to kill 
the Ambraciotes who lost almost two hundred hoplites before they found refuge at 
the friendly city of Agraea. "Demosthenes’ stroke was a masterpiece in policy. Who 
in Ambracia would ever wish to look upon a Peloponnesian again after this display 
of what Thucydides himself moved slightly for once, calls selfish treachery? The 
Spartan reputation at the entire district was dead." (Henderson. The Great war 
between Athens and Sparta, p. 160).
In the meantime the reinforcements from Ambracia arrived at Idomene north of 
Olpae. The territory was consisted of two hills, the lower of which was occupied 
by the Ambraciotes and the higher by the forces which Demosthenes had sent to 
ambush the enemy. Demosthenes divided his army in two parts, and marched at 
night in order to surround the enemy. Just before dawn he decided to attack the 
Ambraciotes who were still asleep. In the slaughter that followed the confused 
Ambraciotes suffered great loses. They had the disadvantages of their heavy armours 
and they had to fight against light armed troops in an unfriendly and rough 
territory. Some of them run to the sea in order to get killed by the Athenian sailors 
and not by the Amphilochians who were the worst enemies. Finally, only few of 
them survived and returned to Ambracia. (Thuc. iii. 112).
This was the end of the expedition of Ambraciotes against Argos of Amphilochia, 
oU-i
which tumedAto be their worst disaster. Thucydides refuses to give the exact number
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of the Ambraciotes who were killed in this expedition because it was too hard to 
believe the Ambraciot loses in comparison with the size of their city, (Thuc. iii. 
113) and he adds that this was the greatest disaster that a single city had suffered 
in a few days} time, during the whole war. Demosthenes after the battle of Idomene 
wanted to complete his victory by making an attack at the defendless city of 
Ambracia but the Ac iamanians and the Amphilochians did not let him because they 
realised that the Athenians would be more difficult neighbours that they defeated 
and outnumbered Ambraciotes. (Thuc. iii. 113).
When the Athenian forces returned home the Amphilochians and the Ambraciotes 
signed a peace treaty of "one hundred years" which had defensive character. (Thuc.
iii. 114). When the Corinthians realised that their colony and ally was now helpless 
and almost destroyed, they sent a garrison of three hundred hoplites to help the 
Ambraciotes. For one more time the Athenians and their allies prevented the 
Peloponnesians from gaining control of the North Western Greece, and continued 
to block the Ionian sea with their navy. The whole campaign proved to be a total 
disaster for Ambracia which not only suffered heavy casualties but also was 
abandoned by her Peloponnesian allies except Corinth, whose interest on Ambracia 
was more than vital. This was the last time that Ambracia played a role in the 
Peloponnesian war, a city which once was a powerful ally for her friends and a 
continuous threat to her enemies, had now turned to be incapable of defending even 
her own territory. We cannot blame the Spartans nor the Athenians for the fate of 
Anbracia, because the only people responsible for the destruction of the city were 
the Ambraciotes themselves, and their continuous hostile policy towards the 
Amphilochian Argos.
During the year 425 the Athenian garrison of Naupactus joined the Athenian troops 
and attacked the city of Anactorium, another Corinthian colony. The city fell by
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treachery and the Ac; aman Jans colonised her, after they expelled the Corinthians. 
(Thuc. iv. 49). It is very possible that the traitors belonged to an anti-Corinthian 
party which probably was composed of the remaining Corcyraeans at the city. We 
have to remember that Anactorium was a mixed colony of Corinth and Corcyra 
(Thuc. i. 55), and it was the pro-Corinthians who turned their city to Corinth during 
433. "The loss of Anactorium was keenly felt by the Corinthians for communication 
with Apollonia was made, more difficult and their waning prestige in an important 
region was further reduced." (Kagan. The Archidamian War, p. 256).
According to Thucydides the only contribution of Locris in an hoplite battle during 
the Archidamian war was a small cavalry force that the Locrians sent i o  the battle 
of Delium in 424. Although this force did not arrive on time for the battle it took 
part in the pursuit of the retreating Athenians and in the slaughter that followed. 
(Thuc. iv. 96).
During the next year Athens and Sparta concluded a one year truce. (Thuc. iv. 
117). In 423 Athens after the defeat of Delium was more willing to come into 
negotiations with Sparta. Sparta on the other hand had suffered a humiliating defeat 
at Sphacteria which led to the captivity of a Spartan force and could see that 
Athens and her power were stronger than they expected. Among other things "...The 
Peloponnesians promise that access to the shrine (of Apollo at Delphi) shdll be free 
and undisturbed; they cannot^however, themselves promise that the journey by the 
sacred way will be safeguarded, so they add that they will do their best to persuade 
the Boeotians and Phokians to grant safe conduct, or perhaps we should say to 
reopen the road. Boeotia and Phokis were clearly only not now represented in 
Athens, but had taken no part in the negotiations for this truce - had presumably 
refused." (Gomme. H.C.T., iv. 118. 1). It is very probable that the Phokians did 
not agree with the terms of the truce but Thucydides does not give the reasons for
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them not doing so.
A year later Athens had lost Amphipolis, and Cleon, who was always against a 
peaceful solution, was dead. The Spartans were anxious to get back the prisoners 
of Sphacteria and both sides could see that it was the time to give peace a chance. 
In March of 421 a peace treaty was concluded between Sparta and Athens. (Thuc. 
v. 14-15). Butjalthough the Lacedaemonians were anxious to sign the treaty^some 
of their allies disagreed with her terms and refused to swear the oath. (Thuc. v. 
17). The cities of Boeotia, Corinth, Elis and Megara rejected the negotiations each 
for their own reasons, but Sparta did not pay any attention to them and finally 
concluded the peace treaty which was going to bring an end to this devastating war. 
(Thuc. v. 18-20). When the Spartans saw that it was not possible to persuade these 
cities to accept the treaty they concluded an alliance with Athens which was going 
to last for fifty years. Another reason for doing so was the continuous threat of 
Argos which refused to renew her own peace treaty with Sparta. (Thuc. v. 22). 
But very soon the Lacedaemonians found themselves in a very difficult situation. 
Corinth one of their most faithful allies was ready to abandon them and join the 
Argive-Mantineian alliance. (Thuc. v. 30). For Corinth the terms of the treaty 
were completely unacceptable, for they had lost control of Sollium and Anactorium, 
and they always wanted the renewal of the war against the Athenians who turned 
to be major threat to their economy and trade. During the year 420 Corinth joined 
the Argive alliance and the next city which followed her was Elis.
Elis was a democracy, but her social system was constituted like an oligarchy. 
(Arist. Pol. 1306a: 1(1*1 ?)Elis was on bad terms with Sparta for a dispute over the city 
of Lepreum. Some time before the Peloponnesian war Lepreum had been in a 
difficult situation because of a war with some other Arcadian tribes and asked Elis 
for help, with the promise to give up half of its territory with the conditional annual
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payment of one talant to Elis. The Lepreans paid the tax every year, but when the
Peloponnesian war started, they used it as an excuse to stop paying the tribute.
When the Eleans used force against them, they turned to Sparta for help. Sparta
offered to act as an arbitrator between the two cities, but the Eleans who knew that
the Lacedaemonians had friendly relations with the Lepreans did not accept this
solution and started to ravage the Leprean territory. The Lacedaemonians now
decided that Lepreum should remain independent and that the Eleans were unjust,
so they sent a garrison to the city for protection. The Eleans who considered
Lepreum as a part of their territory claimed that the presence of the Spartan
garrison at the city was an act of violence. (Thuc. v. 31). According to Seager:
"Elishas far as is known, suffered no disadvantage from any particular clause of the
peace. Her objection was no doubt to the ending of the war on any terms, since
peace would leave Sparta free to turn her attention to her squabble with Elis over
Lepreum. Her advantage would best be served by a renewal of the war or some
other development that would keep Sparta occupied..." (Seager: "After the peace of
Nicias: Diplomacy and Policy 421-416 B.C", C.Q., xxvi, 1976, p. 250). According to
the Eleans it was Sparta who violated the Peace of Nicias when they sent a force
to Lepreum because according to the treaty each city should have the same territory 
ihe? h*A
thatAhad%efore the war and according to the Eleans half of the Leprean territory 
belonged to them. (Thuc. v. 31). Of course this was the excuse of the Eleans but 
in reality their problem was the ending of the war.
After Elis the cities of Corinth and her allies in Chalcidice joined the coalition, but 
Boeotia and Megara despite their attitude towards the treaty refused to abandon 
Sparta and her alliance. (Thuc. v. 31).
We can say that the diplomacy of Corinth that followed the Peace of Nicias was 
partly successful for she managed almost to unite the cities who were at odds with
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Sparta in a separate league and by this action she tried to "blackmail" the 
Lacedaemonians in order to continue the war against Athens. But the blow to the 
Corinthian-Argive plans came when they turned to Tegea in order to join them in 
their alliance. The Tegeans refused and Corinth turned again to Boeotia who refused 
for a second time to leave Sparta. (Thuc. v. 32). During the same year Phokis 
and Locris found themselves against each other in a short war but Thucydides does 
not give any details about the event (Thuc. v. 32). In the meantime Sparta 
decided to take action against those cities which abandoned her and her first target 
was Mantineia. The Lacedaemonian army under Pleistoanax invaded Parassia, which 
was a subordinate of Mantineia, ravaged her territory, destroyed the Mantineian fort 
at the region and gave to the Parassians their independence. (Thuc. v. 33). Their 
next step was to turn against Elis. They sent a garrison to settle Lepreum although 
they had declared that the city should be independent. "These actions lent security 
to Sparta’s frontiers and the helot country and must have increased her reputation 
even as they diminished that of the Argive coalition." (Kagan. The Peace o f Nicias 
and the Sicilian expedition, p. 46). During the same year (420), Alcibiades who 
wanted the renewal of the war, for his personal reasons, persuaded the Athenians 
to conclude an alliance with the Argive coalition. Ambassadors from Argos, Elis 
and Mantineia arrived in Athens to take part in the negotiations. Sparta who was 
aware of the danger sent her own ambassadors to prevent the Athenians from 
concluding this alliance, but Alcibiades tricked them, and turned the meeting to a 
personal victory. Although Nicias tried hard to change the mind of the Athenians, 
Athens finally joined the Argive coalition. (Thuc. v. 43-47). When the new 
alliance was concluded Corinth turned again to Sparta and abandoned the newly 
formed league. (Thuc. v. 48). The last thing that the Corinthians wanted was an 
alliance with Athens, for the renewal of the war wetC their primary aim. "Sparta 
and Athens were at odds, the war party was in charge at Sparta, the war seemed 
about to resume. We need ask only why the Corinthians continued to hold to the
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defensive alliance they had made with Argos, Elis and Mantineia. Caution may 
provide part of the answer, the instability of Spartan politics might require further 
manoeuvres. Beyond that, the Corinthians ambiguous position in respect to the 
Peloponnesian democracies might allow them to intervene at some crucial moment 
in the future." (Kagan. The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, p. 74).
The first action of the new alliance against Sparta took place during the Olympic 
Games of 420. The Eleans did not permit Sparta to take part in the Games because
of the case of Lepreum. According to them Sparta had violated the sacred truce
9Ue
when* sent a garrison 'J’O Lepleum and attacked the fort of Phyrcus.
Of course the Spartans denied that they had violated the truce, and claimed that 
they had sent their troops before the truce. "The rights and wrongs of the complaint 
are not totally clear^Intended to use the Olympic Games to achieve their political 
ends. The Olympic court, composed of Eleans, found against Sparta and imposed 
a fine." (Kagan. The Peace o f Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, p. 75). The 
Lacedaemonians refused to pay the fine or to restore Lepreum to Elis and as a 
result they were banned from the Games and the sacrifices.
"The Eleans would have dared none of th&ehighly provocative actions without 
outside support. As it was, they were afraid the Spartans would force their way in 
by arms. They guarded the sanctuary with their own armed troops aided by a 
thousand men each from Argos and Mantineia. In addition, Athens sent a troop of 
cavalry which took up a position at Harpine, not far from Olympia." (Kagan. The 
Peace o f Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, p. 75). But the Spartans were not willing 
to take any actions at the time. Although the Lacedaemonian Lichas, who was an 
important person in Sparta was beaten and humiliated by the games* attendants for 
a provocative action during the games the Lacedaemonian army did not attack.
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(Thuc. v. 49-50). After the games the Argives made an effort to persuade the 
Corinthians to their alliance, but this time Corinth refused.
During the next year (419) Alcibiades brought a small Athenian force into 
Peloponnesus in order to persuade the A t t a c k s  to join their alliance. He made 
an alliance with Patrae in Achaea, and tried to built a fort at Rhium in order to get 
full control of the Corinthian gulf. (Thuc. v. 52. 2). Of course the Corinthians 
responded immediately to Alcibiades’ actions and destroyed the fort, but Alcibiades* 
mission was successful. He managed to bring the neutral Patrae under Athenian 
control, and in doing this, to isolate more the Corinthians, but above all he damaged 
for one more time the Spartan prestige in the region. On the other hand he could 
isolate completely Corinth and control the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. If he 
managed to built the fort at Rhium. "...it was a grandiose scheme for an Athenian 
general at the head of a mainly Peloponnesian army to march through the 
Peloponnese, cocking a snook at Sparta when her reputation was at its lowest. Its 
daring, such as it was, its theatricality, and its small practical value, were alike 
characteristic - of Alcibiades." (Gomme, Andrewes, Dover. v. 52. 2). The
end of the Argive alliance came with the battle of Mantineia a year later (418). The 
Spartans won a decisive victory and regained the control of Peloponnesus as well 
as their lost prestige. Elis’ forces did not participate in this battle, for she had 
withdrawn her three thousand hoplites when her allies decided to attack Tegea 
instead of Lepreum, which was the target of Elis and the Elean selfish interests 
were one of the factors that gave the victory to the Spartans, whose army of course 
outnumbered the enemy forces. (Thuc. v. 62). After its defeat at Mantineia the 
Argive alliance collapsed. Argos signed a Peace Treaty with Sparta (Thuc. v. 78), 
and Mantineia followed her. (Thuc. v. 81). During the next year (417) the 
Lacedaemonians who controlled now the whole of Peloponnesus arranged the 
matters of Achaea according to their own interests and brought the state to the
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Peloponnesian League. (Thuc. v. 81).
The cities of Western Greece did not make any important contributions to help 
Sparta during the Peloponnesian war. Locris and Phokis almost did not participate 
in the war - with the exception of the fifteen ships that they sent together into 
Ionia during 413. (Thuc. v. 111. 3). Ambracia was almost destroyed by the 
Ac amantans and the Athenians after her unsuccessful expedition against 
Amphilochian Argos at 426. The once powerful city managed to send only two 
ships 4:0 Sicily iy>414 (Thuc. vi. 104), and none to the Ionian ir>413.
Elis, who was interested only in her own claims, not only abandoned the Spartans 
but she also caused a serious blow to the Argive league when she withdrew her 
forces from Tegea. Leucas’ only contribution was her geographical location, and a 
limited number of ships. The Leucadians sent a squadron of ten ships to Sicily 
(Thuc. vi. 104), but Thucydides does not mention them in the catalogue of the cities 
who sent ships in the final stage of the war in Ionia. Although some of these cities 
could play an important role the war, and offer great help to the Peloponnesian 
League?almost all of them decided not to do so and preferred to be just observers, 
or to use their alliance with Sparta for their own benefits.
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V. TH E ARCADIAN STATES
The A rcadian States D uring 
The Peloponnesian W ar
The role of Arcadia during the years of the war does not seem very important. 
Officially the Arcadian states were allies of Sparta but their support to the 
Lacedaemonians during the Peloponnesian war was not great. The Peace Treaty of 
Nicias brought a lot of changes in Greece but especially in Peloponnesus, Sparta 
faced the danger of \o  sing her hegemony over her allies. Argos tried to become 
a third power in Greece and to take with it some of the most important Arcadian 
states. It seems that the Arcadian cities were not so happy with their Spartan 
friends and it seems that they cooperated with them only because of fear and not 
of friendship.
I believe that, if we examine the political history of Arcadia during the years that 
followed the Persian wars and the Pentecontaetia we will see what was the true 
relationship between Sparta and Arcadia, why Arcadia cooperated with the Spartans 
in the Peloponnesian war, and why the Arcadians were at odds with Sparta.
Cleomenes king of Sparta was exiled from his city in 491, he found an "asylum" 
in Arcadia and tried to unite the Arcadian states into one steady league in order to 
attack Sparta to take his revenge. (Hdt. vi. 74-75). The Spartans, when they 
realised that Cleomenes,policy could create them serious problems,. called him 
back and gave him the title of the king for one more time. Of course this is a 
minor incident but it helps us to understand some things: First that the Arcadians 
were not united in the beginning of the fifth century, and this helped the Spartans 
to control them easily, (see also: Larsen. Greek Federal States, p. 181). Second, the 
Spartans knew that the unification of the Arcadians was a serious threat and 
Cleomenes as a king of the Spartans was aware of that. This is why he chose the 
Arcadians in order to "blackmail" his fellow citizens. Third, an Arcadian league
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hostile to Sparta, with the help of Argos and Elis could easily isolate the 
Lacedaemonians from the rest of Greece, and provide ’’asylum" to the helots who 
could escape from Sparta. So we can see that the Spartans had serious reasons to 
keep the Arcadians constitutionally divided. In 480 during the second invasion of 
the Persians in Greece, the Arcadians sent a sum of 2,120 hoplites and in the 
gathering of the Peloponnesian forces which followed later on in the isthmus of 
Corinth they sent all their troops. But although they were very cooperative with 
the other Greeks, they did not act as a league. According to Herodot us in (ix. 77) 
the Mantineans arrived too late in the battlefield of Plataea because they had stayed 
in the isthmus, the Tegeans and the Orchomenians fought against the Persians 
(especially the Tegeans who fought very bravely; Herodot us describes in ix. 26 the 
dispute between the Tegeans and the Athenians on the matter of who was going to 
keep the one flank of the Greek army, something which shows the power of the 
Tegeans and their loyalty to the Spartans). According to Andrewes: "Two 
contingents arrived late for the battle of Plataea, those of Mantineia and Elis. Both 
showed great distress, the Mantineans pursued Artabazos as far as the Spartans 
would let them, both states exiled their generals when their armies returned. (Hdt. 
ix. 77). The battle of Plataea was not a sudden affair, and the abstention of these 
two cities must be taken as deliberate, a sign of very serious disaffection at a 
critical moment. We do not know what particular grounds they had for refusing 
Sparta’s lead, other than iwere miscalculation of the outcome, but Pausanias’ victory 
brought them to heel, just as Agis* victory at Mantinea in 418 ended another period 
of disaffection..." (Andrewes: "Sparta and Arcadia in the early fifth century", Phoenix, 
6, 1952). From these we can see that: 1. The Arcadian city states were not united 
to a league, so they did not follow the same policy and tactics during the Persian 
wars. 2. That Sparta had very friendly relations with Tegea, although these 
relations did not last for too long.
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"In the years following the Persian wars the main known events are the victories 
which Sparta won over the Tegeans and the Argives at Tegea, and over all the 
Arcadians except Mantinea at Dipaea. It appears that Tegea passed from friendship 
with Sparta in 478 to determined and continuing hostility, though we do not know 
why. There is no evidence of Mantinean hostility to Sparta in these years. The 
Mantineans certainly chose initially not to follow Sparta’s march across the isthmus 
in 479, but that was not an act of hostility, and in any case the Mantineans changed 
their mind... It is certain that Mantinea helped Sparta during the Messenian revolt 
and was the only Arcadian state not to oppose Sparta at Dipaea. For the attitudes 
of other Arcadian states before Dipaea we have no evidence... Finally we simply 
do not know what part, if any, Themistocles played in Arcadian politics during his 
stay in Argos." (Roy: "An Arcadian League in the early fifth century B.C.", Phoenix, 
26, 1972, p. 338). So we have Mantinea friendly with Sparta during the third 
Messenian war, (Hdt. ix. 35; Xen. Hell. v. 2. 3). Tegea friendly with Sparta in 
479, hostile in the battles of Tegea and Dipaea. Orchomenus friendly with Sparta 
in 479, hostile at Dipaea. All other cities hostile to Sparta at Dipaea. "It is highly 
unlikely that Tegea, Orchomenus, and Mantinea acted as members of an Arcadian 
league in 479, or that Tegea was united with other Arcadian states when it fought 
Sparta with only Argive support at Tegea, or that Mantinea was united with other 
Arcadian states at the time of the Messenian revolt and Dipaea." (Roy: "An 
Arcadian League in the early fifth century B.C.", Phoenix, 26, 1972, pp. 338-339). We 
do not know many things about the Arcadian states and other cities except that 
Cleitor had offered to Olympia some gifts from wars won over other small states 
or communities. The same happened with the states of Psophis, Gortyna (at Delphi) 
and Caphyae (at Delphi as well). So we notice a series of wars in the region 
during the period 500-450, not major wars, or even wars as such, but some form 
of local conflicts. This is the chronology of the events according to Andrewes: 
("Sparta and Arcadia", Phoenix, 6, 1952, p. 5).
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"ca 490 Cleomenes in Arcadia,
before 480 Tegea loyal, Elis and Mantinea late for Plataept
480 (late) Pausanias’ first recall, trial and acquittal.
478/7 (winter) Leotychidas in Thessaly, his trial and exile.
478/7 Sparta abandons naval hegemony and the Persian war.
ca 472 Themistocles in Argos, Pausanias’ final disgrace and death. 
471/0 Go vo i K v 6 (ao's (and democracy?) at Elis (and about the
same time at Mantineia?) Themistocles driven from Argos. 
468/7 Pindar’s sixth Olympian.
465 (early) Battle of Tegea.
465 Earthquake at Sparta, Messenian revolt.
465/4 Argos attacks Mycenae. Battles at Dipaieis (?) isthmus."
Forrest believes in the existence of an Arcadian league and gives his own order of 
events. According to him: "There are four units to be considered in the northern 
Peloponnese during this period, Elis, an Arcadian league probably dominated by 
Tegea, Mantinea, and Argos." (Forrest: "Themistocles and Argos", C.Q, 54, 1960, p. 
229).
Forrest’s order of events:
by c. 470 Formation of anti-Spartan, democratic league in the northern
Peloponnese, including Argos (with Kleonai), Arcadia (with both 
Tegea and Mantineia), and Elis, 
c. 469 First operations of the league: attack on Mycenai and battle of
Tegea.
c. 468 Change in Argos (and perhaps at the same time in Mantineia).
c. 466 Revolt of Tiryns with Arcadian support against Argos.
465/64 Helot revolt; battle of Dipaea against depleted anti-Spartan
league; capture of Mycenai; capture of Tiryns by Argos. 
According to Forrest, Mantineia was a member of the league but Mantineia, if not
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friendly with Sparta, certainly did not come into conflict with her at the battles of
Tegea and Dipaea. The fact that the united armies of all Arcadian cities (except
Mantineia) opposed Sparta in Dipaea does not prove the existence of a democratic
league or a kind of a confederacy at the same period. There is no evidence for
this, especially when in this period we dCL not have the dominant power in Arcadia
which could unite all the states of the region into a league. Tegea or Mantineia
did not prove so powerful and definitely did not have the strength and means to
unite the Arcadians. I believe that in order to have had a league or a confederacy
in a region we need to have a major power which could unite or lead the states;
but in the case of Arcadia we dtf. not have any. The existence of the Arcadicon
coinage during the period of the Pentecontaetia gives us some information about the
political situation in the region but it does not solve the problem of the existence
or not of an Arcadian league, although in some cases a common coinage indicates
some federal structure. Three different mints with the inscription A P K A M ^ on)
struck in Arcadia during a period of seventy years (490-420), mints A, B, and C.
According to Roy these mints had a political character and purpose but they did not
suggest the existence of an Arcadian league. "We can accept however that mint
A began to strike c. 490; that mints B and C joined it not long after the Persian
wars; that A and B ceased striking c. 460; and that C continued to strike until c.
420. In that case, as Williams argues, A began coining about the time Cleomenes
was in Arcadia (491); and A and B may well have ceased striking in the aftermath
of the battle of Dipaea, at which Sparta defeated all the Arcadians except Mantineia.
If so, mint C was most probably Mantineia, not hostile to Sparta at the time of
Dipaea and so likely to retain privileges which other Arcadians lost; and moreover
as Williams suggests, the end of mint C, dated approximately to 420, could well
be
follow Mantineia’s defeat by Sparta in 418. Mint C can identified  with some 
probability as Mantineia. The identity of the other two mints remains, however, 
quite uncertain." (Roy: "An Arcadian League in the early fifth century B.C.", Phoenix,
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26, 1972, p. 335). (see also: Kraay. Archaic and Classical Greek coins, p. 98). The 
fact that mint C continued to strike although mints A+B had ~ • ceased, probably
reflects the political differences and arguments between the major cities in Arcadia
oX
and the probability that mint C did not represent the whole''Arcadia although it had 
the inscription APKAA\hot/  . If we suppose that mint C was Mantineia>then we 
have to take under consideration Sparta’s influence in the region, for Mantineia was 
the only Arcadian city which was friendly to Sparta around 460, and we can 
assume that Sparta stopped the strike of mints A+B. During 465/4 (battle of 
Dipaea) we have three mints: A+B and mint C which probably is Mantineia. If 
Mantineia represents mint C then mint A+B were struck by an anti-Spartan front 
which wanted to present itself as a confederacy in Arcadia. On the other hand, 
Mantineia (mint C) had the Spartan support and wanted to present herself as the 
dominant city in the region. The fact that we have two coinages with the same 
inscription at the same time shows that there were more than one states which 
claimed that they could unite the Arcadians, under a confederacy, so presumably 
we do not have an Arcadian league united under the same "constitution" and 
policies. According to Roy: "But awareness of common nationality as Arcadians 
need not. have led the Arcadians to common political action, still less to a federal 
organisation. The problem is whether such an organisation arose. Cleomenes did 
not complete his proposed unification of Arcadia, and for the following years from 
491 to 480 we have no evidence. We can however be reasonably sure that from 
480 to the battle of D+paea all Arcadia was never united. Moreover the later 
stages of the Arcadicon coinage itself, when two mints closed and only the third 
continued, suggest disagreement within Arcadia." (Roy: "An Arcadian League in the 
early fifth century B.C.", Phoenix, 26, 1972, p. 340).
According to Head: "The extensive series of coins bearing the inscription 
ranging from circa B.C. 490-417 proves most satisfactorily that the Arcadians, in
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spite of their continual dissensions, maintained from first to last something more 
than a mere tradition of unity, for this coinage, although not politically a federal 
currency like that of the later Achaean league, shows that the independent Arcadian 
towns and villages held fast to the religious bond which brought them together from 
time to time to celebrate in common their national festivals Arcadica." (Head. 
Historia Numorum, p. 444). If this hypothesis is correct then we assume that Arcadia 
was not a confederacy during the fifth century, or at least it was not united 
politically and constitutionally. Comparing the Arcadian states with the Boeotian 
federation which constituted a typical example of a federal state we see that:
1. Arcadia was not united under a constitution and a federal government like the 
Boeotian cities. 2. In the Boeotian federation, there was always a city which held 
the dominant position (e.g Thebes), controlled the political life of the whole 
federation, and in a few words patroned the whole league. In Arcadia this 
dominant power never existed. 3. The Boeotian confederacy had a federal army, 
in which every city had its share. In Arcadia every city had her own army, and 
in many cases they operated independently of each other, (e.g Persian wars; battle 
of Mantineia in 418 etc.). Considering all these I doubt that during the fifth 
century, Arcadia was united under a confederacy, although we have a series of 
coins with the inscription A P K M i k o i v .  These coins do not suggest a political 
organisation, and do not prove the existence of a federal organisation. The 
coinage suggests! A) A religious organisation or, B) a period of rivalries between 
the Arcadian cities, in which every city was striking her own mint, aiming to 
present herself as the patron of the whole Arcadia.
Thucydides does not clearly say if Arcadia was an ally of Sparta during the 
Archidamian war but we assume that the Arcadians fought several times together 
with the Lacedaemonians. During 426 the Mantineians sent a contingent to assist 
Eurylochus on his campaign against the Acamania. Unfortunately, Thucydides does
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not give any details about the number of this Mantineian force, and the only thing 
we know about them is that they fought bravely and were the only soldiers who 
maintained their order during the moment of the defeat of the whole Peloponnesian 
allied army, and managed to retreat as a disciplined force. (Thuc. iii. 108). During 
the year 430 the Spartans sent an embassy to the king of Persia asking for an army 
or money. Sitalces king of Thrace, at those times, who had very friendly relations 
with Athens arrested them. Among the other ambassadors of the Peloponnesians 
Timagoras of Tegea was arrested. Thucydides says that from these ambassadors 
only Pollis from Argos joined the Peloponnesian embassy without having any 
instruction and authority from his city. So we have to assume that Tegea had 
officially sent Timagoras to Persia giving him specific instructions and acting as a 
full ally of Sparta. (Thuc. ii. 67). Although Tegea and Mantineia acted as allies 
of Sparta during the Archidamian war, during the year 423/22 they fought against 
each other in Laodicion of Orestias. The battle took place after the one year truce 
that Athens and Sparta had signed the same year. (Thuc. iv. 134). According to 
Gomme: ’’They do indeed take advantage of the truce from the major war (in which 
they were allies) to have a war of their own. Each city had allies in this battle, 
and one may surmise with Graves that it was they on each side who were driven 
back and suffered heavy loss; and since both cities claimed the victory and set up 
a trophy and sent spoils to Delphi, they were happy. It is almost a parody of the 
foreign policy of the small autonomous city." (Gomme. H.C.T., iv. 134). It is very 
probable that the Tegeans were afraid of the growth of the Mantineian power and 
moved against them in order to stop the Mantineian expansion in the region. 
(Kagan. The Archidamian War, p. 334). Although the battle ended in a draw, the 
Tegeans managed to encamp on the field and to erect a trophy, while the 
Mantineians retreated to Bucolion. In the year 421 the Athenians and Spartans 
signed the Peace Treaty of Nicias which ended the ten year Archidamian war. The 
Lacedaemonians tried unsuccessfully during the same year to renew their peace
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treaty with Argos. When they realised that the Argives were trying to challenge 
their hegemony in Peloponnesus, they reacted vigorously and concluded an alliance 
with Athens in order to isolate the ambitious Argives. As a reaction Argos starts 
negotiations with Corinth (who was against the peace treaty, and the Spartan 
Athenian alliance) in order to form their own alliance and league. Mantineia was 
the first of the Peloponnesian cities who became an ally of Argos because during 
the Archidamian war they had captured a fort in the region of Cypselos in Parrasia
C T h w t . v . ^
which belonged to the Lacedaemonians.A The Mantineians knowing that Sparta was 
going to recapture Cypsela when they ended the war with Athens, tried to
cooperate with another Peloponnesian city who had the means and the power to 
protect them, and an alliance with Argos was the best solution to their problems. 
During the same year the Corinthians tried to persuade Tegea to take part in their 
alliance but the Tegeans refused probably because of their hostility with Mantineia.
The Lacedaemonians, when they realised that their hegemony in Peloponnesus was
in danger, responded immediately (something which was very unusual for them) and ,
of G(?Se\o$*TV\e- W L  -\\\e  VoxAr
moved with all their forces against the fort'^to the Argives in order to defend it and 
with their own army they tried to confront the Lacedaemonians in Parrasia. The ^ 
Spartans finally defeated the Mantineian army and they destroyed the fort. This 
was the first victory of the Spartans against the Argive alliance, after the end of the 
Archidamian war. The most strange thing in this story is that Mantineia^although 
she was an ally of the Lacedaemonians during the Archidamian war, created 
troubles to Sparta by occupying a territory which was claimed by Sparta. The
9
occupation of this territory took place during the Archidamian war at a time that
Sparta and Mantineia fought united against the Athenians. So we can see
Mantineia’s intension to gain superiority over the other Arcadian cities even during 
the Peloponnesian war. On the other hand we can see that Sparta did not pay any
fr
attention to the Arcadian affairs, but she waited until the Archidamian war came 
to an end. The next year (420-419) Argos with the help of Alcibiades signed an
139
Chavter V — The Arcadian States
alliance with Athens. The Mantineians joined the Argive mission to Athens and 
probably took part in the negotiations. Finally Argos and Mantineia became allies 
of Athens. (Thuc. v. 43-48). A peace treaty and an alliance were concluded for 
one hundred years between Athens, Argos, Mantineia and Elis. This peace treaty 
covered also the allies of these states. This article was very strange because 
according to its second part (that the alliance covered also the allies of these states 
who agreed to it) Sparta as an ally of Athens (according to the alliance that they 
had signed the previous year) was an ally of Argos, Elis and Mantineia. The 
Athenians^although they had an alliance with Sparta, at those times were influenced 
by the clever policy and tricks of Alcibiades and tried to use Mantineia and Argos 
as the front line which could protect them from the Lacedaemonians. (Thuc. v. 47). 
During the Olympic Games that took place the same year, the new alliance took its 
first measure against the Lacedaemonians. The Spartans were excluded from the 
games, because they refused to pay a fine to Elis, and the Elians feared that the 
Lacedaemonians were going to use force against them, so they asked their allies to
provide them with forces in case they had to defend themselves. Argos and
botV
Mantineia^sent one thousand hoplites and Athens a small cavalry force, but nothing 
happened finally. (Thuc. v. 5o). Two years later a huge expeditionary force from 
Sparta moved against Argos under the commands of king Agis. Thucydides said 
that the Lacedaemonians managed to gather the biggest and finest Greek army. 
Among the other cities Tegea took part in the campaign, along with all the other 
Arcadian states except Mantineia who sent her troops to help the Argive5« (Thuc. 
v. 57-58). The battle never took place, probably because Agis preferred diplomacy 
than conflict at the last minute, although the Lacedaemonians and their allied army 
had surrounded the Argives. As a result a truce concluded between Argos and 
Sparta and the Lacedaemonian army returned home. (Thuc. v. 58-60). Alcibiades 
who arrived in Argos immediately after the conclusion of the truce persuaded the 
Argives to start the hostilities for one more time. The Argive army invaded
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Orchomenus and forced its people to join their alliance. Thucydides says that some 
Arcadian hostages were kept in Orchomenus, and probably these prisoners were 
Mantineian democrats who were put there by the Spartans after their conflict in 
421/20. (Thuc. v. 61). After the capture of Orchomenus the Argive alliance turned 
against Tegea, something which was proposed by the Mantineians. This decision 
made the Eleans withdraw their forces because their allies did not pay any attention 
to their interest which was the capture of Lepreum. (Thuc. v. 62). Tegea asked 
for immediate help from the Lacedaemonians, and the whole Spartan army moved 
against Argos and Mantineia for one more time. At the same tiipe the other
Arcadian cities gathered their forces in order to join Agis and his army. The two
armies met in Alesion near Mantineia. The Spartan army fought without its allies 
and won a victory which proved that they had the finest army in Greece, and ended 
the dispute over the hegemony of Peloponnesus. (Thuc. v. 65-75). Many of the 
Mantineians died in this battle and Argos was forced to conclude a peace treaty and 
alliance with Sparta. (Thuc. v. 76-80). The new Peloponnesian alliance came to 
an end, Mantineia joined for one more time the Spartan alliance and renounced her 
hegemony over the other smaller Arcadian cities. (Thuc. v. 81).
From then on we assume that the Arcadian states cooperated with Sparta and 
assisted the Peloponnesian alliance during the last stage of the war. According to 
Thucydides Mhe Arcadians, together with the Pellenians, and the Sicyonians built ten 
ships in order to contribute to the large fleet which was going to take part in the
operations in the Aegean, during the Ionia war. Although the Arcadian states
assisted Sparta during the Peloponnesian war, they did not offer their best to the 
Peloponnesian alliance. The continuous enmity between Tegea and Mantineia, the 
ambitions of Mantineia and her expansionistic policy, together with the Argive 
threat troubled the Lacedaemonians for years, and damaged the whole Peloponnesian 
alliance. This lack of unity between the Arcadian states was the most important
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reason for Arcadia’s behaviour during the Peloponnesian war, for if a confederacy 
had existed then the Arcadians could have followed the same policies and 
consequently could have offered more to both the allies and the Lacedaemonians.
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VI. ARGOS 
Argos and the Peace T reaty  of Nicias
Although Argos was not an ally of Sparta during the Peloponnesian war, its policy 
over Lacedaemon and other Peloponnesian states like Arcadia, Corinth and Elis, and 
its intention of becoming the "hegemon" of the Peloponnesians and a major power 
in Greece changed the course of the Peloponnesian war and troubled not only the 
Spartans but also the Athenians and other Greek states.
The Argive diplomacy dominated Greek politics during the years that followed the 
Peace Treaty of Nicias and proved that Sparta had to fight a difficult struggle in 
order to regain her control over Peloponnesus. Before I continue with the analysis 
of the Argive diplomacy and politics which followed the Nicias* Peace Treaty I will 
give a summary of the history of Argos during the fifth century. In 494 Cleomenes 
king of Sparta destroyed the Argive army at Sepeia. (Hdt. 6. 77-81). Although 
Cleomenes defeated the Argives he did not manage to capture the city of Argos and 
for this reason he was criticized later on by the lacedaemonians. The free male 
population of Argos was reduced after this battle, and the slaves took in their hands 
the public offices and the government of the city, but later on the Power returned 
to the next Argive generation of free citizens. Aristotle says that the Argives had 
given the power not only to the staves but also to the most capable perioikoi. (Pol. 
e*. 3, 7). The disaster at the battle of Sepeia was not as serious as the Argives 
later pretended, for only a few years later a thousand Argives fought in Aegina and 
most of them died there. (Hdt. vi. 92. 2-3). We do not know if these Argives 
were sent officially by the government of Argos or if simply they were mercenaries. 
"But it was serious enough to disrupt the Argive constitution at the time and to 
give them for years to come a plausible excuse for military inactivity." (Forrest: 
"Themistocles and Argos", C.Q, 1960). Cleomenes had killed during the battle of 
Sepeia most of the Argive democrats.
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Argos did not send any troops to help the other Greek cities during the Persian 
wars. Herodotus gives three variations of the story concerning the attitude of the 
Argives during the second Persian invasion in Greece. The first story of Herodotus 
says that Argos asked from the Spartans half of their command over the other 
Greek cities. According to the Argives, Argos had the right to be hegemon of all 
the Greek cities, but in the case of the Persian wars it could give a half of its 
hegemony to the Lacedaemonians. We will see that this belief and claim of the 
Argives continued to exist and trouble the rest of Greece until the battle of 
Mantineia (418-417). If this claim of 480’s was true then Argos does not seem to 
suffer a lot from the loss of its men in the battle of Sepeia. Otherwise how could 
a city which had suffered so much after a single battle in 494 and lost one 
thousand more men in Aegina in 490 now ask for the command of the whole Greek 
army?
According to the second story, Xerxes sent delegates to Argos asking the Argives 
to remain neutral in the forthcoming war and not to assist the other Greeks. (Hdt. 
vii. 150-151). It seems strange that Xerxes did not ask the Argives to make a 
military contribution to his army or to create unrest into Peloponnesus. Such an 
Argive assistance could harm the Peloponnesians themselves, the backbone of the 
Greek alliance.
The third variation is the most incredible one. According to this story the Argives 
had invited the Persians to come to Greece in order to regain the control over 
Peloponnesus and to eliminate the Spartan power. (Hdt. vii. 152). The first version 
of the story seems the most plausible and it seems that Argos found the opportunity 
to ask for its own benefits rather than admit inferiority to Sparta.
Until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war Argos did not follow a constant
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policy towards the other states of Peloponnesus but was always more hostile to 
Sparta and friendly to Athens. According to Kelly "As a minor state in a world 
dominated by two major powers, Athens and Sparta, Argos was not always in a 
position to determine unilaterally the nature of its foreign policy. To a large 
extencfc policy was shaped by events over which the Argives had little or no 
control." (Kelly: "Argive foreign policy in the fifth century B.C", Classical Philology, 
69, 1974, p. 81).
Probably Argos did not have the power or the influence over the other 
Peloponnesian states during these years, but its main policy always remained 
unchanged and this policy was to regain its hegemony over Peloponnesus and to 
eliminate the Spartan superpower. This policy of the Argives led to the events that 
followed the Peace Treaty of Nicias, which brought unrest and wars all over 
Peloponnesus.
Argos itself remained neutral during the Peloponnesian war but many of the states 
of the Argolid cooperated with Sparta and sent troops to several Peloponnesian 
operations; especially Hermione, Epidaurus, and Troizen.
During the year 462 Athens signed an alliance with Argos because Sparta rejected 
the Athenian help during the Helot revolt. (Thuc. i. 102). According to Gomme: 
« T0 T5 e^ew/v^v -jtoA£\4\o»s thjs phrase suggests that Argos was actually at 
war with Sparta at the time. It would be curious to speculate how different the 
course of Greek history might have been, if Athens and Argos had now vigorously 
combined to help the revolted Messenians against Sparta." (Gomme. H.C.T., i. 102).
Although Argos succeeded in joining the Athenian alliance in 462, its efforts to 
unite all Arcadia into one alliance against Sparta failed, (Hdt. iv. 35; Diod. xi. 65)
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even if some of the Arcadian states were hostile to Sparta at those times, (see also 
the chapter about the Arcadian states.) Probably during the year 451 a truce was 
signed between Sparta and Argos. (Thuc. v. 14).
•
Gomme says about Argos during the Pentecontaetia. "The dates for the important 
events in the Peloponnese at this time - the recovery of Argos and her conquest of 
Mykenai and Tity&s, the synoecism of Elis, and the struggle of Sparta for the 
hegemony ending in her victories, at Tegea and Dipaea - are quite uncertain. 
Diodor us puts the synoecism in 471-470 and the conquest of Mykenai in 468- 
467; and for all we know to the contrary these dates may be right... we may be 
sure that the condemnation of Pausanias and of Leotychidas (and the latters 
residence after exile in Tegea), and the intrigues of Themistocles when living at 
Argos (Thuc. i. 135), weakened the position of Sparta, and that she with difficulty 
won back the hegemony; but this only gives us vague indications of date. It 
perhaps suggests that 468-466 is more likely than 473-471; if so, the Helot revolt 
did not begin in 468, for Sparta did not win these victories while it was at its 
height." (Gomme. H.C.T., Vol 1, pp. 408-409).
During the second year of the Peloponnesian war the Athenians invaded 
Peloponnesus with one hundred and fifty ships. They attacked Epidaurus, Httfias, 
Troizen, and Hermione. (Thuc. ii. 56). According to Gomme Epidaurus was: 
"...the strongest city in the Argolid peninsula after Argos itself; generally at enmity 
with Argos, and so friendly to Sparta. Its capture by Perikles would not only have 
been important in itself, as a severe blow to Peloponnesian confidence, but would 
have provided a way of direct access to Argos, neutral, but at odds generally with 
the Peloponnese dominated by Spartaf (Gomme. H.C.T., ii. 56).
A very strange incident happened in 429/8. A Peloponnesian envoy was sent to the
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king of Persia asking for help against Athens. Among the ambassadors was the 
Argive Pollis who joined the other Peloponnesians without having any authority 
from Argos. The envoy was arrested by the king of Thrase Sitalces who was friend 
of Athens. (Thuc. ii. 67). The Argive Pollis obviously belonged to the oligarchic 
party which always was pro Spartan for its own political benefit. The fact that the 
Peloponnesians took with them the Argive shows two things. 1. That there were 
secret negotiations between Sparta and Argive oligarchs (as it proved later on, after 
the battle of Mantineia) with the intention to impose oligarchy in Argos and make 
the Argives to join the Spartan alliance. 2. That Argos had always close relations 
with Persia and an Argive delegator was treated as a friend by the king.
During the year 425-424 the Athenians started preparations to attack Corinth. The 
Corinthians were informed of the forthcoming invasion by some Argives. (Thuc. 
iv. 42). This event proves that the Argive oligarchs were working not only for 
Sparta but also for her allies and tried to help them in every way. The Athenians 
attacked Corinth and at the same time they invaded Troizen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. 
(Thuc. iv. 45). According to Gomme: "It would have made a considerable 
difference to the Athenian position, and to that of Argos and removed a most 
obstinate enemy. But Epidaurus resisted all attacks." (Gomme. H.C.T., iv. 45).
The Peace Treaty of Nicias
During the Year 422-421 the truce between Argos and Sparta ended. The 
Lacedaemonians were anxious to renew this truce for two reasons: 1. They were 
holding Cynouria, and did not want to give it back to Argos. 2. They were afraid 
that the Argives were going to turn against them and of course an Argos friendly 
to the Athenians was a continuous threat not only to them but also to the rest of 
their allies in Peloponnese. (Thuc. v. 14). In the meantime in March of 421 after 
ten years of continuous war Sparta and Athens signed the Peace Treaty of Nicias.
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Sparta especially wanted very much this Peace in order to recover from her latest 
misfortunes (Sphacteria - Pylos) and to restore her reputation in Greece. "No 
amount of relief and rejoining by the Spartan and Athenian signers of the Peace 
Treaty of Nicias could conceal its deficiencies. The very ratification of the peace 
revealed its tenuous and unsatisfactory character, for the Boeotians, Eleans, and 
Megarians rejected the treaty and refused to swear the oaths. (Thuc. v. 17. 2)." 
(Kagan. The Peace o f Nicias and the Sicilian expedition, p. 19). On the other hand 
the Lacedaemonians realised that the Argives did not intend to renew their truce and 
for these reasons an alliance* signed between Athens and Sparta. (Thuc. v. 22). 
With this alliance the Spartans isolated the states who refused to participate in the 
peace.
After the conclusion of the alliance, Corinth, who always wanted the renewal of the 
war against Athens, sent envoys to Argos in order to form an alliance. This newly 
formed alliance between Corinth and Argos aimed to unify the Peloponnesian states 
as a strong alliance able to challenge the Spartan hegemony in Peloponnesus. The 
real motives of the Corinthians were: 1. To continue the war against Athens in
order to get back Anactorium and Solium. 2. To threaten Sparta with the creation 
of a new league at Peloponnesus.
"What had brought these states together, each having little in common with the 
other, some even traditionally hostile, was a common belief in the desirability of 
creating a third force in the Hellenic world... The goal of Argive policy from time 
immemorial had been the hegemony of the Peloponnese. She had lost this 
hegemony to Sparta in the sixth century and had been forced thereafter to accept 
a, subordinate position. The situation in 421 seemed a golden opportunity for 
revenge. Sparta was weakened by the strain of the Archidamian war and the 
defection of her chief ally, Corinth. Moreover^ as Thucydides makes clear, the
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Argives were moved by the fact that their truce with Sparta was about to expire, 
for they saw that war was inevitable and at the same time T fo  T1£^®-w<w\/\a6oj 
A Argos, therefore, expected that the coalition would be directed against
Sparta and hoped to use Corinth for its own purposes." (Kagan: "Corinthian 
diplomacy after the Peace Treaty o f Nicias", A.J.Ph., 1960). According to Kagan^the 
tactics of Corinth were aimed to substitute Sparta with Argos, over the hegemony 
of the Peloponnesian alliance. Argos of course was in favour of this alliance and 
the Argives agreed to start negotiations with other Greek states. (Thuc. v. 27-29).
It was vital for the alliance to persuade Megara, Boeotia, and the Arcadian states 
to take part in the league. Mantineia was the first city who agreed to join in the 
new coalition. The Lacedaemonians sent an envoy to Corinth in order to persuade 
the Corinthians not to form a new alliance^but the Corinthians refused. (Thuc. v. 
30). Elis joined the new coalition because of the dispute that she had with Sparta 
over the territory of Lepreum. In the meantime Corinth signed the treaty with 
Argos as well with the states of Chalcidice. Boeotia and Megara refused to join 
the league. (Thuc. v. 31). Unfortunately for the Argives and their allies, another 
important state, Tegea, refused to join them. "Tegea was of strategic importance , 
and an essential link in the chain of states with whose aid they hoped to isolate 
Sparta. As the war later proved by the operation of 418, Tegeate fidelity would 
enable the Spartans to take the offensive against Mantineia and Argos." (Westlake: 
"Corinth and the Argive Coalition", A.J.Ph., 1940, p. 417).
The response of the Lacedaemonians to all these came almost immediately. The
Spartan army attacked Parrasia in Arcadia, defeated the Mantineian army and
destroyed the fort that the Mantineians had built there. (Thuc. v. 33).
After this, Cleoboulos and Xenares two newly elected Spartan ephors, who were
against the Peace Treaty of Nicias, persuaded the Boeotians and the Corinthian
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envoys who were in Sparta at the time, to go into Argos to conclude an alliance 
with the Argives and then to persuade them to join the Peloponnesian league. 
(Thuc. v. 36). From this we can see how much the Spartans wanted an alliance 
with Argos. They were ready to abandon their alliance with Athens in order to 
make Argos to join their own league. Of course this diplomatic trick of the 
Spartans shows that there was always a door open for the Lacedaemonians into 
Argos, as long as their oligarchic friends there wanted to cooperate with them. In 
this case the oligarchs were well informed of Sparta’s plan and two Argive 
magistrates met the Boeotian and Corinthian envoys out of Argos and proposed to 
the Boeotians to join the newly formed alliance. The Boeotians accepted the 
proposal and they promised the Argives that they were going to send delegates to 
Argos to discuss about it. (Thuc. v. 37).
During the next year (420-419) Boeotia and Sparta concluded an alliance, so the 
Argives assumed that this alliance was a part of a plan which wanted Athens to ask 
Sparta for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty in order to avoid isolation. During the 
same year negotiations started between Argos and Sparta for the conclusion of the 
Peace. (Thuc. v. 40-41). Unfortunately for the Spartans this treaty was never 
concluded, for Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to make an alliance with Argos, 
and of course when the Argives realised that the Athenians did not know anything 
about the alliance of Sparta with BoeotiaMumed to Athens concluding an alliance. 
Very soon Mantineia and Elis joined the Athenian - Argive coalition. Alcibiades 
had proved that he was a successful politician and diplomat who succeeded in 
isolating Sparta in the Peloponnesus. Thucydides in (v. 44) gives the reason that 
forced Argos to conclude an alliance with Athens: 1. Argos was a democratic state 
like Athens. 2. Athens was always friendly towards Argos. 3. Athens was a great 
power at sea, so Argos could easily avoid any isolation if the Athenian triremes 
continued to control the Aegean sea. 4. Athens could offer military assistance to
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Argos in a case of war against Sparta.
Although Corinth was an ally of Argos, she refused to take part in the alliance with 
Athens, and turned once again to the Spartan coalition.
The first operation of the newly formed alliance took place the year 419-418. 
Athens and Argos tried to persuade Epidaurus to join their league. The Athenians 
believed that if Epidaurus concluded a treaty with them then Corinth could be 
isolated and remain neutral, and on the other hand the Athenian army could have 
an easy access to the island of Aegina. Epidaurus refused the Argive offer and 
Argos invaded the region of Epidauria in an effort to capture the city. Sparta’s 
help to Epidauria arrived as always late, but Argos succeeded only in devastating 
a part of the Epidaurian country side. Although the war lasted for the whole winter 
no major battle took place. (Thuc. v. 53-56).
During the next year (418-417) the whole Spartan army, followed by forces from 
Tegea, marched against Argos. Sparta had realised that it was time for action since 
her hegemony over Peloponnesus was in danger. Corinth sent two thousand 
hoplites, Boeotia five thousand hoplites, five hundred cavalry, and a force of 500 
light infantry, Phlius contributed all her forces. (Ihuc. v. 57). A huge army was 
under the commands of king Agis who led his forces out of Argos using some 
clever military manoeuvres. Mantineia had sent help to the Argives, and Elis 
contributed 3,000 hoplites, but the Athenian cavalry had not arrived yet when the 
Lacedaemonian army surrounded the army of Argos. (Thuc. v. 58-60). "The 
Argives were arrayed to meet him and all was in readiness for a great conflict; the 
armies had all but made contact when a remarkable event took place. Two 
Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five strategoi, and Alkephron, proxenos of the 
Spartans^ came forward to Agis asking him to avoid battle. They offered, as
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Thucydides tells us, to put to arbitration any grievances the Spartans might have 
against them and to make a treaty as well. Agis accepted the offer, struck a four 
month’s truce with the Argives, and led his army homeward. The batde never took 
place." (Kagan: "Argive Politics and Policy after the Peace o f Nicias", Classical 
Philology, 1962, p. 209).
The most plausible explanation for this incident is that the Argive generals tried to 
avoid the battle for political reasons. The Argive oligarchs were always pro 
Spartans and they knew that they could gain control over Argos* politics only with 
the help of the Lacedaemonians. Avoiding this battle they were hoping that they 
could manage to persuade the people of Argos that they had saved the Argive army 
from destruction, as it was surrounded by the Peloponnesian forces. But this trick 
did not work and the Argive people blamed the two generals for the truce.
This truce did not last for long because Alcibiades who had come into Argos 
persuaded the Argives to renew their hostilities against the Lacedaemonians and 
their allies. (Thuc. v. 61).
The first operation of the allies was against Orchomenus. The Arcadian city was 
captured easily and joined the alliance. (Thuc. v. 61). After the capture of 
Orchomenus the alliance invaded Tegea after a proposal of Mantineia^ - but this 
attack made Elis to withdraw her forces because the allies did not follow her 
proposal, to attack Lepreum. (Thuc. v. 62).
At the same time Sparta was gathering her army in order to respond to Tegea*s 
appeal for help. (Thuc. v. 63-64). The battle of Mantineia which followed proved 
Sparta’s superiority on land and restored her name throughout Greece. Agis with 
the Lacedaemonian and the Arcadian army won a decisive victory of major
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importance and destroyed in one day Argos* ambitions and beliefs for an hegemony 
over Peloponnesus. The Argive army proved not strong enough to defeat the 
Spartan phalanxes, and the alliance was finally defeated. (Thuc. v. 65-75).
As a result o f this battle Sparta and Argos signed a peace treaty and an alliance for 
fifty years. (Thuc. v. 76-80). At last Sparta had made Argos join the 
Peloponnesian league. After the Spartan victory at Mantineia the Argive oligarchs 
took the control over Argos and the same happened to Sikyon. (Thuc. v. 81). 
The one thousand aristocrats who were the elite corps of Argos were used by the 
Oligarchs in order to impose their own policy upon Argos. The secret negotiations 
between the Argive oligarchs and the Spartans at last proved successful, but 
unfortunately for the Lacedaemonians, the oligarchic government of Argos did not 
last for a long time. The next year (417-416) the Argive democrats overthrew* the 
oligarchs and turned the city for one more time to Athens. The Argive people 
started to built/ Long Walls in an effort to protect the city from the Spartan 
invasions, but Sparta attacked Argos for one more time and destroyed its Long 
Walls. (Thuc. v. 83).
Argos played a very important role during the years that followed the Peace Treaty 
of Nicias, for it became the city which could unite the Peloponnesian states under 
one alliance and be, therefore, strong enough to challenge the Spartan superiority 
in the region. Unfortunately for the Argives their ambitions never came true, for 
in reality Corinth, the most important member of this alliance, did not want to 
abandon Sparta. Corinth used Argos and the whole of the alliance in order to 
blackmail Sparta to renew the war with Athens. On the other hand the Argives 
believed that, with the help of Corinth and other states of Peloponnesus, they could 
gain the hegemony of Peloponnesus. They were wrong, for their real role was to 
create the impression that they were able to confront Sparta. By this way Sparta
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was going to realise that her hegemony could be in question and that decisive 
actions would have to be taken if she wanted to restore her prestige and influence 
over Peloponnesus. The Argives on the other hand, coming unharmed out of the 
Archidamian war anxious to play a role in Peloponnesus since they believed 
Sparta had come out of the war weaker than ever. The Corinthians^who were fully 
aware of the Argive ambitions, decided to use Argos in order to press Sparta. They 
persuaded Argos to create an alliance with other cities of Peloponnesus, and to 
challenge Sparta. When the democracy of Argos concluded an alliance with 
Athens, Corinth turned away and finally the Athenians, together with the Argives, 
and the other members of their alliance, were defeated in the batde of Mantineia. 
This Spartan victory marked the success of the Corinthian odds again, the Treaty 
of Nicias was not going to last very long, and the Peloponnesian alliance was ready 
to renew the military operations against Athens.
Argos had no place in this plan. The Argives finally were abandoned by the most 
powerful member of the alliance, Corinth, and were defeated in a single battle. It 
is very probable that the oligarchs of Argos played their role in the whole story, 
cooperating with Sparta or Corinth. Whatever the truth was^Mantineia. and Elis 
finally forgot all their ambitions and jo ined  Sparta in the Peloponnesian alliance, 
and Argos abandoned its plans for an hegemony over Peloponnesus.
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The Peloponnesian war ended in 404 with the complete defeat of the Athenians and 
the capture of their city. Although Thebes and Corinth demanded that Athens 
should be destroyed, the Spartans who had the final word, decided that a city like 
Athens, once friendly and cooperative, should not be wasted. According to the 
Lacedaemonian terms Athens had to pull down her Long Walls and to surrender her 
fleet (or what was left from her fleet) except twelve ships. After 27 years of 
consecutive war at last the Athenian Empire collapsed. Sparta and her allies finally 
won the costly war which ravaged Greece for so long a time. No city alone bears 
the full responsibility for the opening of the war, for each one was trying to serve 
its own interests during very unstable times.
After the Persian wars Athens changed rapidly to a powerful, rich and imperialistic 
\ state whose aim was to become the greatest power in Mediterranean. (Thuc. vi.
90).
i
i|
The power and ambitions of the Athenians gradually became a threat for the allies 
of Sparta, and finally alarmed the Lacedaemonians themselves who saw their 
hegemony to be in danger.
It is true that it was the allies of Sparta, and especially Corinth who wanted to take 
drastic measures against Athens in order to stop her expansion.
Corinth, like many other states who belonged to the Peloponnesian alliance, had 
realised that she was not safe at all because of Athens’ policies and tactics, and that 
the only and final means to resist the Athenian storm was a major war in Greece. 
Sparta, on the other hand^was not so willing to follow her allies in any actions that 
could risk her power, and the stability in the Peloponnesus in general, so she 
preferred not to take part in any operations that could damage her relations with
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Athens like the Corcyraenhand the Potidaentoaffairs.
It is clear from Thucydides’ narrative tha^although Sparta was annoyed by Athens’ 
actions, her decision to declare war against Athens came after the continuous 
demands of her allies who wanted Sparta to act as the liberators of the whole of 
Greece from the ambitious Athenians.
During the 27 years of the war, Sparta had been proved several times unwilling to 
follow her allies’ desires and plans and in some cases - like the period that 
followed the Peace Treaty of Nicias - secret negotiations, and diplomacy had to be 
used in order to bring Sparta back to the offensive.
Of course no one can support the view that Sparta had no responsibility for the
Peloponnesian war, but I think that we should accept that Sparta was forced, in a 
way, to take action against Athens, for the Athenians did not threaten Sparta herself,
but some of her allies who finally brought the issue to the Peloponnesian League.
Sparta took the decision to attack Athens only when she saw that her most 
important allies were ready to abandon her in order to find another state which 
could offer them protection, and the fact that the Lacedaemonian hegemony over 
Peloponnesus was at risk, finally persuaded the Spartans to take arms against Athens 
and only then Sparta decided to stop the Athenians. Sparta’s allies, on the other 
hand, who could feel the Athenian danger, had realised that they should take their 
measures in order to protect their interests. Corinth saw her plans for hegemony 
over the Ionian ' o destroyed because of Athens interference in the region, 
Megara had to face economic destruction because of Athens* embargo, and Boeotia 
became one of the most bitter enemies of Athens after her defeat at Oenophyta in 
457. According to them Athens should be stopped as soon as possible before it 
was too late, and the only way to succeed in that was to move their alliance against
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Athens.
We can not say that all the allies of Sparta offered their best during the whole 
Peloponnesian war, for the war lasted for a very long period and most of the 
members (if not all) o f the Peloponnesian alliance faced many problems (political, 
economic, etc.), during its twenty seven years.
For some cities - like Megara, Ambracia, Potidaea, or Melos - the war proved to 
be a destruction, for they suffered a lot basically because they had miscalculated the 
real Athenian power.
Some other allies of Sparta - like Corinth^were more lucky for they managed finally 
to eliminate the Athenian threat, but on the other hand the destructive war brought 
an end to any ambitious plans they might have, for becoming major powers, before
VY\ o s 4 ~
431. Thebes was the city who gained i  ^  from the war, for she had
strengthened her political power inside Boeotia, and finally became the most 
dominant city in the region.
I am not sure that the allies of Sparta would have been very willing to confront 
Athens, if they had known that the war was going to last for so long. The Peace 
Treaty of Nicias - which actually marked only a very short period of true peace - 
seems like the only chance the two opponents had to stop the war before
it was too late. This chance was lost mostly because of the Corinthians, who found 
themselves among the losers of the treaty, after ten years of continuous fighting, 
although they were the ones who believed in a quick and easy victory in 431.
Athens on the other hand, proved to be a very difficult opponent for her resistance 
lasted for 27 consecutive years, and even during this period the Athenians never
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abandoned their expansionistic plans which finally brought destruction to the city. 
If the Athenians had not decided to attack Sicily5then the war could have ended in 
a different way, for Sparta and her allies were not able to harm Athens seriously 
in mainland Greece and especially in the Aegean Sea. During the final stage of the 
war in Ionia Sparta’s allies were exhausted from the continuous clashes, and 
even the enthusiastic Corinthians or the aggressive Boeotians decided to stay back 
and wait for Athens’ end to come. Although the members of the Peloponnesian 
alliance came victoriously out of the Peloponnesian war>it was Sparta alone that 
gained much from this victory, for she replaced Athens in the role of the 
hegemon of Greece, and she continued Athens’ expansionistic policy to the East. 
Sparta’s allies exhausted by the misfortunes of such a devastating war finally 
realised that^although they tried hard to avoid the Athenian threat, their victory did 
not change many things in the Greek world, and several years later most of them 
had to face the Spartan phalanxes in their struggle against the new hegemon of 
Greece.
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